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Gn. Pompejusz a optymaci (52 rok przed Chrystusem)
The author begins his deliberation by pointing out that the optimates decided to cooperate with
Pompey because they merely had a choice, and underlining that despite that fact, their initiative
led to a political breakthrough in Rome by bringing under control the successive wave of crisis
besetting the Republic increasingly from 54 and by resulting in creation of a new political camp.
Bearing this in mind, the author emphasizes the grounds of the mentioned breakthrough,
which were based on the gradual changes that started in year 54 and continued until the beginning
of 52, in the line-up on the Roman political arena, particularly between Pompey and the optimates;
as well as the factors favouring their agreement and cooperation. These included the changes in
policy carried out by both sides in said time, the key moments when those changes were made,
gradual maturing to establishing the alliance, as well as the character and structure of Pompey’s
blocs and optimates grouping.
After outlining the enumerated issues, the author discusses the relations between Pompey and
the optimates subsequent to their alliance during Pompey’s third independent consulate, which
he held for about six months in 52. The debate is based on those actions of Pompey and his new
political partners which had or could have had impact on their relations at the time
Trybunat ludowy Marka Antoniusza (49 rok przed Chr.)
The author begins his discussion of the problems associated with Marcus Antonius’s exercise of the office of a tribune of the plebs in 49 BC by indicating the peculiar features of his tribunate. For it turned out that Antonius had to hold his plebeian office in a time when the Roman Republic saw events which would determine its future fate. Antonius actively participated in these events and played a decisive role in them due to his political associations. The consequence of his engagement was a delay of many months in his activity associated with this tenure and active participation in the civil war. Antonius resumed his duties as the tribune of the plebs as late as at the end of his term i.e. shortly before 9 December, 49.
Then the author describes the problems associated with Antonius’s appointment to the college of tribunes of the plebs for the year 49, especially the support that was expressed to him at that time by C. Scribonius Curio, a former‑year tribune of the plebs who was his friend, and by a protector and at the same time the principal of both men — C. Iulius Caesar. Due to this fact a great deal of attention was devoted to the analysis of source information associated with these issues, especially the ones contained in the Eighth Book of the Bellum Gallicum by Aulus Hirtius.
The author begins his discussion of the activities initiated by Antonius after he assumed the office on 10 December, 50 by presenting his expression of support for the defence of Caesar and the activities directed against Pompeius that were realised until the end of this month. Then the author concentrateshis attention on the presentation of the most important and best known manoeuvres of Antonius that he realised in the senate forum during 1—7 January, 49, during the sessions devoted to Pompeius’s conflict with Caesar. The author devoted due attention to the events that happened in the senate room on the first and last day of the sessions. The activity of Antonius away from Rome during the Italic campaign was mentioned only briefly as it is not directly associated with the problem stated in the title of the article. The author’s considerations are concluded by a discussion of Antonius’s resumption of the duty of a tribune of the plebs in the final period of his tenure and an evaluation of his tribunate
Trybunat ludowy Marka Antoniusza (49 rok przed Chr.)
The author begins his discussion of the problems associated with Marcus Antonius’s exercise
of the office of a tribune of the plebs in 49 BC by indicating the peculiar features of his tribunate.
For it turned out that Antonius had to hold his plebeian office in a time when the Roman Republic
saw events which would determine its future fate. Antonius actively participated in these events and
played a decisive role in them due to his political associations. The consequence of his engagement
was a delay of many months in his activity associated with this tenure and active participation in the
civil war. Antonius resumed his duties as the tribune of the plebs as late as at the end of his term i.e.
shortly before 9 December, 49.
Then the author describes the problems associated with Antonius’s appointment to the college of
tribunes of the plebs for the year 49, especially the support that was expressed to him at that time by
C. Scribonius Curio, a former‑
year tribune of the plebs who was his friend, and by a protector and at
the same time the principal of both men — C. Iulius Caesar. Due to this fact a great deal of attention
was devoted to the analysis of source information associated with these issues, especially the ones
contained in the Eighth Book of the Bellum Gallicum by Aulus Hirtius.
The author begins his discussion of the activities initiated by Antonius after he assumed the office
on 10 December, 50 by presenting his expression of support for the defence of Caesar and the activities
directed against Pompeius that were realised until the end of this month. Then the author concentrates
his attention on the presentation of the most important and best known manoeuvres of Antonius that
he realised in the senate forum during 1—7 January, 49, during the sessions devoted to Pompeius’s
conflict with Caesar. The author devoted due attention to the events that happened in the senate room
on the first and last day of the sessions. The activity of Antonius away from Rome during the Italic
campaign was mentioned only briefly as it is not directly associated with the problem stated in the title
of the article. The author’s considerations are concluded by a discussion of Antonius’s resumption of
the duty of a tribune of the plebs in the final period of his tenure and an evaluation of his tribunate
Marcus Antonius’s Tribunate of the Plebs (49 BC)
The author begins his discussion of the problems associated with Marcus Antonius’s exercise of the office of a tribune of the plebs in 49 BC by indicating the peculiar features of his tribunate. For it turned out that Antonius had to hold his plebeian office in a time when the Roman Republic saw events which would determine its future fate. Antonius actively participated in these events and played a decisive role in them due to his political associations. The consequence of his engagement was a delay of many months in his activity associated with this tenure and active participation in the civil war. Antonius resumed his duties as the tribune of the plebs as late as at the end of his term i.e. shortly before 9 December, 49.
