7,997 research outputs found
Valor intrínseco na bioética ambiental: uma análise crítica das concepções de Dworkin, Singer e Rolston III
No full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2010O tema desta dissertação é o valor intrínseco e sua aplicabilidade no contexto da bioética ambiental. Discute-se, sobretudo, as concepções de valor intrínseco apresentadas por Ronald Dworkin, Peter Singer e Holmes Rolston III. Tais autores possuem concepções de valor intrínseco diversas e delas realizam diferentes usos e aplicações, o que origina o problema desta pesquisa, levando-nos a questionar se tais concepções de valor intrínseco realmente são suficientes para se propor uma teoria bioética ambiental. A hipótese considerada é a de que dependendo do conceito e do uso da expressão "valor intrínseco", a concepção adotada pelos filósofos não é suficientemente adequada para fundamentar ou, pelo menos, apoiar a construção de uma proposta de ética ambiental que garanta individualmente igual proteção às mais diversas formas de vida. Assim, o objetivo consiste em analisar diversos usos e aplicações de concepções de valor intrínseco na ética prática e, mais especificamente, verificar os limites dessas concepções na sua aplicação no contexto de teorias bioéticas. A partir disso, aponta-se para uma concepção de "valor inerente" para a qual uma ética ambiental genuína deve voltar-se, sem descartar as contribuições de Dworkin, Singer e Rolston III. Para tanto, defende-se a importância de superar uma visão representacionista de mundo, segundo a qual os seres humanos são concebidos enquanto entidades separadas do restante do mundo natural, substituindo-a por uma concepção de natureza que entende os seres humanos como parte do mundo natural, que, por sua vez, é continuamente construído pela interação mente e mundo
Attempt by Omission
No full textIn addition to requiring subjective culpability, criminal offenses typically involve two objective features: action and harm. In the paradigmatic case, both features are present, but criminal law also allows for liability where either of them is absent. Rules governing omission liability enable punishment where the offender performs no act, while rules defining inchoate crimes (such as attempt) impose liability where the offender causes no harm. In different ways, these two sets of rules establish the minimum threshold of objective conduct-to use the classic term, the minimum actus reus-required for criminal liability.
The absolute floor for a criminal actus reus, then, would be defined by the intersection of these two sets of rules. The prospect of liability for inchoate omissions, involving no act and no harm, exists at the frontier of the state's authority to criminalize conduct and, whether allowed or rejected, effectively determines the outer boundaries of that authority. Accordingly, inchoate-omission liability raises fundamental issues about the nature and proper scope of criminal law.
This article considers those issues, asking whether criminal punishment for harmless inaction is legally possible, empirically observable, or normatively desirable and, perhaps surprisingly, answering all three of these questions in the affirmative. However unlikely or dubious the legal math may seem, it turns out that zero action plus zero harm can, does, and should sometimes add up to a crime.Please contact Charlotte Schneider ([email protected]) for any questions regarding this deposit
Defining Inchoate Crime: An Incomplete Attempt
No full textPlease direct any questions about this deposit to me, as the authorized depositor.Peer reviewed
Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model Penal Code Second
No full textThis commentary raises two issues that, in the author's view, present some of the greatest challenges - as well as opportunities - for modern criminal theory and criminal-code reform. The first issue relates to the allocation of decision-making authority regarding an offender's ultimate punishment. Specifically, while Apprendi, its progeny, and most of the scholarship in this area have discussed the appropriate constitutional rules to govern element-versus-sentencing-factor determinations, more attention must be paid to developing and justifying a normative basis for making such determinations. The second issue relates to when, and how, criminal law imposes liability for more than one offense at a time. Here again, though the law of double jeopardy may provide a constitutional resolution of the issues, exploration of the underlying normative considerations remains surprisingly, and seriously, inadequate.Please address any questions about this deposit to me, as the authorized depositor.Peer reviewed
Retributive Justice in the Real World
No full textThere are two commonly recognized "theories" of criminal law: utilitarianism, which sees criminal law's purpose as preventing future harms; and retributivism, which sees criminal law's purpose as punishing past wrongs. One significant but little-discussed difference between the two theories relates to their relative scope: in a meaningful way, utilitarianism presents itself as a complete theory of criminal law, while retributivism does not.
