1,721,017 research outputs found
Mandatory Cooperation
Get PDFThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record Ripstein, Arthur. "Mandatory Cooperation." In Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, vol. 96, no. 1, pp. 23-40. Oxford University Press, 2022. is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akac013My aim in this paper is to develop a new model of the obligation to do your part in contributing to the provision of what are frequently described as ‘public goods’. I will situate my account in a broadly Kantian account of the state as a public rightful condition, which enjoys powers that no private person could enjoy, in the service of its distinctively public mandate. The exercise of those powers imposes special duties on the state, which require it to provide distinctively public goods. As an artificial person, the state can only act through natural persons; doing your part enables the state to achieve its distinctively public purposes
Political Authority and Distributive Justice
Get PDFMany political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders?
I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities.
I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.Ph
Authority, Justice, and Public Law: A Unified Theory
No full textIn articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority.
The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.Ph
The Tortious Liability of States for Combatant Activities
Get PDFThis thesis examines whether it should be possible for civilians to hold states liable for losses states inflict on them during warfare. Answering this question requires turning into two bodies of laws that appear to be incompatible and unable to yield clear conclusions. First, the laws of war, which regulate states’ conduct in combat, but do not provide individuals with a private law claim-right against states or impose duties of compensation on states towards civilians. Second, tort law, which offers civilians a cause of action, yet its structure seems difficult to apply in the battlefield, and its availability is frustrated in many common law jurisdictions by a special immunity. Consequently, arguments relating to the liability of states tend to be polarized, advocating for either complete immunity or total liability, and are divorced, to various degrees, either from the laws of war or from tort law.
In this thesis, I develop a novel account of the tortious liability of states for wrongs they inflict during combat that is informed by the laws of war, tort law theory and doctrine, and substantive rule of law principles. My central claim is that by examining the laws of war, it is possible to articulate the rights and duties of states and civilians during war, including what amounts to an imposition of wrongful losses for which corrective justice duties arise. Only losses that are inflicted while violating the laws of war are wrongs for which liability can and should be imposed, as such actions are outside the scope of states’ authority. By exposing the nexus between the laws of war and tort law and defining which losses amount to belligerent wrongs, the framework I offer illuminates how tort doctrines can apply in the battlefield and why tort liability should be available for civilians against states.S.J.D.2022-06-22 00:00:0
Odious Debts and Global Justice
Get PDFIn this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue.
While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coercive. Second, I develop an account of odious debts from a moral point of view. I argue that a big portion of the debts of the poorest countries are not binding and therefore countries are morally entitled to repudiate them. An implication of this is that lenders have no moral right to demand repayment of odious debts. The reason why some debts are not binding is that citizens should only be held liable for debts incurred in their name when the money that is the basis of that debt is used for legitimate public purposes, not private ones.
Whenever ruler acts in accordance to private purposes, states are no longer collectively responsible for the acts incurred in their name. This follows from a proper understanding of social contract theories but also, I argue, from a utilitarian perspective.Ph
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Between Groups and Across Time: A Relational Group-based Account of Reparations for Historical Injustice
Get PDFMany people believe that injustices committed long ago ought to be repaired. Yet, the possibility of reparative justice for historical injustices encounters significant philosophical objections. In particular, it appears as though we cannot apply the standard picture of reparative justice that we use for most injustices. On this picture, reparative justice requires that the wrongdoer provide reparations to the victim, the content of which corresponds to the way the wrongdoer’s action was unjust. This standard picture captures what we want from an account of reparative justice: The wrongdoer ought to be accountable to the victim and address the victim’s losses caused by the wrongdoer’s action. However, we cannot seem to extend this intuitive standard picture to cases of historical injustice. The individual wrongdoers and victims no longer exist, often the content of the injustice is not something that we could possibly repair, and the effects of the injustice are so widespread that it seems impossible to determine which effects ought to be repaired.
These challenges have led many philosophers to argue that we cannot extend the standard picture of reparative justice to cases of historical injustice. They argue for alternative models of what ought to be done to address historical injustice based on structural injustice, the beneficiary pays principle, or equal distributions. While these models do something for historical injustice, they do not capture what we seem to want from reparative justice: The wrongdoer ought to do something for the victim to take responsibility for their wrong. This means that the alternative models cannot capture what we seem to want from an ideal account of reparations for historical injustice.
My goal is to show that it is possible to extend the standard picture to cases of historical injustice. I develop the Relational Group-Based Account of reparative justice for historical injustice. The central point of this account is that reparations for historical injustice are about what one group wrongfully did to another. I defend this account by demonstrating how it overcomes major philosophical objections against the possibility of reparations and by resolving important challenges about group wrongs.Ph.D
Authority, Justice, and Public Law: A Unified Theory
Get PDFIn articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority.
The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.Ph
Political Authority and Distributive Justice
No full textMany political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders?
I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities.
I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.Ph
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