150,146 research outputs found
«il Nome nel testo». Rivista internazionale di onomastica letteraria, diretta da M.G. Arcamone, D. Bremer, M.S. Mirto, L. Surdich,
No full textOpen Access Mandates and the "Fair Dealing" Button
No full textWe describe the "Fair Dealing Button," a feature designed for authors who have deposited their papers in an Open Access Institutional Repository but have deposited them as "Closed Access" (meaning only the metadata are visible and retrievable, not the full eprint) rather than Open Access. The Button allows individual users to request and authors to provide a single eprint via semi-automated email. The purpose of the Button is to tide over research usage needs during any publisher embargo on Open Access and, more importantly, to make it possible for institutions to adopt the "Immediate-Deposit/Optional-Access" Mandate, without exceptions or opt-outs, instead of a mandate that allows delayed deposit or deposit waivers, depending on publisher permissions or embargoes (or no mandate at all). This is only "Almost-Open Access," but in facilitating exception-free immediate-deposit mandates it will accelerate the advent of universal Open Access
Sale Leaseback Transactions: Price Premiums and Market Efficiency
No full textSale-leaseback transactions are ubiquitous in real estate markets in the United States with annual volume estimated to be greater than $7 billion. However, there is no evidence concerning the price impact of such transactional arrangements. Using a data set of sale-leaseback transactions, this study examines the price impact on commercial property transactions across seven markets. The findings reveal that transactions structured as saleleasebacks occur at significantly higher prices than market transactions. In addition, after accounting for income differentials, buyers and sellers are appropriately pricing the transactions resulting in no undue advantage to either party, that is, the expected price premium is accounted for in the saleleaseback prices.
Protection for Sale Under Monopolistic Competition : An Empirical Investigation
No full textThis paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monopolistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monopolistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect competition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.endogenous trade policy, campaign contribution, monopolistic competition, intraindustry trade, import penetration
Disegno – Laboratori del primo anno
No full textIl volume illustra l’attività condotta all’interno dei Laboratori del disegno tenuti presso la Facoltà del Design del Politecnico di Milano. Prendendo a riferimento l’a.a. 2000/2001, esso non si configura come testo didattico quanto, piuttosto, come rendiconto di una sperimentazione didattica che ha progressivamente portato ad affiancare all’insegnamento tradizionale del disegno forme di rappresentazione non grafiche (fotografia, modellistica ecc), per approdare, attraverso gli anni, all’attuale formula del laboratorio multidisciplinare. Collocati al primo anno del corso di studi, tali laboratori propongono pertanto un approccio complessivo ai problemi della rappresentazione, privilegiando una metodologia didattica di tipo induttivo e tenendo conto delle specificità che l’insegnamento del disegno presenta in una scuola di design rispetto ad una facoltà di architettura o di ingegneria
Protection for Sale Under Monopolistic Competition: An Empirical Investigation
No full textThis paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monop- olistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect compe- tition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.endogenous trade policy; campaign contribution; monopolistic competition; intrain- dustry trade; import penetration
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Stuck in a time warp: security interests in chattel mortgages and the bills of sale legislation in Nigeria
No full textExamines the law in Nigeria on the use of the bill of sale as a security device in the form of a chattel mortgage. Considers issues including the definition of "personal chattels," the formal requirements of a bill of sale, the remedies for its breach and the effect of a borrower's bankruptcy. Discusses the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Regulations on security interests in moveable property. Evaluates the regime and suggests reforms
Diversità genetica e struttura di popolazioni di accessioni di mirto (Myrtus communis L.) raccolte in diverse aree climatiche della Sardegna.
No full textTESTING PROTECTION FOR SALE IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES
No full textThis paper tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, import penetration, and political campaign. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports. Furthermore, the presence of import quotas raises the level of protection substantially. The estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries.Agribusiness,
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