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Sebastiano Moruzzi, Vaghezza. Confini, cumuli e paradossi, Laterza, Bari 2012, pp. 196
Full text linkThe text offers a Critical Review of "Vaghezza. Confini, cumuli e paradossi" by Sebastiano Moruzzi. The author critically reflects on the book by considering its methodologies, its arguments, and its relation with other books of the same type and on the same subject.Il testo propone una Lettura Critica del libro "Vaghezza. Confini, cumuli e paradossi" di Sebastiano Moruzzi. L'autrice riflette criticamente sul libro considerandone le metodologie, gli argomenti e il nesso con altri libri dello stesso tipo e sullo stesso argomento
Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), "Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic"
Full text linkBook Reviews:Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic, Oxford University Press, 2010, 586 pp., ISBN 9780199570386
Argomentazione e analisi del testo nelle didattiche disciplinari
No full textIn this paper I discuss a workshop that I co-taught within the POT-PLS project proposed by the University of Bologna in 2020. The aim of the workshop was to instruct mathematics and physics teachers on how to integrate methodological tools from physics and philosophy in order to improve teaching and learning.
We focused in particular on the analysis of some widely used textbooks, and we selected as a case study for the analysis some pages related to the properties of the parabola. The workshop highlighted some deficiencies in the use of arguments in the presentation of the knowledge related to the parabola. In this paper we report
this analysis and provide some suggestions concerning in particular the use of arguments in teaching and learning physics and mathematics
Deflating Truth About Taste
Full text linkIn Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property,
it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim. This argument has been taken,
together with the scope problem, as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism. We offer a
reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the
steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and
epistemological view of a given subject matter is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be
constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and
relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake
no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we
contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines,
they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts.
This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism
Hinge Epistemology and Alethic Pluralism
No full textI provide a reconstruction of a recent argument presented by Annalisa Coliva—the Alethic Challenge—that puts pressure her own version of propositional framework of hinge epistemology. Coliva has suggested that a way out from the Alethic Challenge is to hold that the truth of hinge propositions has a deflationary nature and that her hinge epistemology can adopt alethic pluralism for making sense of this suggestion. I assess the viability of this suggestion by arguing that the adoption of alethic pluralism on behalf of the propositional framework for hinge epistemology is hostage to two problems. The first problem is that of integrating a deflationary conception of truth in a pluralist alethic framework—the Integration Challenge. I also formulate a second problem: the problem of keeping distinct the truth property of hinges from the truth property of the other empirical propositions—the Alethic Leaching Problem
Truth relativism and Evans' challenge
No full textIn this paper I develop a version of Evans’ challenge for MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive relativism. The argument is meant to show that, contrary to MacFarlane’s intentions, the correctness of an assertion is a relative matter if the area of discourse has an assessment-sensitive semantics. Thus MacFarlane’s truth-relativism is an inherently unstable doctrine for it is unclear how we should behave in order to achieve the goal of an assertion
Austere Truth Pluralism
No full textModerate pluralism is the dominant view in the pluralism debate. We will show that austere pluralism—a form of strong truth pluralism—should be taken seriously as a contender in the pluralist landscape. We will do three kinds of work to level the playing field. First, we will argue that moderate pluralists conveniently take advantage of the dual nature of their view, switching back and forth between their distinctively monist and distinctively pluralist commitments depending on the issue or task at hand (section 2). Crucially—and perhaps somewhat ironically—the plurality of truth-grounding properties plays an ineliminable role in explaining the metaphysical unity of truth, a key feature of moderate pluralism—and a monist one at that (section 3). Second, we will introduce and articulated austere pluralism, a novel form of strong pluralism (section 4), and we will show that it is entirely adequate for capturing the core idea of truth pluralism (section 6.1) and can deal with the problem of mixed compounds and the problem of mixed inferences, two challenges usually regarded as stumbling blocks for strong pluralism (section 5). Third, we will argue that austere pluralism fares better than moderate pluralism with respect to ontological parsimony, an important theoretical virtue (section 6.2)
Conscious citizenship and science education. Promoting students’ epistemic cognition through a taxonomy of epistemological obstacles
No full textLiving in the current information and knowledge-based society can be a
double-edged sword: the possibility of reaping benefits depends, to a large extent,
on the ability to decide who and what to believe, as well as on knowing how
to integrate multiple sources of information to gain consistent and expendable
knowledge, aimed at improving the quality of people’s personal and professional
life. This means that schools and other formal agencies should provide
learners with the analytical and critical tools necessary to effectively manage
the flow of information they are exposed to. In this context, the paper intends to
clarify under what conditions the integration of knowledge can foster a deeper
understanding of scientific rationality in students, allowing them to participate
in society as educated, informed and responsible citizens. For this purpose,
a project of a taxonomy of epistemological obstacles will be presented as an
example of an integrated approach to science teaching and learning, conceived
as a correlated system of products and expert practices
Critical Thinking and Integrated Curriculum: Developing a lens to problematize their relationship in secondary education
No full textEuropean Epistemology Network Meeting [MEETING]
No full textIncontro annuale dell'European Epistemology Network Modena - Bologna 28-30 giugno 201
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