95 research outputs found
Online programming markets
No full textMany of the mechanisms that exist offline and ensure that an interaction between people runs smoothly are not available in online interactions. A large shadow of the future cannot easily be guaranteed, for example: who knows whether you are going to deal with the people in this online help forum again, whether you will be buying from the same online reseller again. In addition, because the interacting partners can be geographically dispersed it is often impossible to sanction a partner who has misbehaved toward you, even if you manage to discover that individual's real world identity. In the absence of such mechanisms, interactions online tend to reduce to single-shot social dilemmas with high risk of opportunistic behavior and, as a result, a high risk of a possible breakdown in such potentially profitable interactions.1 Reputation systems, used by online auction sites such as eBay but also by other sites such as Amazon or Yahoo, provide one mechanism to potentially increase trust between interacting partners online. The lack of trust that can arise because of the online setting might be compensated for when both partners can judge the trustworthiness and capabilities of the other through their reputation. Many of us recognize such a reputation system in eBay. When you have bought or sold something on eBay, both buyer and seller get the opportunity to leave a feedback score (on eBay this is either a +1, 0, or -1) and a brief comment about the business partner. One's total score and the comments are made public and are available to all other buyers and sellers to see. The underlying idea is, of course, that buyers and sellers value their reputations, find it worthwhile to invest in them, and abstain from the opportunistic behavior (such as selling junk or refusing to pay) that they might otherwise be tempted to engage in. Although sites differ in the details of the reputation system they use, most of the larger sites that use reputation systems tend to follow a procedure similar to the one used by eBay. Several studies have tried to assess whether reputation systems might work, and under what circumstances. Virtually all empirical studies focus on two dependent variables: the probability of sale and the selling price. Strangely enough, the empirical evidence in favor of reputation systems as a safeguard against opportunistic behavior is not that overwhelming. Some researchers have found no positive effects of a good reputation on probability of sale and selling price, and others have found statistically significant but substantially insignificant effects. Only a handful of researchers have found substantial effects in the expected direction-for instance, a positive correlation between the reputation score of a seller on eBay and the selling price of the product (which we cover briefly in the next section). This general lack of empirical support, combined with the current boom in online interaction, poses a tantalizing problem, part of which we hope to resolve in this chapter. As we argue, eBay data pose several problems to adequately testing effects of reputation when one considers probability of sale and selling price as the dependent variable. Moreover, what is critical but generally neglected is that arguments center on how much buyers would be willing to pay extra for a product from a seller with a good reputation, rather than on how much extra they might have to pay for that good. The latter depends on many often unmeasured factors, such as market conditions, which makes using the actual selling price as the dependent variable a poor proxy of what we should measure-the willingness to pay extra for an additional unit of reputation. We show that when you look in an online context where these problems of data quality and availability are less severe, the positive effect of reputation on the willingness to pay does indeed surface.</p
Online programming markets
No full textMany of the mechanisms that exist offline and ensure that an interaction between people runs smoothly are not available in online interactions. A large shadow of the future cannot easily be guaranteed, for example: who knows whether you are going to deal with the people in this online help forum again, whether you will be buying from the same online reseller again. In addition, because the interacting partners can be geographically dispersed it is often impossible to sanction a partner who has misbehaved toward you, even if you manage to discover that individual's real world identity. In the absence of such mechanisms, interactions online tend to reduce to single-shot social dilemmas with high risk of opportunistic behavior and, as a result, a high risk of a possible breakdown in such potentially profitable interactions.1 Reputation systems, used by online auction sites such as eBay but also by other sites such as Amazon or Yahoo, provide one mechanism to potentially increase trust between interacting partners online. The lack of trust that can arise because of the online setting might be compensated for when both partners can judge the trustworthiness and capabilities of the other through their reputation. Many of us recognize such a reputation system in eBay. When you have bought or sold something on eBay, both buyer and seller get the opportunity to leave a feedback score (on eBay this is either a +1, 0, or -1) and a brief comment about the business partner. One's total score and the comments are made public and are available to all other buyers and sellers to see. The underlying idea is, of course, that buyers and sellers value their reputations, find it worthwhile to invest in them, and abstain from the opportunistic behavior (such as selling junk or refusing to pay) that they might otherwise be tempted to engage in. Although sites differ in the details of the reputation system they use, most of the larger sites that use reputation systems tend to follow a procedure similar to the one used by eBay. Several studies have tried to assess