Then the author describes the problems associated with Antonius’s appointment to the college of tribunes of the plebs for the year 49, especially the support that was expressed to him at that time by C. Scribonius Curio, a former‑year tribune of the plebs who was his friend, and by a protector and at the same time the principal of both men — C. Iulius Caesar. Due to this fact a great deal of attention was devoted to the analysis of source information associated with these issues, especially the ones contained in the Eighth Book of the Bellum Gallicum by Aulus Hirtius.
The author begins his discussion of the activities initiated by Antonius after he assumed the office on 10 December, 50 by presenting his expression of support for the defence of Caesar and the activities directed against Pompeius that were realised until the end of this month. Then the author concentrateshis attention on the presentation of the most important and best known manoeuvres of Antonius that he realised in the senate forum during 1—7 January, 49, during the sessions devoted to Pompeius’s conflict with Caesar. The author devoted due attention to the events that happened in the senate room on the first and last day of the sessions. The activity of Antonius away from Rome during the Italic campaign was mentioned only briefly as it is not directly associated with the problem stated in the title of the article. The author’s considerations are concluded by a discussion of Antonius’s resumption of the duty of a tribune of the plebs in the final period of his tenure and an evaluation of his tribunate
Udział i rola cezarian w zamachu na G. Juliusza Cezara (15 marca 44 roku)
Investigating the role of Caesarians in the attempt on the life of G. Julius Caesar on 15th March
44 BC, the author of the article makes an attempt to explain several issues connected with this
subject‑matter.
First of all, he establishes the criteria serving the purpose of distinguishing Caesarians.
He defines them analysing the ways of presenting politicians connected with who participated
in his murder typical of the authors of Ancient source texts and contemporary historians. He also
brings the profiles of assassinators closer and clarifies motives which could make the senators
befriended with Caesar act against their protector and leader. Having presented the very issues, the
author discusses the role of Caesarians in the attempt on the life of G. Julius Caesar. He considers
it relatively thoroughly, examining the activity of the best‑known
Caesarians in the conspiracy
organized against Caesar and in the course of the assassination which ended in his death on a day
of the Ids of March in 44
Kwestura G. Juliusza Cezara a rozwój jego kariery w następnych latach
The author of this article analyses some of Caesar’s actions taken during the time he served
as quaestor and their political implications, while attempting to capture their influence on the further
development of his career. Particular attention is paid to the consequences of the eulogies delivered during
the funerals of aunt Iulia and wife Cornelia, which helped to win over residents of the capital sympathizing
with the populares, and, in the long run, after proper consolidating the effects of those speeches
in the following years, enabled him to build a long-lasting political base. The article also points to their
other effect: Caesar’s establishing closer contacts first with Pompey and a little later with Crassus, which
also significantly accelerated the development of his career. The author also emphasizes the positive
impact on Caesar’s career that was only brought to light years later, as a result of his thorough knowledge
of Hispania Ulterior that he gained diligently performing the duties of quaestor. This was the foundation
for Caesar’s subsequent successes during the time he governed Hispania Ulterior in the late sixties
Stanowisko senatu wobec rywalizacji Pompejusza z Cezarem (1 XII 50 r. - 11 I 49 r. p.n.e.)
The last forty days before the outbreak of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar, i.e. the
period from December 1, 50 BC to January 11, 49 BC was, for several reasons, an extremely interesting
moment in the history of the Roman Republic. For Pompey it was the last chance to enforce,
with the help of the consuls that were his clients and other civil servants that began their term
on January 1,49 BC, a policy that would suit his purposes. This is why immediately after December
I, 50 BC, and especially in January 49 BC, we observe a growing activity of the two potentates and
of their supporters, which signalised the beginning of the final stage of their rivalry. The most important
events related to that rivalry took place in the senate which had to take some vital decisions
on the Gallic question which was a subject the controversy between Pompey and Caesar. The senate,
therefore, became an object of a refined, though sometimes very brutal, pressure from both sides and
from the politicians supporting either of the two sides.
