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Why Functional Properties can be Emergent : An Argument against Kim
No full textSlors Marc. Why Functional Properties can be Emergent : An Argument against Kim . In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°25, 1997/2. Emergence and explanation. pp. 59-65
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Self or No-Self? Towards a better concept of self for enactivism
No full textEnactivism was originally conceived by Varela et all. as a research paradigm for theorizing about the mind, explicitly combining modern (western) cognitive science, phenomenology and Buddhism. They combined these fields in order to integrate these different perspectives on the mind: third-person (stemming from science) and first-person (phenomenology and Buddhism); theoretical insights (phenomenology and science) and practical insights (Buddhism). The one factor binding the theoretical and practical perspectives together, is that they all pointed toward a view wherein the self as ordinarily understood is an illusion: a no-self doctrine. Phenomenologists like Dan Zahavi, however, do hold on to the reality of self, albeit in a minimalist form.
In this thesis I want to argue that a phenomenological, minimal notion of self is a better fit for enactivism then a strict no-self doctrine. The minimal self maintains all of the theoretical benefits of a Buddhist no-self doctrine for enactivism, like being able to deny the existence of a full-blown Cartesian ego-self. Furthermore: a phenomenological notion of self is better able to stave off Cartesian mind-body dualism, if supplemented with a Merleau-Pontian analysis of embodiment, so that the lived body becomes part of the minimal self
Does Cognitive Neuroscience Research on Mental Imagery need Behaviour?
No full textMental imagery is often experienced in the “mind’s eye”, without overt behavioural signs.
Accordingly, cognitive neuroscience has largely focused on its sensory content, often neglecting behavioural paradigms that investigate its functional role. In this paper, I challenge the sensory account for promoting a passive view of mental imagery and instead argue for an active perspective in which imagery serves goal-directed, functional purposes. Moreover, a purely sensory account is scientifically untenable: without subjective report or behavioural evidence, there is no empirical basis to confirm that such imagery is experienced. Finally, novel behavioural paradigms designed are introduced to examine the functional role of mental imagery and its integration with other cognitive domains
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Folk Psychology in Cross-Cultural Context: A Non-Universalist Account Based on Interactive-Mindshaping Practices
No full textThis paper argues that folk psychology, deined as a belief-desire core, is not a universal occurrence but a culture-speciic adaptation of WEIRD societies (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic). The standard approach maintains that folk psychology results from the maturation of an individually possessed and universally present cognitive capacity called “mindreading.” My non-universalist approach is based on interactive-mindshaping practices such as
imitation, norm enforcement, and narrative encounters. These practices continuously shape the minds of individuals such that they can regulate their behaviour in accordance with a variety of culture-speciic norms. These practices can explain most cross-cultural variations in social interaction and understanding. Some cultures, like WEIRD societies, have developed folk psychological practices involving conceptual tools such as beliefs and desires. However, other cultures, like Samoa, embody a functioning society without engaging in such practices. Therefore, when actual social practices are considered, it turns out that folk psychology is not a universal occurrence
Why folk-psychology is not about the mind
No full textThis paper defends the thesis that folk-psychological terms do not track private subjective experience. To this end, evidence is presented in support of the idea that people's everyday phenomenal experiences differ much more than public discourse about mental states suggests. Data can be gathered from studies that employ Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), questionnaires and cases of extreme phenomenology. The fact that people with different phenomenological experience are similarly competent users of folk-psychological terms suggests that tracking subjective experience is not a function of mental state terms. This is especially relevant for terms that appear to describe phenomenal experience, such as ‘imagination’. Phenomenal variation has consequences for various debates in philosophy of mind, such as the phenomenology of intentional states and social cognition
A Tale Untold – Implicit Narratives in the Narrative Self Constitution View
No full textIn narrative theories of personal identity there is a lack of clarity on how explicit an identity constituting narrative must be. In the Narrative Self Constitution View (Schechtman 1996), implicit self-narratives are taken to be unarticulated parts of one’s life which nevertheless determine one’s feelings and behaviors. Strawson (2004) takes an anti-narrativist stance because of the revision thesis, according to which explicit narratives are non-veridical reconstructions. Implicit narratives seem resistant to revision, and would hence undercut Strawson’s argument. I seek to clarify whether the concept of implicit narratives is intelligible and to what extent a narrative should be articulated. I argue that implicit narratives are intelligible indeed and that it is affection rather than articulation that is relevant
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