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    Task sharing can change the fate of task irrelevant information: Evidence from the joint Picture-Word interference paradigm

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    The joint version of the picture-word interference (PWI) paradigm was employed to investigate how people can deal with the task irrelevant information when they share an interference paradigm with another person. Participants performed the PWI paradigm, which requires to name a picture while ignoring a distractor word, both individually (baseline) and co-acting with an alleged partner (joint task). Results showed that, compared to the baseline and to a control condition in which participants continued to perform the PWI individually, the belief of co-acting with another individual suppressed the semantic interference effect (i.e., slower naming times for semantically related picture-word pairs) when the co-actor was thought to be in charge of the distractor words but not when s/he was thought to work on the same stimuli (pictures) as the participant. Task sharing was effective in eliminating the semantic interference effect only when written word recognition was made more difficult by presenting distractor words in case alternation letters (mOuSe). These results can be explained by assuming that the information about the co-actor’s task in a context of impaired word recognition would provide participants with an effective strategy to ignore the task irrelevant information when another person is in charge of this information

    Personality assimilation across species: enfacing an ape reduces own intelligence and increases emotion attribution to apes

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    Seeing another person’s face while that face and one’s own face are stroked synchronously or controlling a virtual face by moving one’s own induces the illusion that the other face has become a part of oneself—the enfacement effect. Here, we demonstrate that humans can enface even members of another species and that this enfacement promotes “feature migration” in terms of intelligence and emotional attribution from the representation of other to the representation of oneself, and vice versa. We presented participants with a virtual human face moving in or out of sync with their own face, and then morphed it into an ape face. Participants tended to perceive the ape face as their own in the sync condition, as indicated by body-ownership and inclusion-of-others-in-the-self ratings. More interestingly, synchrony also reduced performance in a fluid-intelligence task and increased the willingness to attribute emotions to apes. These observations, which fully replicated in another experiment, fit with the idea that self and other are represented in terms of feature codes, just like non-social events (as implied by the Theory of Event Coding), so that representational self–other overlap invites illusory conjunctions of features from one representation to the other
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