Utilitarianism provides a comprehensive vision of criminal justice that can offer guidance, or at least a clear agenda, regarding both the content of criminal law and the best means for enforcing it. Retributivism, on the other hand, apparently speaks only to the criminal law's design, and not to its implementation. Retributive theory seems to say nothing about how to make the tradeoffs and compromises necessary to "do" criminal justice in the real world, whose inevitable resource constraints and other limitations prevent the system from imposing the full deserved punishment on every offender.
This article explores and evaluates the range of options for developing a real-world legal theory, as opposed to an idealized moral theory, of retributive punishment. It concludes that perhaps the only effective, or even plausible, option for doing so would be to adopt the approach of "consequentialist retributivism," which sees desert-based punishment as a goal to maximize rather than (as other approaches would demand) a categorical ex ante commitment. Interestingly, though this seems like the most intuitively sensible way to implement retributive justice, it is the approach with the least support in the theoretical literature. Thus, this article further seeks to advance the debate by suggesting the appeal (and perhaps the necessity) of employing the hitherto neglected perspective of consequentialist retributivism.Please contact Charlotte Schneider ([email protected]) for any questions regarding this deposit
Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal Law
No full textMost American criminal codes create an offense for recklessly killing another person, and nearly all contain a general provision covering any attempt to commit an offense. This article explores the relation between reckless homicide and attempt, which proves more complex than it appears and also turns out to provide a useful starting point for examination of several broader issues in attempt law and criminal law generally.
The idea of attempted reckless homicide (ARH) is largely disfavored by legal scholars and almost, but not quite, universally rejected in American law. Part I of the article questions that hostility. The theoretical arguments against ARH prove unpersuasive, or else too persuasive, in that taking them seriously would call into doubt not only ARH but also the general notion of having attempt liability at all. Moreover, the legal case against ARH under existing criminal statutes is by no means airtight. Indeed, the widely followed Model Penal Code formulation of attempt, read according to its own commentary's interpretive guidance, actually allows ARH in a limited set of situations, though the Code elsewhere tries to deny the possibility of ARH.
Although the law has not embraced ARH per se, it does penalize the same (or very nearly the same) conduct ARH would address, by creating a distinct offense of reckless endangerment, or a variety of more particular offenses covering specific forms of dangerous conduct, or both. Yet as Part II of the article discusses, the endangerment-offense solution to the ARH puzzle creates its own practical problems and raises a distinct set of questions about how to formulate criminal-law rules. The idea of writing a single attempt provision expansively covering any conduct that risks, but does not create, a criminal harm seems rooted in a sense that criminal law works best by establishing relatively few general rules of broad application. By contrast, the idea of identifying particular types of risky conduct and criminalizing each with a specific offense, such as reckless endangerment, indicates a sense that criminal rules should be narrow and precise rather than broad and flexible.
The article explores these two visions of how to write criminal law - which I call the thin-code and thick-code models, respectively - and describes how the choice between thick and thin is not merely formal, but may have significant practical consequences. Though each model has its independent merits, indiscriminately mixing the two is likely to make for a poor and problematic criminal code. Sadly, though, such thoughtless blends of thin and thick are all too common in our criminal law; if anything, they seem to be increasing.Please contact Charlotte Schneider ([email protected]) for any questions regarding this deposit
E-book : Industrial Transformation In The Developing World (author: Michael T. Rock & David P. Angel)
No full textArsip Kuliah Online 2010: E-book : Industrial Transformation In The Developing World (author: Michael T. Rock & David P. Angel
E-book : "industrial Transformations In The Developing World (author: Michael T. Rock & David. P Angel)
No full textArsip Kuliah Online 2010: E-book : "industrial Transformations In The Developing World (author: Michael T. Rock & David. P Angel
Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory
No full textBlackmail, a wonderfully curious offense, is the favorite of clever criminal law theorists. It criminalizes the threat to do something that would not be criminal if one did it. There exists a rich literature on the issue, with many prominent legal scholars offering their accounts. Each theorist has his own explanation as to why the blackmail offense exists. Most theories seek to justify the position that blackmail is a moral wrong and claim to offer an account that reflects widely shared moral intuitions. But the theories make widely varying assertions about what those shared intuitions are, while also lacking any evidence to support the assertions.
This Article summarizes the results of an empirical study designed to test the competing theories of blackmail to see which best accords with prevailing sentiment. Using a variety of scenarios designed to isolate and test the various criteria different theorists have put forth as “the” key to blackmail, this study reveals which (if any) of the various theories of blackmail proposed to date truly reflects laypeople’s moral judgment.
