1,721,049 research outputs found
Genetic Discrimination
Get PDFSpaak, Torben. (2006). Genetic Discrimination. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/155979
The Authoritative Intention Thesis
No full textJoseph Raz defends the authoritative intention thesis, which has it that to the extent that law derives from deliberate law-making, its interpretation should reflect the intention of the law-maker. The idea is that as a matter of conceptual necessity, if one follows legislation, then one interprets the relevant piece of legislation in such a way that it reflects the intention of the law-maker. Raz’s position, then, is that legal content (as well as form) that is the result of deliberate law-making is necessarily communicated content. While I find the authoritative intention thesis appealing, I do not find the arguments that Raz adduces in support of the thesis persuasive. Raz adduces two main arguments in support of the thesis, which I shall refer to as the no-prediction argument and the argument from authority, as well as a third, highly condensed argument, which he mentions in passing in a discussion of another question; and all three arguments involve the assumption that as a matter of conceptual necessity, law aims to function as an authority, and the claims that legal directives that are not interpreted in accordance with the law-maker’s intention, will, strictly speaking, not be the law-maker’s directives, and that this in turn means that the law-maker cannot be in control of the process of legislation and can consequently not function as an authority. As I try to show, all three arguments fail, though in different ways.
Reasons Holism and the Shared View of Precedent
No full text Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.
Realizm prawniczy i rodzaje funkcjonalne. Metafizycznie redukcjonistyczny naturalizm Michaela Moore’a
No full textMichael Moore defends an account of scientific, mental, moral, and legal properties, according to which there are not only natural kinds, but also moral and functional kinds; and he maintains, more specifically that: 1) distinctively legal phenomena, such as legal rights, precedent, malice, etc. are functional kinds, in the sense that they have a nature that consists in the function they fulfill in law, 2) the function of a functional kind is that effect, or those effects, of the functional kind that causally contribute more than does any of its other effects to the goal of the larger system within which it occurs, and 3) functional kinds can be reduced to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, 4) the relevant version of naturalism is metaphysically reductionist naturalism, and 5) functional kinds play an indispensable role in the explanation of human behaviour.
I argue, however, 1) that the method for determining the function of a (purported) functional kind proposed by Moore is too indeterminate to be able to pin down the function. I also argue 2) that it turns out to be very difficult to identify the properties that are part of the indefinitely large disjunction of natural properties which, on Moore’s analysis, is identical to a functional kind, 3) that functional kinds cannot be part of the best explanation of human behaviour, because they lack nomological unity, and that they lack such unity because they are necessarily multiply realizable, and 4) that Moore will therefore have to give up: a) the view that functional kinds are identical to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, b) the view that functional kinds are part of the best explanation of human behaviour, or both (a and b). I also argue 5) that the idea of a functional kind should not play a central role in any theory of law or legal reasoning.Michael Moore broni ujęcia własności naukowych, umysłowych, moralnych i prawnych, zgodnie z którym istnieją nie tylko rodzaje naturalne, ale także rodzaje moralne i funkcjonalne; a dokładniej utrzymuje, że: 1) zjawiska wyraźnie prawne, takie jak prawa (legal rights), precedens, zła wola itp. są rodzajami funkcjonalnymi w tym sensie, że ich natura polega na funkcji, jaką pełnią w prawie, 2) funkcją rodzaju funkcjonalnego jest ten skutek lub te skutki rodzaju funkcjonalnego, które przyczyniają się bardziej niż jakikolwiek inny skutek do osiągnięcia celu większego systemu, w którym występują, 3) rodzaje funkcjonalne można zredukować do nieokreślenie dużych dysjunkcji własności naturalnych, 4) właściwą wersją naturalizmu jest metafizycznie redukcjonistyczny naturalizm, oraz 5) rodzaje funkcjonalne odgrywają niezbędną rolę w wyjaśnianiu ludzkiego zachowania.
Twierdzę jednak, 1) że metoda określania funkcji (rzekomego) rodzaju funkcjonalnego zaproponowana przez Moore’a jest zbyt nieokreślona, by można było tę funkcję ustalić. Twierdzę również, 2) że bardzo trudno jest zidentyfikować własności, które są częścią nieokreślenie dużej dysjunkcji własności naturalnych, która w analizie Moore’a jest tożsama z rodzajem funkcjonalnym, 3) że rodzaje funkcjonalne nie mogą być częścią najlepszego wyjaśnienia ludzkiego zachowania, ponieważ brakuje im jedności nomologicznej, a brakuje im takiej jedności, ponieważ są z konieczności realizowane na różne sposoby, oraz 4) że Moore będzie musiał w związku z tym zrezygnować: a) z poglądu, że rodzaje funkcyjne są identyczne z nieokreślenie dużymi dysjunkcjami naturalnych własności, b) z poglądu, że rodzaje funkcyjne są częścią najlepszego wyjaśnienia ludzkiego zachowania, lub z obu (a i b). Twierdzę również, 5) że idea rodzaju funkcjonalnego nie powinna odgrywać centralnej roli w żadnej teorii prawa czy rozumowania prawniczego. [tłumaczenie Redakcja
The Canberra Plan and the Nature of Law
No full textIn this article, I shall consider a method for conceptual analysis which has been called the Canberra Plan and which might perhaps be conceived as an alternative approach to conceptual analysis in the classical sense. The Canberra Plan is not, however, aimed primarily at the elucidation of the relevant concept, but at the metaphysical question of identifying the descriptive (or natural or physical) property that corresponds to the concept.