whether reputation systems might work, and under what circumstances. Virtually all empirical studies focus on two dependent variables: the probability of sale and the selling price. Strangely enough, the empirical evidence in favor of reputation systems as a safeguard against opportunistic behavior is not that overwhelming. Some researchers have found no positive effects of a good reputation on probability of sale and selling price, and others have found statistically significant but substantially insignificant effects. Only a handful of researchers have found substantial effects in the expected direction-for instance, a positive correlation between the reputation score of a seller on eBay and the selling price of the product (which we cover briefly in the next section). This general lack of empirical support, combined with the current boom in online interaction, poses a tantalizing problem, part of which we hope to resolve in this chapter. As we argue, eBay data pose several problems to adequately testing effects of reputation when one considers probability of sale and selling price as the dependent variable. Moreover, what is critical but generally neglected is that arguments center on how much buyers would be willing to pay extra for a product from a seller with a good reputation, rather than on how much extra they might have to pay for that good. The latter depends on many often unmeasured factors, such as market conditions, which makes using the actual selling price as the dependent variable a poor proxy of what we should measure-the willingness to pay extra for an additional unit of reputation. We show that when you look in an online context where these problems of data quality and availability are less severe, the positive effect of reputation on the willingness to pay does indeed surface.</p
FRAME DECAY, INFORMAL POWER, AND THE ESCALATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN A MANAGEMENT TEAM: A RELATIONAL SIGNALING PERSPECTIVE
No full textIn a study of conflict in organizations, Lindenberg's relational signaling theory is used to develop hypotheses on the impact of relationship strength, network embeddedness, and organizational change on social escalation. Social escalation is defined as the involvement of one or more third parties in a conflict. An empirical test is conducted with data on 67 conflicts involving 22 managers, gathered during three years of ethnographic fieldwork and a longitudinal network study in a management team of a German paper factory. Multilevel analysis indicates that strong ties between conflicting parties decrease the level of social escalation, whereas informal power advantage of one party increases the chances for social escalation. Both effects disappear over time. It is argued that the dissolving impact of relationships and networks is due to the disappearance of so-called solidarity frame-stabilizing activities in the firm. The results highlight the context-dependence of network effects and escalation processes. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Rational behavior in decision making. A comparison between humans, computers and fast and frugal strategies
No full textRational behavior in decision making. A comparison between humans, computers, and fast and frugal strategies Chris Snijders and Frits Tazelaar (Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands) Real life decisions often have to be made in "noisy" circumstances: not all crucial information is available, some of the information that is available is redundant, and it is usually far from obvious how to sensibly combine the useful information that is there. Under such circum- stances, the average human is not likely to make correct decisions. There are several theories or ideas as to how one might make good decisions, even under circumstances that are noisy. One idea is that, typically, humans acquire experience over time. Through experience people learn, perhaps even without being aware of it, which bits of information are important and how to combine them. A second stream of thought suggests that in such noisy circum- stances, it is better to use computer models to make a decision (this idea has been popularized by Meehl). Computer models are insensitive to useless information and are able, given enough input from previous similar decisions, to accurately infer what the best decision under particular circum- stances is. A third stream of thought suggests that humans tend to use simple decision- strategies to deal with complex and noisy information, and moreover that these strategies are remarkably accurate (Gigerenzer's "fast and frugal strategies"). We set out to compare these three kinds of decision making: experts, computer models, and fast and frugal strategies, in a set of seven experiments based on real-world data regarding purchasing decisions in organizations
Trust and Exchange : Effects of Temporal Embeddedness and Network Embeddedness on Providing and Dividing a Surplus
Full text linkDissertation of the University of Utrecht
Mutually profitable cooperation is characterized by the fact that the combined efforts of the cooperating parties generate a certain surplus. The first part of the book studies the production of a surplus as a trust problem between two actors. Should an actor provide resources if the other actor can decide on the division of the surplus if it materializes? Under which conditions is trust in a reasonable division of the surplus warranted? We study the effects of `temporal embeddedness'. If both actors interact repeatedly, they can learn something about the other actor's trustworthiness from past interactions. And, they can control their relation by facilitating or hampering future exchange in which both actors should be interested. The first part of the book studies the effects of such `temporal embeddedness' on the provision of a surplus between two actors. Hypotheses are derived on the basis of a simple social capital stock model. These hypotheses are tested using experiments as well as survey data.
