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Replication Data for: Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
No full textIn many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated
Replication Data for: Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
No full textIn many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated
The road to development: market access and varieties of clientelism in rural Punjab, Pakistan
Get PDFRural economies in developing countries are often characterised by high levels of
inequality, particularly so in their distribution of land. This can lead to the
establishment of patron-client relationships between peasants and their landlords
with far-reaching social, political, and economic implications for both parties.
This thesis investigates whether, and how, clientelist networks change, when
connecting isolated villages become connected to the outside economy. It does so
from three different perspectives. Firstly, it highlights the ability of resource rich
landlords to interlink different markets in the rural economy in an effort to
maximise surplus extraction. Yet, when peasants are provided credible exit
options, the change in relative bargaining powers alters the character of such
interlinkages in favour of the peasants. Secondly, it explores how clientelism
enables landlords to use peasant votes as bargaining chips with politicians to
appropriate public resources for their own private benefit. Yet, when peasants are
given outside options, the landlord has to provide them with public goods in order
to maintain his economic and social standing in the village. Lastly, it analyses
peasants’ difficulty in engaging in community driven projects when residing under
a strong patron. Yet, when landlords have to compete with markets outside the
village, they no longer have the incentive or ability to block peasant collective
action for self provision. In all three areas, it is argued that the patrons’ ability to
control peasant activities stems from the interaction of inequality with isolation,
which provides them with monopoly/monopsony powers. Hence while policy
solutions to exploitative forms of clientelism have typically focused on land
redistribution, I argue that similar results are attainable by increasing peasants’
outside options. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis I make use of a
natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in rural Punjab,
Pakistan. The research design compares connected villages dominated by large
landlords to isolated ones and uses villages with relatively egalitarian distribution
of land as a control group. Making use of field interviews and quantitative survey
data the thesis finds that connectivity results in converging outcomes between
connected villages dominated by large landlords and those with more egalitarian
distribution of land. The results suggest that connecting villages previously
isolated from the outside economy can go a long way to help the rural poor
The road to development: market access and varieties of clientelism in rural Punjab, Pakistan
Get PDFRural economies in developing countries are often characterised by high levels of inequality, particularly so in their distribution of land. This can lead to the establishment of patron-client relationships between peasants and their landlords with far-reaching social, political, and economic implications for both parties. This thesis investigates whether, and how, clientelist networks change, when connecting isolated villages become connected to the outside economy. It does so from three different perspectives. Firstly, it highlights the ability of resource rich landlords to interlink different markets in the rural economy in an effort to maximise surplus extraction. Yet, when peasants are provided credible exit options, the change in relative bargaining powers alters the character of such interlinkages in favour of the peasants. Secondly, it explores how clientelism enables landlords to use peasant votes as bargaining chips with politicians to appropriate public resources for their own private benefit. Yet, when peasants are given outside options, the landlord has to provide them with public goods in order to maintain his economic and social standing in the village. Lastly, it analyses peasants’ difficulty in engaging in community driven projects when residing under a strong patron. Yet, when landlords have to compete with markets outside the village, they no longer have the incentive or ability to block peasant collective action for self provision. In all three areas, it is argued that the patrons’ ability to control peasant activities stems from the interaction of inequality with isolation, which provides them with monopoly/monopsony powers. Hence while policy solutions to exploitative forms of clientelism have typically focused on land redistribution, I argue that similar results are attainable by increasing peasants’ outside options. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis I make use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in rural Punjab, Pakistan. The research design compares connected villages dominated by large landlords to isolated ones and uses villages with relatively egalitarian distribution of land as a control group. Making use of field interviews and quantitative survey data the thesis finds that connectivity results in converging outcomes between connected villages dominated by large landlords and those with more egalitarian distribution of land. The results suggest that connecting villages previously isolated from the outside economy can go a long way to help the rural poor
The impact of connectivity on market interlinkages – evidence from rural Punjab:evidence from rural Punjab
Get PDFUp to the late 1980s it was generally accepted that many of the key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding that rural markets were interlinked, causing equilibria to be jointly determined. In recent years, however, theory on market interlinkages has disappeared from mainstream agrarian development literature. Based on a household-level survey conducted in rural Pakistan, this paper seeks to re-introduce the importance of interlinkages and to illustrate the exploitative potential this market structure can have for poor peasants, particularly in unequal isolated villages where the landlord is essentially a monopolist/monopsonist. A proposed solution is then to connect villages to the external economy so as to increase peasants’ alternative options. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway, the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely - as they do have the functional effect of lowering transaction costs - it does significantly alter the nature of the relationship between landlords and the rural poor in favour of the latter, and in particular to the advantage of the socially lower classes.Up to the late 1980s it was generally accepted that many of the key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding that rural markets were interlinked, causing equilibria to be jointly determined. In recent years, however, theory on market interlinkages has disappeared from mainstream agrarian development literature. Based on a household-level survey conducted in rural Pakistan, this paper seeks to re-introduce the importance of interlinkages and to illustrate the exploitative potential this market structure can have for poor peasants, particularly in unequal isolated villages where the landlord is essentially a monopolist/monopsonist. A proposed solution is then to connect villages to the external economy so as to increase peasants’ alternative options. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway, the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely - as they do have the functional effect of lowering transaction costs - it does significantly alter the nature of the relationship between landlords and the rural poor in favour of the latter, and in particular to the advantage of the socially lower classes
