1,338 research outputs found
Ludwig Pollak, Römische Memoiren. Künstler, Kunstliebhaber und Gelehrte 1893-1943. Herausgegeben von Margarete Merkel Guldan
No full textLunsingh Scheurleer Robert-Alexandre. Ludwig Pollak, Römische Memoiren. Künstler, Kunstliebhaber und Gelehrte 1893-1943. Herausgegeben von Margarete Merkel Guldan. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 67, 1998. pp. 534-535
Ludwig Pollak, Römische Memoiren. Künstler, Kunstliebhaber und Gelehrte 1893-1943. Herausgegeben von Margarete Merkel Guldan
No full textLunsingh Scheurleer Robert-Alexandre. Ludwig Pollak, Römische Memoiren. Künstler, Kunstliebhaber und Gelehrte 1893-1943. Herausgegeben von Margarete Merkel Guldan. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 67, 1998. pp. 534-535
Gary Becker's Contributions to Family and Household Economics
No full textGary Becker's influence on the economics of the family has been pervasive. His ideas have dominated research in the economics of the family, shaping the tools we use, the questions we ask, and the answers we give. The foundational assumptions of Becker's economic approach to the family -- maximizing behavior and equilibrium -- as well as such primary auxiliary assumptions as household production and interdependent preferences, are now widely accepted not only by economists but also by family sociologists, demographers, and others who study the family. Yet the interesting and provocative implications of Becker's economic approach to the family do not follow from the foundational assumptions or from the primary auxiliary assumptions. Instead they depend on contested auxiliary assumptions to which neoclassical economics has no commitment and which lack empirical support. This paper discusses the crucial role of auxiliary assumptions in Becker's analysis of the family, first in the context of preferences, then in the context of household production, and finally in the context of family or household collective choice.
Bargaining Around the Hearth
No full textIn "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families.
Living close to mothers or mothers-in-law gives married women with young children greater freedom to work
No full textIn an increasingly mobile society, there may still be incentives for remaining close to family members, especially for those with young children. Janice Compton and Robert A. Pollak take a close look at the effects on the labor supply – how many hours they are willing to work – of young mothers of living close to their mothers or mothers-in-law. They find that married women who live closer to their children’s grandmothers are more likely to be willing and able to work, and work longer hours. They argue that this effect is directly related to the greater availability of childcare that grandparents provide for married mothers with young children
Allocating Time: Individuals' Technologies, Household Technology, Perfect Substitutes, and Specialization
No full textIn an efficient household if the spouses' time inputs are perfect substitutes, then spouses will “specialize" regardless of their preferences and the governance structure. That is, both spouses will not allocate time to both household production and the market sector. The perfect substitutes assumption implies that spouses' "unilateral" production functions (i.e., the household production function when only one spouse allocates time to home production) are closely related, satisfying a highly restrictive condition that I call "compatibility." I introduce the “correspondence assumption,” which postulates that the unilateral production functions in a newly formed household coincide with individuals’ production functions before they enter marriage. The correspondence assumption provides a plausible account of the genesis of household technology and simplifies its estimation. I introduce the "additivity assumption” which postulates that the household production function is the sum of the spouses' unilateral production functions and argue that additivity is implicit in much of the new home economics. Together, the correspondence and additivity assumptions imply that individuals’ technologies reveal the entire household technology. I show that perfect substitutes, additivity and concavity imply that the household production function is of the same form as the unilateral production functions, exhibits constant returns to scale, and depends on the spouses' total time inputs, measured in efficiency units.
Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production
No full textWhat determines bargaining power in marriage? This paper argues that wage rates, not earnings, determine well-being at the threat point and, hence, determine bargaining power. Observed earnings at the bargaining equilibrium may differ from earnings at the threat point because hours allocated to market work at the bargaining solution may differ from hours allocated to market work at the threat point. In the divorce threat model, for example, a wife who does not work for pay while married might do so following a divorce; hence, her bargaining power would be related to her wage rate, not to her earnings while married. More generally, a spouse whose earnings are high because he or she chooses to allocate more hours to market work, and correspondingly less to household production and leisure, does not have more bargaining power. But a spouse whose earnings are high because of a high wage rate does have more bargaining power. Household production has received little attention in the family bargaining literature. The output of household production is analogous to earnings, and a spouse's productivity in household production is analogous to his or her wage rate. Thus, in a bargaining model with household production, a spouse's productivity in home production is a source of bargaining power.
An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence
No full textThis paper proposes and analyzes an intergenerational model of domestic violence (IMDV) in which behavioral strategies or scripts are transmitted from parents to children. The model rests upon three key assumptions: * The probability that a husband will be violent depends on whether he grew up in a violent home. * The probability that a wife will remain with a violent husband depends on whether she grew up in a violent home. * Individuals who grew up in violent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in violent homes. The IMDV calls attention to three features neglected in the domestic violence literature. The first is the marriage market. If some men are more likely than others to be violent as husbands and some women are more likely than others to remain in violent marriages, then the probability that such individuals marry each other is crucial. The second neglected feature is divorce: ongoing domestic violence requires the conjunction of a husband who is violent and a wife who stays. Third, variables and policies that reduce the rate of domestic violence in the short run are likely to reduce it even further in the long run.
From Eggs to the Stars
No full textJane Pollak is a Westport, Connecticut, artist who started her career as a high school art teacher. She has now branched out into public speaking, is the author of two books, and embraces the life of entrepreneur as a sole proprietor of her rapidly expanding business of decorating eggs. For Jane, her life path has been one of hope and unexpected personal and business achievements.</jats:p
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