The second part of the book studies the division of a given surplus. We consider the case where actors are embedded in a network structure and connected actors can engage in dyadic negotiations on the division of a surplus. We show how the actors' network embeddedness determines their success in bargaining. We thus provide predictions on the actors' shares of their surpluses from bilateral negotiations with their partners. Further, we specify conditions for a decay of a negotiation structure into substructures by showing that it is sometimes favorable for an actor not to utilize possible negotiation ties. Predictions on the division of a surplus and on `network breaks' are tested using evidence from laboratory experiments.
Frame decay, informal power, and the escalation of social control in a management team: a relational signaling perspective.
No full textKlapschaatsen in management
No full textDe auteurs zijn beiden hoogleraar: Chris Snijders aan de Technische Universiteit Eindhoven en Frits Tazelaar aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Met een omvangrijke multidisciplinair samengestelde onderzoeksgroep verrichtten zij de afgelopen vijftien jaar grootschalig empirisch onderzoek op het terrein van samenwerking en het management van transacties en relaties tussen bedrijven, onder meer op het terrein van inkoopmanagement, facilitymanagement en het management van R&D-allianties. Mede op basis daarvan maken zij werk van de ontmaskering van een groot aantal hardnekkige mythes in managementland. Met een verwijzing naar fundamenteel en toegepast onderzoek uit de economie, sociologie en psychologie voorzien zij bovendien in verklaringen voor de geconstateerde verschillen tussen feit en fictie en geven ze oplossingen en concrete suggesties voor de verbetering van de kwaliteit van professioneel management. Een tegendraads boek met een verrassend nieuwe kijk op de managementpraktijk. Nieuw voor de onderhavige terreinen van management is in ieder geval óók dat de auteurs hun analyses niet louter op casuïstiek, maar op zeer uitgebreide kwantitatieve gegevens baseren. Zij bestudeerden duizenden transacties tussen honderden organisaties en legden duizenden concrete business cases ter beoordeling voor aan managers. 'Klapschaatsen in management' geeft de vertaling van hun wetenschappelijke werk naar de professionele managementpraktijk. Aan hun analyses, beschrijvingen en verklaringen verbinden zij concrete oplossingen. Die wijzen allemaal in dezelfde richting: terwijl mensen-in-het-algemeen, en zeker ook managers, bijzonder feilbaar zijn in hun oordeel en beslissingen en op dit punt vaak aan zelfoverschatting lijden, kunnen die inschattingen, beoordelingen en beslissingen in de dagelijkse praktijk beduidend verbeteren als systematisch gebruik gemaakt wordt van computergestuurde instrumenten en innovatieve decision support tools. Dit boek laat u niet alleen zien waarom dat zo is, maar ook hoe dit zich in de praktijk laat uitwerken. Voor topmanagers, innovatieve managers-van-morgen, leidinggevenden en werkenden in inkoop, facilitaire dienstverlening, logistiek, R&D, consultants en interim-managers. Ook voor young professionals en studenten bedrijfskunde, economie, management & organisatie, sociologie, psychologie en toegepaste besliskunde
Frame decay, informal power, and the escalation of social control in a management team: a relational signaling perspective.