Another result of this course of events was, apart from the above mentioned animation, an
intensification of the political struggle in Rome, which led to the Senate changing their mind radically
during those forty days. In order to trace the development of that political struggle, and the
various tendencies that accompanied it, the author of the present article discusses the situation in
the senate after the December 1, 50 BC debate and the policy adopted by Pompey and Caesar at that
time in relation to the senate. The author pays particular attention to such decisive moments as the
senate’s activity in the first days of January 49 BC, and particularly the debates that took place on
the first and the seventh day of that month. Since it during those debates that the senate changed radically
their attitude to the Gallic question, the author devotes a lot of space to Pompey’s and Caesar’s actions
related to that fact, and to the activity of their most zealous supporters in relation to particular senators
and to the senate as a whole. That discussion is rounded up by a presentation of the political
situation in Rome, mainly as regards the situation in the senate, in the period from January 8 to January
II, 49 BC, and of the effect that it had on the further development of events
Obywatelskie cnoty Gnejusza Pompejusza a Republika Rzymska (lata 54-52 przed Chrystusem)
The purpose of the author’s research was to demonstrate the real attitude of Pompeius
towards the Roman Commonwealth. The research was motivated by very flattering opinions
expressed by Paterculus and Plutarch concerning the civil virtues of this outstanding
Roman citizen. The author took the years 54−52 as the basis for his inquiries, because at that
time, Rome was the scene of a political crisis and a struggle for power of rare intensity, in
which Pompeius actively participated. He was also eventually delegated the responsibility
of quenching the disturbances that troubled the Republic. As a result, he was forced
to make a variety of moves on the public forum, under various circumstances. He was
not always able to hide his intentions and aims. Thanks to this, his attitude towards the
Roman Republic could relatively well be compared to the civil values ascribed to him by
the aforementioned antiquity authors
C. Iulius Caesar’s office of aedile (65 BC) and its political contexts
Autor artykułu omawia aktywność publiczną G. Juliusza Cezara w trakcie sprawowania przez niego urzędu edyla kurulnego w 65 roku przed Chrystusem. Swoją uwagę koncentruje nie tylko na działaniach Cezara wynikających z posiadanych przez niego wówczas uprawnień łączących się z tym stanowiskiem. Akcentuje także wykraczające poza nie posunięcia polityczne Cezara, związane z nimi intrygi oraz będące ich efektem rozgrywki, w które był on zaangażowany. Dlatego autor artykułu wiele uwagi poświęcił również politycznym powiązaniom Cezara — politykom, z którymi wówczas ściśle współpracował, oraz przeciwnikom, z którymi się wtedy na forum publicznym ścierał, a także najważniejszym ówczesnym rzymskim ugrupowaniom, czyli popularom i optymatom.In discussing C. Iulius Caesar’s office of aedile held by him in 65 BC, the author of the present article included in his deliberations Caesar’s activity on two levels: his actions going beyond the powers of the curule aedile and the measures closely related to the duties thereof. The former ones were connected to the accusations that Caesar had taken part in the conspiracies organized at that time, whose participants aimed at seizing power in the Republic. These allegations concerned Caesar’s cooperation, also in this context, with Marcus Licinius Crassus. The latter ones, that is the activities closely related to the duties of the curule aedile, pertained to Caesar’s actions implemented within the prerogatives of these officials, that he took either independently or in cooperation with Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, his peer at the office. Discussing both abovementioned aspects, the author analyzes the grounds of Caesar’s specific initiatives, contemplates the course of their implementation as well as their circumstances and conditions. He pays special attention to the positive and negative outcomes of his moves, presenting them both on a personal and public level
Kwestia tajności sprzysiężenia M. Juniusza Brutusa i G. Kasjusza Longinusa
The issue of secrecy of conspiracy organised against C. Iulius Caesar by M. Iunius Brutus
and G. Cassius Longinus, the consequence of which was murdering the dictator on March 15
44 B.C, is dealt with by the author from two different perspectives.
Firstly, he discusses the very actions of conspirators, the aim of which was to hide their
moves, as well as favourable factors and circumstances. Thus, he accentuates the masking
actions taken by them, a careful choice of participants of the involvement into a conspiracy, its
organization in two stages, a careful planning of the attempt on the dictator and a well‑thought
choice of place for its realization. He also emphasizes the dullness of Caesar’s diligence as well
as that of politicians loyal to him, the use of some of his actions, his self‑confidence,
lack of
suspicion, gentleness, resignation from the services of qualified security, ignoring warnings or
getting allies from his closest environment.
Secondly, the author presents the factors and circumstances that did not allow for keeping
the very involvement into a conspiracy secret. He shows both the ones that got out of control, and those they did not influence. All of them could be the reason why the information on the
conspiracy came out and unmasked it. In this context, he pays attention to the role of ominous
signs sent to Caesar from gods, predictions and the results of offering made that were not
beneficial for him, a big number of conspirators, a wide circle of their loved ones, friends,
acquaintances and servants, ass well as a hasty, especially in the last weeks, development of
conspiracy and, which may be connected with the choice of his final scenario ― delaying the
moment of murdering the dictator.
The result of the considerations conducted is the conclusion that it is difficult to speak of
the secrecy of the conspiracy organised by M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus against
Caesar in an explicit way. The success of the attempt, in the light of leak of information on an
intended murder of the dictator, was to a large extent, the result of a happy coincidence rather
than the effect of keeping the secret by the conspirators
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