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    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis

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    We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis

    Equilibrium in matching models with directed search: Existence and characterization

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    We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-off between price and trade probability. In the first chapter, we present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium. The proof is based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions. In the second chapter, we develop a tool based on directional derivatives that we use to characterize equilibrium and to resolve the long-standing problem of establishing uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium in this class of models. In the third chapter, we extend the analysis to a dynamic setting with homogeneous buyers and sellers. It is shown that there exists a continuum of Pareto-ranked equilibria characterized by prices that are generally above the static Nash equilibrium price, unless sellers can commit to maintain a trading relationship. In addition, price dispersion may endogenously arise as a temporary or permanent phenomenon

    Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts

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    We conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more sophisticated methods

    Author Index

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    koamabayili/VECTRON-author-checklist: VECTRON author checklist

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    We have done our best to complete the author checklist relating to the use of animals in the hut study. Note that the objective for the hut study was to evaluate the IRS treatment applications for residual efficacy against Anopheles mosquitoes, including the local An. coluzzii mosquito population. Cows were only used to attract mosquitoes into the huts and no tests were carried out directly on the cows. The author checklist is intended for use with studies where experiments are carried out on animals, which is why we have had such difficulty in completing this for the hut study, as many of the questions do not relate to how the cows were used

    Essays on Experimental Group Dynamics and Competition

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    This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I investigate the effects of complexity in various voting systems on individual behavior in small group electoral competitions. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe individual behavior within one of three voting systems – plurality, instant runoff voting (IRV), and score then automatic runoff (STAR). I then estimate subjects’ behavior in three different models of bounded rationality. The estimated models are a model of Level-K thinking (Nagel, 1995)[1], the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer, et al. 2004)[2], and a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995)[3]. I consistently find that more complex voting systems induce lower levels of strategic thinking. This implies that policy makers desiring more sincere voting behavior could potentially achieve this through voting systems with more complex strategy sets. Of the tested behavioral models, Level-K consistently fits observed data the best, implying subjects make decisions that combine of steps of thinking with random, utility maximizing, errors.In the second chapter, I investigate the relationship between the mechanisms used to select leaders and both measures of group performance and leaders’ ethical behavior. Using a laboratory experiment, we measure group performance in a group minimum effort task with a leader selected using one of three mechanisms: random, a competition task, and voting. After the group task, leaders must complete a task that asks them to behave honestly or dishonestly in questions related to the groups performance. We find that leaders have a large impact on group performance when compared to those groups without leaders. Evidence for which selection mechanism performs best in terms of group performance seems mixed. On measures of honesty, the strongest evidence seems to indicate that honesty is most positively impacted through a voting selection mechanism, which differences in ethical behavior between the random and competition selection treatments are negligible.In the third chapter, I provide an investigation into the factors and conditions that drive “free riding” behavior in dynamic innovation contests. Starting from a dynamic innovation contest model from Halac, et al. (2017)[4], I construct a two period dynamic innovation contest game. From there, I provide a theoretical background and derivation of mixed strategies that can be interpreted as an agent’s degree to which they engage in free riding behavior, namely through allowing their opponent to exert effort in order to uncover information about an uncertain state of the world. I show certain conditions must be fulfilled in order to induce free riding in equilibrium, and also analytically show the impact of changing contest prize structures on the degree of free riding. I end this paper with an experimental design to test these various theoretical conclusions in a laboratory setting while also considering the behavioral observations recorded in studies investigating similar contest models and provide a plan to analyze the data collected by this laboratory experiment

    Complexity and Conflict: Modeling Contests with Exogenous and Endogenous Noise

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    Contest outcomes often involve some mix of skill and chance. In three essays, I vary the sources of noise and show how player actions either influence, or are influenced by, noise. I begin with a classic multi-battle contest, the Colonel Blotto game. Due to his disadvantage in resources, the weak player in this contest stochastically distributes resources to a subset of battlefields while neglecting all others in an attempt to achieve a positive payoff. In contrast, the strong player evenly distributes his resources in order to defend all battlefields, while randomly assigning extra resources to some. Because the weak player benefits from randomizing over larger numbers of battlefields, a strong player has incentive to decrease the range over which the weak player can randomize. When battlefields are exogenously partitioned into subsets, or fronts, he is able to do this by decentralizing his forces to each front in a stage prior to the distribution of forces to battlefields and actual conflict. These allocations are permanent, and each subset of battlefields effectively becomes its own, independent Blotto subgame. I show that there exist parameter regions in which the strong player’s unique equilibrium payoffs with decentralization are strictly higher than the unique equilibrium payoffs without decentralization.In my second paper, I show how sources of exogenous noise, what Clausewitz referred to as the “fog of war,” obscure developments on the battlefield from the view of a military leader, while individual inexperience and lack of expertise in a particular situation influence his decisionmaking. I model both forms of uncertainty using the decentralized Colonel Blotto game from the first chapter. To do so, I first test the robustness of allocation-stage subgame perfect equilibria by changing the contest success function to a lottery, then I find the players’ quantal response equilibria (QRE) to show how individual decision-making is impacted by bounded rationality and noisy best responses, represented by a range of ψ values in the logit QRE. I find that player actions rely significantly less on decentralization strategies under the lottery CSF compared to the case of the all-pay auction, owing mainly to the increased exogenous noise. Moreover, agent QRE and heterogeneous QRE approximate subgame perfect equilibria for high values of ψ in the case of an all-pay auction, but under the lottery CSF, QRE is largely unresponsive to changes in ψ due to the increase in exogenous noise.Finally, I examine a potential method for introducing noise into the all-pay auction (APA) contest success function (CSF) utilized in the Colonel Blotto games of the first two chapters. Many contests are fundamentally structured as APA, yet there is a tendency in the empirical literature to utilize a lottery CSF when stochastic outcomes are possible or the tractability of pure strategy equilibria is desired. However, previous literature has shown that using a lottery CSF sacrifices multiple distinguishing characteristics of the APA, such as the mixed strategy equilibria described by Baye et al. (1996), the exclusion principle of Baye et al. (1993), and the caps on lobbying principleof Che and Gale (1998). I overcome this by formulating an APA that incorporates noise and retains the defining characteristics of an auction by forming a convex combination of the APA and fair lottery with the risk parameter λ
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