No full texteTrust : forming relationships in the online world
No full textThere is one thing that moves online consumers to click "add to cart,"that allows sellers to accept certain forms of online payment, and that makes online product reviews meaningful: trust. Without trust, online interactions can't advance. But how is trust among strangers established on the Internet? What role does reputation play in the formation of online trust? In eTrust, editors Karen Cook, Chris Snijders, Vincent Buskens, and Coye Cheshire explore the unmapped territory where trust, reputation, and online relationships intersect, with major implications for online commerce and social networking. eTrust uses experimental studies and field research to examine how trust in anonymous online exchanges can create or diminish cooperation between people. The first part of the volume looks at how feedback affects online auctions using trust experiments. Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels find that the availability of feedback leads to more trust among one-time buyers, while Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens demonstrate that, in investment transactions, the buyer's own experience guides decision making about future transactions with sellers. The field studies in Part II of the book examine the degree to which reputation facilitates trust in online exchanges. Andreas Diekmann, Ben Jann, and David Wyder identify a "reputation premium"in mobile phone auctions, which not only drives future transactions between buyers and sellers but also payment modes and starting bids. Chris Snijders and Jeroen Weesie shift focus to the market for online programmers, where tough competition among programmers allows buyers to shop around. The book's third section reveals how the quality and quantity of available information influences actual marketplace participants. Sonja Utz finds that even when unforeseen accidents hinder transactions-lost packages, computer crashes-the seller is still less likely to overcome repercussions from the negative feedback of dissatisfied buyers. So much of our lives are becoming enmeshed with the Internet, where ordinary social cues and reputational networks that support trust in the real world simply don't apply. eTrust breaks new ground by articulating the conditions under which trust can evolve and grow online, providing both theoretical and practical insights for anyone interested in how online relationships influence our decisions.</p
eTrust : forming relationships in the online world
No full textThere is one thing that moves online consumers to click "add to cart,"that allows sellers to accept certain forms of online payment, and that makes online product reviews meaningful: trust. Without trust, online interactions can't advance. But how is trust among strangers established on the Internet? What role does reputation play in the formation of online trust? In eTrust, editors Karen Cook, Chris Snijders, Vincent Buskens, and Coye Cheshire explore the unmapped territory where trust, reputation, and online relationships intersect, with major implications for online commerce and social networking. eTrust uses experimental studies and field research to examine how trust in anonymous online exchanges can create or diminish cooperation between people. The first part of the volume looks at how feedback affects online auctions using trust experiments. Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels find that the availability of feedback leads to more trust among one-time buyers, while Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens demonstrate that, in investment transactions, the buyer's own experience guides decision making about future transactions with sellers. The field studies in Part II of the book examine the degree to which reputation facilitates trust in online exchanges. Andreas Diekmann, Ben Jann, and David Wyder identify a "reputation premium"in mobile phone auctions, which not only drives future transactions between buyers and sellers but also payment modes and starting bids. Chris Snijders and Jeroen Weesie shift focus to the market for online programmers, where tough competition among programmers allows buyers to shop around. The book's third section reveals how the quality and quantity of available information influences actual marketplace participants. Sonja Utz finds that even when unforeseen accidents hinder transactions-lost packages, computer crashes-the seller is still less likely to overcome repercussions from the negative feedback of dissatisfied buyers. So much of our lives are becoming enmeshed with the Internet, where ordinary social cues and reputational networks that support trust in the real world simply don't apply. eTrust breaks new ground by articulating the conditions under which trust can evolve and grow online, providing both theoretical and practical insights for anyone interested in how online relationships influence our decisions.</p
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