1,721,029 research outputs found
Inspection Intensity and Market Structure
Full text linkwww.card.iastate.edu Stéphan Marette is with UMR Economie publique INRA-INAPG, Paris, and is a visiting scholar in the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University. This paper is available online on the CARD Web site: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the authors. Questions or comments about the contents of this paper should be directed to Stéphan Marette, 560
Accounting for "Quality" in Economics
No full textCfp for a special issue of Œconomia Editors of the Special IssueSpencer Banzhaf (North Carolina State University)Christian Bessy (IDHES, École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay)Erwin Dekker (Mercatus Center, George Mason University)Julien Gradoz (CLERSÉ, Université de Lille)Jean-Sébastien Lenfant (PRISM, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)Stéphan Marette (INRAE, AgroParisTech)Ever since the marginalist revolution, economics has developed as the study of equilibria in various market structure..
Consumer confusion and multiple equilibria
Full text linkThis paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible certification systems for signalling quality. It is shown that the presence of confused consumers leads to the emergence of multiple stable equilibria, in which either all firms select the credible certification or all firms select the non-credible certification. A situation with numerous confused consumers is characterized by the complete absence of credible certification.Quality, certification
The Collective-Quality Promotion in the Agribusiness Sector: An Overview
No full textThis paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.collective-quality promotion, labeling, marketing organization, quality signals.
Politique de la concurrence et secteur agro-alimentaire dans l’Union européenne
Full text linkLe secteur agro-alimentaire dans l'Union européenne (UE) se caractérise par la coexistence d'entreprises agricoles de taille relativement modeste et de firmes de grande taille pour l'industrie en amont (industrie fournissant les intrants) et en aval (industrie de transformation, grande distribution). Cette taille modeste des exploitations agricoles par rapport à leur aval et à leur amont peut être défavorable à un partage équilibré de la valeur ajoutée entre les différents maillons des filières agro-alimentaires, dans la mesure où ce partage dépend des pouvoirs de marché et de négociation des uns et des autres. L'Unité mixte de recherche Economie publique INRA-INAPG a analysé comment la politique de la concurrence s'exerce dans le secteur agro-alimentaire européen. Cet article de synthèse a pour objectif de présenter les grandes lignes de cette politique pour les marchés de l'agro-alimentaire dans l'UE. Les principes économiques et juridiques sont brièvement rappelés, avant d'étudier les principales décisions françaises et européennes.
Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, The
No full textThis paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers' cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.cost of regulation, information, standard.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
The Labels in Agriculture, Their Impact on Trade and the Scope for International Policy Action
No full textInspection Intensity and Market Structure
No full textAn investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.inspection policies, market regulation, regulatory funding.
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