Collective action, clientelism and connectivity
Get PDFBacked by a range of studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community based development amongst international organisations. A major caveat to the ‘second wave’ of collective action studies, however, is that collective action will often break down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for rural societies in developing countries, as these are often entrenched in patron-client networks. And while studies of collective action under clientelism are in short supply, the few that exist are generally pessimistic. This paper argues, however, that clientelist relations are highly context-specific, which matters a great deal for their implications for collective action. Making use of a natural experiment in rural Punjab, Pakistan, the paper finds that the unequal relationship between landlords and peasants does not, in and by itself, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that allow patrons to block community based projects. Despite still relying on powerful landlords, peasants in connected villages face no such constraints. On the contrary, their patrons assisted them in their collective endeavours, making the hierarchical network an added resource for peasants to rely upon.Backed by a range of studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community based development amongst international organisations. A major caveat to the ‘second wave’ of collective action studies, however, is that collective action will often break down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for rural societies in developing countries, as these are often entrenched in patron-client networks. And while studies of collective action under clientelism are in short supply, the few that exist are generally pessimistic. This paper argues, however, that clientelist relations are highly context-specific, which matters a great deal for their implications for collective action. Making use of a natural experiment in rural Punjab, Pakistan, the paper finds that the unequal relationship between landlords and peasants does not, in and by itself, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that allow patrons to block community based projects. Despite still relying on powerful landlords, peasants in connected villages face no such constraints. On the contrary, their patrons assisted them in their collective endeavours, making the hierarchical network an added resource for peasants to rely upon
The impact of market exposure on public goods provision
Get PDFLow levels of public goods provision in many developing countries’ rural communities often force the poor to approach someone with considerable command over both financial and social resources to act as their patron. However engaging with the patron – typically a landlord – does not guarantee public provision, as inequality and lack of alternative options considerably weakens peasants’ bargaining power, thus enabling the landlord to use peasant’ votes to secure public resources for his own benefit. This paper proposes to increase peasants’ bargaining power, and thus their ability to pressurize their patron to broker public goods for them, by increasing their alternative options through connectivity. In order to empirically test the viability of this solution the paper makes use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan. Using household-level data, the study shows that households situated close to the road enjoy a significantly higher level of public investment when compared to similar peasants living in isolated villages. Moreover, the data finds the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the socially lower classes within rural society.Low levels of public goods provision in many developing countries’ rural communities often force the poor to approach someone with considerable command over both financial and social resources to act as their patron. However engaging with the patron – typically a landlord – does not guarantee public provision, as inequality and lack of alternative options considerably weakens peasants’ bargaining power, thus enabling the landlord to use peasant’ votes to secure public resources for his own benefit. This paper proposes to increase peasants’ bargaining power, and thus their ability to pressurize their patron to broker public goods for them, by increasing their alternative options through connectivity. In order to empirically test the viability of this solution the paper makes use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan. Using household-level data, the study shows that households situated close to the road enjoy a significantly higher level of public investment when compared to similar peasants living in isolated villages. Moreover, the data finds the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the socially lower classes within rural society
Replication Data for: Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
No full textIn many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated
The impact of connectivity on market interlinkages: evidence from rural Punjab
No full textUp to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages. Recently, however, this theory has lost its importance in development literature. Based on a household-level survey from rural Pakistan, this paper seeks to re-introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential, particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist/monopsonist. The solution proposed is to break isolation. Making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway, the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely, it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature
What do brokers provide for urban slums?
No full textRapid urbanisation in developing countries has often resulted in slums with minimal public goods provision, where the poor rely on clientelist networks to provide for their basic needs. Using household-level data, this paper is the first to empirically document how political clientelism operates in Pakistani slums. It finds that urban brokers, unlike their rural counterparts, are unable to claim credit for public goods provision. Instead, they provide personalised and highly targeted services – such as dispute resolution and assistance with documentation. Moreover, unlike traditional clientelism, urban networks are found to be problem-solving and welfare-enhancing for slum dwellers
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