10 research outputs found
Editorial : The December 2025 issue of the International Journal of Economic Performance presents 26 articles focusing on critical global themes
No full textEditorial
The December 2025 issue of the International Journal of Economic Performance presents 26 articles focusing on critical global themes
The editorial of this issue was written by Saïd SOUAM, Professor of Economics,
Paris Nanterre University (EconomiX) (France) . Associate Editor of the journal
Financialization and Innovation of Chinese Listed Firms: An Empirical Appraisal
No full textThis article thoroughly examines the links between financialization and innovation activities of a sample of 312 publicly listed Chinese firms for the period 2000-2023, encompassing the crucial post-pandemic recovery phase. We utilize various panel models, including fixed effects, random effects, and dynamic estimations across different periods and financial contexts. According to our research, financialization has a negative impact on firms’ innovation rates. It harms financially constrained firms more strongly, and its impact increases over time, starting at -0.08 in the 2000-2010 period and reaching -0.22 in the 2016-2023 period. Our findings offer policy recommendations that could help mitigate the adverse effects of growing financialization on the innovation of Chinese firms
Incentives and optimal antitrust policy
No full textWe analyze a model where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with information which enhances the probability of the success of the prosecution. More precisely, we explore the efficiency consequences of a contest between the audit inspector and the cartel. Both of them bid to win the contest by expending efforts. We show that the race issue depends positively on the financial incentives proposed to the inspector but the impact of an increase of the level of the fine, to be paid once an illegal agreement is detected, is ambiguous. Moreover, we show that the optimal combination of the two instruments consists in two regimes. When the marginal cost of providing the relevant information is relatively high, the antitrust authority equally shares the collected fine and does not provide the inspector with any information. Conversely, when this marginal cost is relatively small, the authority uses the two instruments. She has to provide him with the maximum level of information consistent with winning the contest with certainty
A theory of antitrust enforcement game
No full textWe analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission
of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments
at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing
him with information which enhances the probability of the success of the prosecution. More
precisely, we explore the efficiency consequences of a contest between the audit inspector and
the cartel. Both of them bid to win the contest by expending efforts. We show that the race issue
depends positively on the financial incentives proposed to the inspector but the impact of an
increase of the level of the fine, to be paid once an illegal agreement is detected, is ambiguous.
Moreover, we show that the optimal combination of the two instruments consists in two regimes.
When the marginal cost of providing the relevant information is relatively high, the antitrust
authority equally shares the collected fine and does not provide the inspector with any
information. Conversely, when this marginal cost is relatively small, the authority uses the two
instruments. She has to provide him with the maximum level of information consistent with
winning the contest with certaint
Analyse économique des fusions horizontales
No full text[fre] Cet article retrace l'évolution de l'analyse économique des fusions horizontales et examine sa portée pour la politique de la concurrence. Dans un contexte d'application très stricte des lois antitrust, l'article pionnier de Williamson [1968] s'est attaché à montrer que les coûts liés à la monopolisation d'une industrie devaient être comparés aux gains réalisés grâce aux opéra- tions de fusion. Les contributions qui ont suivi ont ré-examiné l'arbitrage fondamental relevé par Williamson sous des hypothèses plus réalistes. D'un côté, la prise en compte des réactions stratégiques des concurrents limite l'augmentation du pouvoir de marché pour les entreprises qui initient les opérations de fusion. D'un autre côté, le contexte d'information asymétrique dans lequel travaillent les autorités de la concurrence milite plutôt en faveur d'un durcissement des règles et nuance le message essentiellement libéral de Williamson. [eng] This article recalls the evolution of the economic analysis of horizontal mergers and examines its relevance for competition policy. In the context of a strict enforcement of antitrust laws, Williamson [1968], in a pioneer article, stressed that the costs inherent to the industry monopolization should be compared with the benefits resulting from mergers. Later contributions have reexamined the fundamental trade-off raised by Williamson under more realistic assumptions. On one hand, taking into account the strategic reactions of competitors sets limits to the increase in market power for the merging companies. On the other hand, the context of asymmetric information in which competition authorities work militates in favor of thougher regulations and lessens the rather liberal message of Williamson.
Etudes de l’impact Environnemental de la Centrale Electrique Thermique de Cap-Djinet
No full text81 p. : ill. ; 30 cmLa centrale électrique de Cap-Djinet est une centrale thermique à vapeur qui utilise le gaz ou le fuel (gas-oil) comme combustible dans la chaudière pour la production de la flamme. Elle émet du dioxyde de soufre (SO2), des oxydes d'azote (NOx), du dioxyde de carbone (CO2), des cendres et des poussières. Elle est aussi génératrice de bruit émanant de toutes ses machines tournantes. Elle nécessite de grandes quantités d'eau de refroidissement qu'elle rejette à la mer à des températures généralement supérieures de plusieurs degrés par rapport aux températures normales. Tout cela, ne peut ne pas avoir d'impacts sur l'environnement. Des mesures des rejets des chaudières dans l'air et du niveau des nuisances sonores ont été réalisées pour évaluer leurs effets sur le personnel de la centrale, toute la zone environnante, et la population limitrophe à la centrale, cela constitue donc l'objectif de notre travail. Notre étude consiste d'abord, à présenter la centrale, son mode de fonctionnement, recenser ses différents rejets dans l'atmosphère et dans la mer, évaluer les effets que représente toute cette pollution générée par ces rejets. Enfin, nous avons essayé d'exploiter les résultats des mesures pour illustrer l'effet de la pollution que constituent ces rejets et ces nuisances sonores sur l'environnemen
Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration
No full textWe analyze the incentives of a controlling shareholder of a firm to acquire, directly or indirectly through his firm, shares in a competitor. We charaterize the conditions under which these partial acquisitions as well as the equilibrium toehold and its nature: controlling or silent. We find that while this shareholder gains, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or of the target, or even of both. We show that the incentives are enhanced if the dominant shareholder initially holds silent stakes in rivals while controlling interests may discourage them. Moreover, we find that partial acquisitions always lead to a decrease in the joint profit of the two firms involved, and an increase in competitor's profits as the market becomes less competitive
Analyse economique des fusions horizontales
No full textAvailable from INIST (FR), Document Supply Service, under shelf-number : DO 7715 / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueSIGLEFRFranc
