20,207 research outputs found

    Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild

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    BRIEF VON BRUNO S. FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO S. FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO S. FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO S. FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno S. Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild

    No full text
    BRIEF VON BRUNO FREY AN KURT ROTHSCHILD Brief von Bruno Frey an Kurt Rothschild ([1]

    Democracy by competition : referenda and federalism in Switzerland. by Bruno S. Frey and Iris Bohnet

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    tag=1 data=Democracy by competition : referenda and federalism in Switzerland. by Bruno S. Frey and Iris Bohnet tag=2 data=Frey, Bruno S.%Bohnet, Iris tag=3 data=Publius : The Journal of Federalism, tag=4 data=23 tag=5 data=2 tag=6 data=Spring 1993 tag=7 data=71-81. tag=8 data=REFERENDUMS tag=10 data=Competition is not only a prerequisite for the successful working of economics but also of political coordination systems. We argue that popular referenda and federalism are the key factors in maintaining competition in the political arena. tag=11 data=1993/5/10 tag=12 data=93/0611 tag=13 data=CABCompetition is not only a prerequisite for the successful working of economics but also of political coordination systems. We argue that popular referenda and federalism are the key factors in maintaining competition in the political arena

    Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service

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    Under certain conditions, output related performance measurement and pay-for-performance produce negative outcomes. We argue that in public service, these negative effects are stronger than in the private sector. We combine Behavioural Economics and Management Control Theory to determine under which conditions this is the case. We suggest as alternatives to the dominant output related pay-for-performance systems selection and socialization, exploratory use of output performance measures, and awards
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