Blackmail is not only a common subject of scholarly theorizing, but also a common object of criminal prohibition. Every American jurisdiction criminalizes blackmail, although there is considerable variation in its formulation. The Article reviews the American statutes and describes the three general approaches these provisions reflect. The empirical study of lay intuitions also allows an assessment of which of these statutory approaches (if any) captures the community’s views, thereby illuminating the extent to which existing law generates results that resonate with, or deviate from, popular moral sentiment.
The analyses provide an opportunity to critique the existing theories of blackmail and to suggest a refined theory that best expresses lay intuitions. The present project also reveals the substantial conflict between community views and much existing legislation, indicating recommendations for legislative reform. Finally, the Article suggests lessons that such studies and their analyses offer for criminal law and theory.Please contact Charlotte Schneider ([email protected]) for any questions regarding this deposit
A importância moral da dor e do sofrimento animal na ética de Peter Singer
No full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2012.O objetivo desta dissertação é defender a importância moral da consideração da dor e do sofrimento de animais não-humanos. Isso se dá através do principio da igual consideração de interesses desenvolvido por Peter Singer. A senciência possibilita os animais a terem interesses, no mínimo, o interesse evitar a dor e o sofrimento. É por essa razão que devem ser incluídos nas decisões morais. São reconstruídas e analisadas as objeções de Peter Harrison, Carl Cohen, R.G. Frey e Lawrence C. Becker direcionadas ao princípio de Singer, e que criticam os pressupostos básicos, quais sejam, a capacidade de sentirem dor/sofrimento e de terem interesses, sobre os quais se fundamenta a inclusão dos animais nas considerações morais. Cada uma dessas objeções é analisada e criticada de modo a demonstrar suas limitações e inconsistências, juntamente com as implicações morais geradas para seres humanos. Na análise dessas críticas, reforça-se a importância e a consideração moral que deve ser conferida à dor e ao sofrimento dos animais. Após essa discussão teórica, é analisado um caso de âmbito prático: a pesquisa científica sobre o câncer humano através do modelo animal. Verifica-se, a partir do princípio de Singer, a imoralidade de tal procedimento realizado em animais sencientes devido à violação de seus interesses. Com isso, a dissertação enfatiza a exigência ética de abolir o uso de animais nessa prática em razão da incapacidade preditiva dos animais, mas principalmente devido à dor e ao sofrimento causado neles e também aos seres humanos, que ficam sujeitos aos erros, prejuízos e sofrimentos originados pelo intenso uso animal nas pesquisas. Nessa conclusão, se constata que a insistência no uso de animais nos experimentos compromete o cientista a preferir usar seres humanos, uma vez que isso gera mais benefícios e resultados mais seguros. A recusa moral ao uso de humanos em pesquisas implica, por outro lado, na recusa moral do uso de animais, ou seja, sua abolição.Abstract : The aim of this dissertation is to defend the moral importance of considering pain and suffering of nonhuman animals. This is achieved through The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests developed by Peter Singer. The sentience enables nonhuman animals to have interests, at least the interest of avoiding pain and suffering. That is why it should be included in moral decisions. The objections of Peter Harrison, Carl Cohen, RG Frey and Lawrence C. Becker directed to the principle of Singer are reconstructed and analyzed, as they are criticizing the basic assumptions, i.e., the ability to feel pain/suffering and have interests, upon which is based the inclusion of animals in moral considerations. Each of these objections is analyzed and criticized in order to demonstrate their limitations and inconsistencies, simultaneously with its moral implications for humans. In the analysis of these criticisms, it reinforces the moral importance and considerations that should be given to pain and suffering of animals. After this theoretical discussion, a case study of practical scope is analyzed: animal testing for scientific research on human cancer. It is verified from the Singer's principle that such procedures performed on sentient animals are a violation of their interests and, therefore, immoral. Thus, the dissertation emphasizes the ethical demand to abolish the use of nonhuman animals in this practice due to their predictive inability, but mainly due to the pain and suffering caused to them and also to humans, who are subject to errors, injuries and suffering originated by the intense use of nonhuman animals on research. The conclusion verifies that the insistence on the use of nonhuman animals in experiments moves the scientist to prefer using humans in experiments since it generates greater benefit and more reliable results. The moral refusal to using humans in research implies the moral rejection of the use of animals in experiments and consequently, its abolition
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