1,720,972 research outputs found
Simultaneous and Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function in Games with Externalities
No full textFondazione Enrico Mattei, Note di Lavoro, serie Economic Theor
A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games
No full textThis paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooper- ative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements
The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation
No full textThis paper focusses on a particular behaviour for firms competing in imperfect competitive markets firstly theorized in the late 30s by a number of well known economists (Robinson (1933), Sweezy (1939)). This is the well known model of kinked demand curve, basically predicting an asymmetric behaviour of every firm in response to a price change: each firm expects its rivals to be more reactive in matching its price cuts than its price increases. Although this theory has been often criticized as not theoretically grounded, we show that this is not the case. In particular, in a symmetric and monotone market, we prove that, if every firm accepts a simple kinked-demand norm of behaviour (KD), the perfectly collusive outcome (monopoly pricing) constitutes an equilibrium. We show that this result is rather robust and can be extended to all symmetric strategic form games in which players are allowed to deviate either individually or in a coordinated manner as coalitions of players: a KD norm of behaviour always makes the efficient outcome (the one maximizing the sum of all players' utility) stable. Also, we show that a slightly stronger norm of behaviour (implicitly implying a norm of reciprocity) makes the efficient outcome the only stable outcome of the game. Finally, the KD norm of behaviour can also be considered rational whenever players' actions are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow et al. (1982)
Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
No full textThis paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the “coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions
Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games
No full textWorking Paper n. 2011/13 - University of Urbin
On the Eect of Premia and Penalties on Optimal Portfolio Choice
Full text linkIn a standard portfolio choice between a risky and a safe asset, we study the effect of imposing premia and penalties conditional on the realized return of the portfolio meeting a given threshold. We show that thresholds set at ”intermediate levels” have the effect to increase the optimal share of the safe asset, while very low and very high thresholds may induce larger shares of the risky investment if a condition on the curvature of the utility function holds
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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