1,720,993 research outputs found
Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
Full text linkAbreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio. (1984). Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/2329
Bayesian implementation in transferable utility environments, and other essays in microeconomic theory.
No full textThe dissertation is comprised of three distinct papers, linked primarily by their common basis in game theoretic modeling techniques. The aim of Chapter 1 is to characterize the set of implementable social choice rules in environments of incomplete information where utility is transferable. When agents' private information is distributed independently, a simple condition labeled positive association is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for implementation. In fact, it is shown that well-known incentive compatibility conditions (which guarantee a weak form of implementability) are almost sufficient for strong implementation as well. These results echo those derived by Matsushima [33], but extend that work in two important respects. First, the analysis is extended beyond the traditional expected utility framework in which Matsushima operates. Second, a representation theorem is provided for those social choice rules that satisfy positive association. In Chapter 2, sufficient conditions are identified for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in a broad class of games of strategic substitutability. By utilizing lattice programming techniques, the role of these sufficient conditions is made transparent: the conditions ensure unique best responses and impose upper and lower bounds on the slopes of best response functions. The uniqueness result is applied to a series of quantity competition models. In the standard, homogeneous product model of Cournot, the sufficient conditions are shown to be a generalization of those identified by Gaudet and Salant (1991) and Long and Soubeyran (2000). New results are derived for models of quantity competition when firms produce differentiated products, and when firms compete simultaneously in multiple markets. Chapter 3 introduces a repeated game-theoretic model to establish a potentially efficiency enhancing role of the labor union. In a world in which employment contracts are incomplete, it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements. By monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers, the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm's adherence to these implicit agreements. Thus, the union provides a signaling mechanism which allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract. This mechanism enhances the firm's credibility when forming employment contracts, and facilitates increased employment levels.PhDEconomic theorySocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/125478/2/3016865.pd
Essays on asset markets in international economics: Human capital and foreign exchange.
No full textThis dissertation consists of three essays that examine issues in international asset markets for human capital and foreign exchange in the context of models of representative agents with optimizing behavior. The response of the relative wages of skilled workers to shocks in the terms of trade is examined in the context of a small, open economy with a comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods. It is shown that the long-run response of the relative wage will be smaller than the initial response to a real exchange rate shock. Impulse response functions are estimated for data from the United States and some support is found for the hypothesis that relative wages display overshooting behavior in response to real exchange rate shocks. Next, the divergence in growth rates of economies is examined in the context of a two sector growth model with physical capital and human capital. It is shown that when there are positive externalities in human capital production associated with the skill level in the economy, divergence in growth rates can occur and that government policy can potentially boost economic growth. Third, the observed forward premium puzzle in foreign exchange markets is shown to be consistent with the uncovered interest parity condition. A simultaneous equation system describing a small open economy with an active monetary policy regime is set up to show that the single equation test of the unbiasedness hypothesis may be inappropriate. Markov regime-switching estimates and tests are conducted for data from the dollar-yen and dollar-deutschemark markets at monthly frequency. The evidence supports the existence of two regimes in both markets marked by different volatilities, and by regime-shift dates that can be identified with shifts in monetary policy. The coefficient estimates for the relation between the forward premium and next-period change in the spot exchange rate are more precise in the low-volatility regimes.PhDEconomicsSocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/132002/2/9938536.pd
Analysis of a Dynamic, Decentralized Exchange Economy
No full textA dynamic exchange economy model is presented. Similarly to the Walrasian equilibrium problem, each consumer is characterized by a feasible set and by an instantaneous demand function, that depends on the price vector, time, and the commodity holding. The commodity holding of each consumer varies according to his instantaneous demand function at each moment. We show that the market can choose prices that will lead the commodity holding of each consumer to remain in his consumption set while the aggregate commodity holding satisfies the scarcity constraints of the market.Stacchetti, Ennio. (1984). Analysis of a Dynamic, Decentralized Exchange Economy. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/5035
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals
Full text linkIn a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income, which the government would like to "flatten" ex post. Self-enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution. We investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem, and show that in the constrained-optimal equilibrium, usually a linear tax schedule is imposed. This remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100989/1/ECON430.pd
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