[1] The idea of the Canberra Plan is, more specifically, (a) to clarify the import of the concept by reference to the role the concept plays in a network of concepts, principles, and claims, and (b) to investigate and see what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept thus analyzed. What I want to do in this article, then, is first to introduce the Canberra Plan and give some consideration to its advantages and disadvantages and, secondly, to apply it to the concept of law, in order not only to clarify the import of this concept, but also to find out what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept. The question of what descriptive property, if any, corresponds to the concept of law should be of considerable interest to jurisprudents, not only because the meta-ethical question of whether legal properties are descriptive, or even natural or physical, is generally interesting, but also because the existence of such descriptive (or natural or physical) legal properties is precisely what is asserted by legal positivists through the so-called social thesis, which has it that we determine what the law is using factual criteria. That is to say, if the analyst succeeds in establishing that the property of being law is a descriptive property, he would seem to have offered at least some support for the social thesis of legal positivism and, therefore, for legal positivism. In order to investigate this interesting question, I shall carry out a Canberra-style analysis of the concept of law, and I shall argue, tentatively, (1) that X is law if, and only if, (i) X is a relation between (a) a system of norms all of which can be traced back to one of several recognized sources of law that can be handled on the basis of exclusively factual considerations, and (b) an organization that is constituted and regulated by the norms of the system and whose task it is to interpret and apply these norms, (ii) X aspires to regulate social life in general, (iii) X is non-optional, and (iv) X claims to trump competing normative systems. In addition, I shall argue, equally tentatively, (2a) that the property of being law is precisely the descriptive property that satisfies the conditions (i)-(iv), (2b) that this property is a role property, not a realizer property, and (2c) that there is very little to be said about the legal realizer property on a general level and that the legal realizer property differs in this regard from moral and mental realizer properties. I shall, however, also argue (3a) that the analyst who applies the Canberra Plan to the concept of law will almost certainly find it very difficult to come up with a collection of sufficiently rich analytic platitudes, especially what Frank Jackson calls input and output clauses, (3b) that he is not likely to get much help from the idea of mature legal thinking (introduced here as an analog to Jackson’s idea of mature folk morality), and (3c) that the so-called permutation problem, which is very problematic, will arise as a result of the above-mentioned lack of input and output clauses. And I shall therefore argue (4) that, as things stand, the Canberra Plan will not help us clarify the nature of law or lend support to the strong social thesis of legal positivism
Alf Ross on the Concept of a Legal Right
No full textIn this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound
Robert Alexy's Legal Constitutivism
No full textIn this chapter, I discuss Robert Alexy's dual-nature theory of law conceived as a version of legal constitutivism. Alexy argues (i) that legal acts necessarily raise a claim to correctness; (ii) that it follows from law's raising a claim to correctness that law has a dual nature; (iii) that the dual nature of law implies that legal acts that do not raise a claim to correctness, or raise one but fail to satisfy it, will lack legal character or else will be legally defective; (iv) that the dual nature of law is incompatible with the separation thesis of legal positivism; and (v) that it follows from law's dual nature that legal argumentation is a special case of general practical argumentation. Spaak argues, however, (A) that even if in some sense legal acts necessarily raise a claim to correctness, it does not follow that law has a dual nature; (B) that even if it did follow that law has a dual nature, it would not follow (i) that the separation thesis of legal positivism was false, or (ii) that legal argumentation was a special case of general practical argumentation; and (C) that this in turn suggests that constitutivists about practical reason are fighting an uphill battle.--
Bulygin’s Analytical Legal Positivism
No full textIn this chapter, I present a set of theses that outline the main traits of Bulygin's conception of legal positivism. Eugenio Bulygin is a prominent example of a positivist legal theorist. His intellectual contribution to this field is a rich and sophisticated corpus of ideas that shows the strength of the positivist methodology among legal scholars in the Latin world. The specific way Bulygin understands legal positivism has been highly influential among Spanish, Italian and Latin American researchers and gave rise to a research programme that still has a strong vitality. In many aspects, his approach is at odds with the current dominant tendency within legal positivism. The goal of this chapter is to show some of these differences.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentin
Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory : The Case of Gustav Radbruch
No full textThe received view among legal theorists has been that Gustav Radbruch’s post-war standpoint was that law and morality are conceptually connected, and that therefore laws that are intolerably unjust are flawed law and must yield to justice; whereas Radbruch’s pre-war stance had been that of a legal positivist and a moral relativist. But recently Stanley Paulson has challenged the received view, arguing that Radbruch really wasn’t a legal positivist before the war, and that Radbruch’s pre-war analysis is actually compatible, indeed continuous, with the post-war analysis. In this article, I argue that Radbruch’s pre- and post-war analyses are indeed incompatible, because they involve incompatible claims about the existence of a conceptual connection between law and morality. I also argue that the pre-war analysis is to be preferred to the post-war analysis. For whereas the pre-war analysis presupposes meta-ethical relativism, the post-war analysis presupposes moral objectivism, and meta-ethical relativism, but not moral objectivism, is a defensible meta-ethical theory.Relativism i rättsvetenskape
Karl Olivecrona on Judicial Law-Making
No full textKarl Olivecrona maintains that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explains, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. I am not convinced by Olivecrona’s analysis, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term ‘evaluation’ in a broad enough sense to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and that therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide a case is false. I begin with a consideration of the structure of Olivecrona’s argumentation in support of the claim that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case (Section 2), adding a few words about the distinction between law application and judicial law-making (Section 3). I then consider Olivecrona’s tacit assumption that the occurrence of non-objective judicial evaluations must lead to judicial law-making (Section 4), the central claim that courts must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case (Section 5), and Olivecrona’s meta-ethics (Section 6). Having done that, I consider and reject an alternative interpretation of Olivecrona’s confusing ideas about evaluations (Section 7). I state my conclusions in Section 8.Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy: a Critical Appraisa
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