1,721,074 research outputs found

    Natural resources and conflict: the crucial role of power mismatch and geographic asymmetries

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    Natural resource rents are often equated with political turmoil and fighting. While one can easily find examples where there has been such a link (see e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Chad, Nigeria or Iraq), one can as easily pick examples of both democracies (e.g. Norway) or nondemocracies (e.g. Saudi Arabia) where resource wealth has not been associated with political instability. As argued below, whether the spoils of nature give birth to the horror of war depends on a series of geographical and political factors, namely asymmetries and mismatches that are not compensated by appropriate policies

    Resource concentration and civil wars

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    This paper highlights the importance of natural resource concentration and ethnic group regional concentration for ethnic conflict. The existence of multiple conflict terrains (and hence multiple threat points) is the source of bargaining failure, similar to the one determined by the presence of offensive advantages. The theory predicts war to be more likely when resource concentration and group concentration are high, and the empirical analysis, both at the country level and at the ethnic group level, confirms the essential role of geographic concentration variables for civil war

    The geography of interstate resource wars

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    We establish a theoretical and empirical framework to assess the role of resource endowments and their geographic location in interstate conflict. The main predictions of the theory are that conflict is more likely when at least one country has natural resources, when the resources in the resource-endowed country are closer to the border, and, in the case where both countries have natural resources, when the resources are located asymmetrically vis-a`-vis the border. We test these predictions on a novel data set featuring oilfield distances from bilateral borders. The empirical analysis shows that the presence and location of oil are significant and quantitatively important predictors of interstate conflicts after World War II. JEL Codes: C23, D74, F51, H56, Q34

    Ballot or Bullet: The Impact of the UK’s Representation of the People Act on Peace and Prosperity

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    Does democracy curb domestic political violence? To study this, we focus on the United Kingdom’s Representation of the People Act of 1867—which is a critical juncture in the history of democratisation. Constructing a novel borough (‘urban centre’) level dataset on social conflict events and economic performance around the 1868 elections (the first elections where newly enfranchised citizens could vote), we exploit arguably exogenous variation in enfranchisement intensity. We find a strong and robust peace-promoting effect of franchise extension and identify as a major channel of transmission the increase of the population’s political influence (voice) and local economic growth

    The Effects of Conflict on the Structure of the Economy

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    The presence of conflict affects peoples economic incentives. Some sectors of activity flourish, while others suffer. For understanding structural problems in developing countries and designing appropriate post-conflict reconstruction policies, it is essential to understand in what ways conflict affects the structure of the economy. We develop a simple model of conflict and multiple sectors of activity, where conflict efforts, the allocation of factor endowments and the production outputs are endogenous. We predict that for moderately destructive conflicts labor-intensive sectors are most affected by fighting, while for highly destructive conflicts capital-intensive sectors suffer most. In the latter case, under some conditions it is also possible that in the presence of endogenous conflict - an increase in the price of the capital-intensive commodity reduces the output of this same good. The model further predicts that export-sectors and sectors that require inter-temporal investments are particularly exposed to conflict activity. In the empirical part of the paper, we study the impact of various forms of conflict, separately and as an aggregate conflict index constructed with principal component analysis. We present some basic stylized facts about the effect of conflict on the productive structure of the economy. Conflict reduces the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP, increases the exploitation of some simple natural resources (i.e. forestry) and reduces the production of crops. Using industrial level data for developing countries we study the channels through which conflict affects the manufacturing sector. As expected, we find that industries that are more institutional/transaction intensive are the ones that suffer most in conflictive societies. Laborintensive sectors are also negatively affected by conflict. It is also found that exporting industries and sectors requiring external financing suffer more during conflict. Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis. --Conflict,Production Structure,Resource Curse,Post-Conflict Reconstruction

    Ethnic Violence Across Space

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    Spatial analyses focus to a large extent on the 'bright side of proximity', namely voluntary (positive-sum) interactions such as, e.g., in trade and innovation. In contrast, the violent 'dark side of proximity' has often been overlooked. To address this gap, we study the role of spatial proximity in ethnic conflict, developing a structural model of spatial violence in which ethnic groups recruit fighters strategically across space. The spatial decay of violence determines the equilibrium placement of fighters and drives specific spatial patterns of conflict. The structural parameters of the model are estimated using fine-grained data on ethnic groups and violence from twenty-four ethnically divided countries. We find that in more than half of these, spatial decay is substantial: half of all ethnic violence dissipates after 350 km. Violence is asymmetric, is higher near ethnic borders and typically originates from outside a location. Counterfactual estimates suggest that setting up barriers would reduce violence, but pacifying groups suffering from grievances would often be more effective.Hannes Mueller acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S) and the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through grant PGC-096133-B-100. Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595 ‘Policies for Peace’.Peer reviewe

    Strategic Mass Killings

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    We provide a model of conflict and mass killing decisions to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur. We predict that mass killings are most likely in countries with large amounts of natural resource rents, polarization, institutional constraints regarding rent sharing, and low productivity of labor. The role of resources such as oil, gas, and diamonds and other key determinants of mass killings is confirmed by our empirical results based on countrylevel as well as ethnic group–level analysisJoan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from the AXA Research Fund and from the Spanish Government Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología project ECO2011-25293. Massimo Morelli gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Program for Economic Research at Columbia University. Dominic Rohner is grateful for the financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (ggrant 100014-122636)Peer Reviewe

    Incentives and constraints for mass killings: a game-theoretic approach

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    This chapter provides a rationalization of large-scale atrocities consistent with the main characteristics of the history of the last fifty years. Mass killings or genocides are planned; they are perpetrated by groups in power; they typically happen at the end of civil wars; they sometimes follow from external pressures or constraints on the group in power; the risk of mass killings is highest in polarized countries with low productivity and high dependence on natural resources. The normative implications in terms of third-party intervention have to be carefully considered. Neither a threat of direct intervention (effectively putting a cap on allowed mass killings) nor the imposition of minimum standards to be used for the treatment of defeated minorities can be evaluated in the absence of consideration of the economic structure and social divisions

    Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending

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    No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory

    Post-conflict private sector development : promoting durable peace : What are the characteristics and short comings of economic development in post-independent, sub-Saharan Africa : examples from Mozambique?

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    Includes abstract.In times of war the private sector adapts, often to function informally, and can serve to either perpetuate conflict or to incentivize peace. Accordingly, the private sector is a powerful tool that can be utilized during post-conflict reconstruction to enable sustain- able peace and economic development. After a conflict, in an effort to establish a means of survival outside of the war economy, there is a pressing need for the population to have a means by which to provide a livelihood and productively contribute to society. Establishing sustainable economic exchange and developing social capital between various members of society is one mechanism by which to achieve restorative justice and disincentivize conflict. ...this paper argues for a hybrid approach to private sector development that includes both the investment climate and interventionist methods to disincentivize a return to conflict
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