1,720,983 research outputs found
Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?
No full textThe Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Econometrica 4:386–405,
9 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in 10 the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the 11 decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost 12 neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase 13 in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and 14 property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a 15 transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential exter- 16 nalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets 17 needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only cen- 18 tralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also 19 aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure
Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence
No full textIP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity when Property Rights are Incomplete
No full textThis paper explores the interface between two important institutional pillars of market exchange – Intellectual Property (IP) law and Antitrust law – in light of a theory of property rights incompleteness. This theory interprets property as an incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined rights over actual and potential uses of given resources and defines externalities as joint claims over rival production uses of undefined entitlements, irrespective of whether the object of property rights has a tangible or intangible nature. The paper argues that traditional distinctions between physical property and IP based on attributes of tangibility, rivalry and excludability are misleading and bases on the substantial homogeneity of property rights and IPRs an argument supporting the complementarity between IP law and Antitrust law. Far from being an unjustified ex-post limitation to existing property rights, likely to undermine ex-ante incentives, Antitrust intervention represents one of the means by which incompletely specified property rights (both intellectual and tangible) might be redefined over time as externalities emerge
Multilevel Hidden Markov Models for Behavioral Data: A Hawk-and-Dove Experiment
Full text linkMotivated by the analysis of behavioral data taken from an economic experiment based on the Hawk-and-Dove game, this article describes a multilevel hidden Markov model, that includes covariates, autoregression, and endogenous initial conditions under a unified framework. The data at hand are affected by multiple sources of latent heterogeneity, due to multilevel unobserved factors that operate in conjunction with observed covariates at all the levels of the data hierarchy. We fit a multilevel logistic regression model for repeated measurements of player behaviors, nested within groups of interacting players. The model integrates discrete random effects at the group level and Markovian sequences of discrete random effects at the player level. Parameters are estimated by a computationally feasible expectation-maximization algorithm. We model the probability of playing the Hawk strategy, which implies fighting aggressively for controlling an asset, and test the role played by initial possession, property, and other player-specific characteristics in driving hawkish behaviors. The results from our study suggest that crucial factors in determining hawkish behavior are both the way possession is achieved - which depends on our treatment manipulation- and possession itself. Furthermore, a clear time-dependence is observed in the data at the player level as accounted for by the Markovian random effects
In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures
No full textThe standard model of optimal deterrence predicts that the probability of wrongful conviction of the innocent is, at the margin, as detrimental to deterrence as the wrongful acquittal of guilty individuals. We extend the model in several directions: using expected utility as well as non- expected utility to consider the role of risk aversion, non-linear probability weighting and loss aversion. We also consider how relevant emotions such as guilt, shame and indignation play out. Several of these factors support the intuition that wrongful convictions of the innocent do have a larger detrimental impact on deterrence and thus the policy implications are reconciled with the widely shared maxim in dubio pro reo. We then draw some theoretical implications such as a novel justification for the different standards of proof in criminal vs civil law as well as other policy implications
Lo sciopero virtuale tra equivoci e illusionI
No full textNel febbraio 2009 il governo italiano ha approvato un disegno di legge per la regolamentazione e prevenzione dei conflitti collettivi di lavoro con riferimento alla libera circolazione delle persone. Una delle novità riguarda la disciplina dello sciopero virtuale. L’approccio seguito alla legge delega circa questa forma di sciopero sembra presentare tuttavia, alla luce dell’analisi economica degli incentivi, alcuni rile- vanti problemi
Exploring Coases' World: An introduction
No full textThe Nobel Laureate Ronald H. Coase has occupied a central place in the law and economics approach to the analysis of institutions. Many Coasean topics have been discussed and debated over almost a century. Yet, ‘deconstructing’ Professor Coase’s contributions leaves a legacy of further refining the economic meaning of property rights, the predictive role of transaction costs for institutional dynamics, and the nature of governance in the modern firm
The Pied Piper: Prizes, Incentives, and Motivation Crowding-in
No full textIn mainstream business and economics,prizessuch as the Presidential Medal of Freedom are understood as special types ofincentives, with the peculiar features of being awarded in public, and of having largely symbolic value. Informed by both historical considerations and philosophical instances, our study defines fundamental theoretical differences betweenincentivesandprizes. The conceptual factors highlighted by our analytical framework are then tested through a laboratory experiment. The experimental exercise aims to analyze how prizes and incentives impact actual individuals' behavior differently. Our results show that bothincentives(monetary and contingent) andprizes(non-monetary and discretional rewards) boost motivation to perform if awarded publicly, but onlyprizescrowd in motivation promoting virtuous attitude
Strangers’ property
Full text linkWhy are impartial institutions such as formalized property rights so important for the emergence of impersonal trade? Previous literature has stressed the role of such institutions in providing third-party enforcement to shield strangers from locals’ opportunism. We document the existence of a second mechanism based on the role of formalized property rights in inducing respect for the property of strangers, regardless of enforcement. Ten years after the randomized introduction of formal property rights across rural Benin, we conducted a taking-dictator-game experiment in which participants could appropriate the endowment of an anonymous stranger from a different village. Even if enforcement institutions are absent and peer effects are silenced by design, participants from villages where the reform was implemented took significantly less than those in control villages. We further give consideration to several possible transmission channels and discuss their plausibilit
Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal
No full textA consistent empirical literature shows that in many organizations supervisors systemati- cally overrate their employees’ performance. Such leniency bias is at odds with the standard principal-agent model and has been explained with causes that range from social interac- tions to fairness concerns and to collusive behavior between the supervisor and the agent. We show that the principal-agent model, extended to consider loss-aversion and reference- dependent preferences, predicts that the leniency bias is comparatively less detrimental to effort provision than the severity bias. We test this prediction with a laboratory experi- ment where we demonstrate that failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents. This offers a novel explanation as to why supervisors tend to be lenient in their appraisals
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