1,721,265 research outputs found
Steven J. Brams: Negotiation Games. Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration
No full textSteven J. Brams: Negotiation Games. Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration. 1st
revised ed. Routledge, London 2003, 26 + 297 s., ISBN 0-415-30895-X
Steven J. Brams, Superior Beings : if they exist, how would we know ? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility, 1983
No full textBarbotin Edmond. Steven J. Brams, Superior Beings : if they exist, how would we know ? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility, 1983. In: Revue des Sciences Religieuses, tome 61, fascicule 1-2, 1987. p. 99
Steven J. Brams, Superior Beings : if they exist, how would we know ? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility, 1983
No full textBarbotin Edmond. Steven J. Brams, Superior Beings : if they exist, how would we know ? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility, 1983. In: Revue des Sciences Religieuses, tome 61, fascicule 1-2, 1987. p. 99
Theory of Moves
No full textSteven J. Brams' Theory of Moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, it extends the strategic analysis of conflicts into the more distant future. It elucidates the role that different kinds of power - moving, order and threat - may have on conflict outcomes, and it also shows how misinformation affects player choices. Applied to a series of cases drawn from politics, economics, sociology, fiction and the Bible, the theory provides not only a parsimonious explanation of their outcomes, but also shows why they unfolded as they did. This book, which assumes no prior knowledge of game theory or special mathematical background, will be of interest to scholars and students throughout the social sciences.</jats:p
Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited
Get PDFProcedures to divide a cake among n people with n-1 cuts (the minimum number) are analyzed and compared. For 2 persons, cut-and-choose, while envy-free and efficient, limits the cutter to exactly 50% if he or she is ignorant of the chooser's preferences, whereas the chooser can generally obtain more. By comparison, a new 2-person surplus procedure (SP'), which induces the players to be truthful in order to maximize their minimum allocations, leads to a proportionally equitable division of the surplus - the part that remains after each player receives 50% - by giving each person a certain proportion of the surplus as he or she values it.
For n geq 3 persons, a new equitable procedure (EP) yields a maximally equitable division of a cake. This division gives all players the highest common value that they can achieve and induces truthfulness, but it may not be envy-free. The applicability of SP' and EP to the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good, like land, is briefly discussed
Tieteestä apua riitojen sovitteluun
Get PDFSteven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor: The Win-Win
Solution. Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. New
York 1999. W.W. Norton, 177 s
Fair division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution - Brams,SJ, Taylor,AD
No full textItem does not contain fulltextBoekbespreking van: Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor ; Fair Division : From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996. ISBN 978052155644
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Get PDFPolitical parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each others' preferences, we show that it may not be rational for them to act sincerely by choosing their most-preferred ministry that is available. One consequence of acting sophisticatedly is that the resulting allocation may not be Pareto-optimal, making all the parties worse off. Another is nonmonotonicty—choosing earlier may hurt rather than help a party. We introduce a mechanism that combines sequential choices with a structured form of trading that results in sincere choices for two parties. Although there are difficulties in extending this mechanism to more than two parties, other approaches are explored, such as permitting parties to making consecutive choices not prescribed by an apportionment method. But certain problems, such as eliminating envy, remain.Proportional Representation, apportionment, divisor methods, Sincere and Sophisticated Choices, Envy Free Allocations, Sports Drafts
ТЕОРЕТИКО-ИГРОВОЕ ВВЕДЕНИЕ В ВИЗАНТИЙСКОЕ БОГОСЛОВИЕ
Get PDFThe paper provides an overview of the most famous game-theoretic representation of biblical history, developed by Steven J. Brams and dedicated to the analysis of classical theological issues of the bibli-cal tradition in terms of game theory. The possible ways of applying such an approach to the analysis of logical components of Byzantine theology are outlined in this context.В статье представлен обзор одного из главных на данный момент теоретико-игрового иссле-дования библейской истории, проведенного Стивеном Брамсом (Steven J. Brams) и посвящен-ного анализу классических теологических вопросов иудео-христианской библейской тради-ции в свете теории игр, а также очерчены возможные перспективы применения такого под-хода к анализу логического компонента в византийском богословии
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