537 research outputs found

    Please weight: when confronted by a large Indian statistic, divide by population

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    The latest wealth index by New World Wealth that looks at multimillionaires has ranked India eighth in the global rich list. But Maitreesh Ghatak and Debraj Ray contend that looking at absolute numbers can be misleading. Accounting for population and economic differences across countries, it shows that while India does not stand out in terms of income going to the top 1%, it does in terms of income going to the top 0.1%

    Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics

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    The textbook paradigm of economywide development rests on the premise of "balanced growth": that is, on the presumption that all sectors will grow in unison over time as a country gets richer. Of course, we would all agree that balanced growth is an abstraction. In many developing countries, economic growth has been fundamentally uneven. The question really is not whether growth is balanced -- it isn't -- but whether the abstraction is a useful one. For many important development questions, I believe the answer is no. This is why I would like to take the reality of "uneven growth" seriously and use it as an organizing device for a research program. I divide my research agenda into roughly two parts: the sources and nature of uneven growth, and the reactions to uneven growth -- how forces are set in motion to restore balance or perhaps even to thwart the growth process. To help us think about the effects of uneven growth, I present a version of Albert Hirschmann's tunnel parable: You're in a multi-lane tunnel, all lanes in the same direction, and you're caught in a serious traffic jam. After a while, the cars in the other lane begin to move. Do you feel better or worse? At first, movement in the other lane may seem like a good sign: you hope that your turn to move will come soon, and indeed that might happen. However, if the other lane keeps whizzing by, with no gaps to enter and with no change on your lane, your reactions may well become quite negative. Unevenness without corresponding redistribution can be tolerated or even welcomed if it raises expectations everywhere, but it will be tolerated for only so long. Thus, uneven growth will set forces in motion to restore a greater degree of balance, even (in some cases) actions that may thwart the growth process itself.

    Natural resources and conflict: the crucial role of power mismatch and geographic asymmetries

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    Natural resource rents are often equated with political turmoil and fighting. While one can easily find examples where there has been such a link (see e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Chad, Nigeria or Iraq), one can as easily pick examples of both democracies (e.g. Norway) or nondemocracies (e.g. Saudi Arabia) where resource wealth has not been associated with political instability. As argued below, whether the spoils of nature give birth to the horror of war depends on a series of geographical and political factors, namely asymmetries and mismatches that are not compensated by appropriate policies

    Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation

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    A model of "satisficing" behavior in the repeated Prisoners Dilemma is studied. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. [S]he switches from the action played in the previous period only if the achieved payoff fell below the aspiration level (with a probability that depends on the shortfall). Aspirations are updated in each period, according to payoff experience in the previous period In addition, aspirations are subjected to random perturbations around the going level, with a small "tremble" probability. For sufficiently slow updating of aspirations, and small tremble probability, it is shown that in the long run both players cooperate most of the time

    Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics

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    The textbook paradigm of economy-wide development rests on the premise of "balanced growth"; that is, on the presumption that all sectors will grow in unison over time as a country gets richer. This view has served us reasonably well in some circumstances, but is not particularly useful for accounts of modern (under)development.In many developing countries, economic growth has been fundamentally uneven: software development, the outsourcing of services, sectoral technological change, quick compositional shifts between agriculture and other sectors, the rise of particular exports, "special" economic zones, and so on. This paper will discuss both the sources of uneven growth, and its implications, with greater emphasis on the latter. The paper will argue that much of the distributional issues, or the reactions to globalization that we see in modern developing societies can be viewed as reactions to a growth process that is fundamentally uneven and is indeed perceived as such.Balanced Growth; Economic Development; Globalization

    Reciprocity in Groups and the Limits to Social Capital.

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    Robert Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation” (Putnam 1995: 67). Such networks are typically associated with norms that pro-mote coordination, cooperation and reciprocity for the mutual benefit of network members. These norms, coupled with the appropriate use of sanctions in case of noncompliance, are often thought to enable these groups to deal smoothly and effectively with multiple social and economic issues. At the same time, some au-thors have noted that strongly bonded groups may have adverse consequences for others (see, for instance Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, 1996) or even for themselves (see for instance George Akerlof, 1976, or Kaushik Basu, 1986). It is this latter aspect that we wish to emphasize in these notes. Based on our earlier work on risk sharing in groups and networks (Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2003, 2005 and Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2006), this paper proposes a simple model of mutual help in groups and networks. We argue that, if social capital can promote cooperation among groups of indi

    Updating Validations and Stochastic Dynamics on Coordination

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    This work studies an equilibrium selection of infinitely repeated symmetric 2x2 coordination games that show a tension between Pareto efficiency and risk dominance, in which bounded rational agents adopt the following simple behavior rule: each agent has a valuation of actions, and chooses the highest one. Valuations are updated according to the sign of the difference between the current valuation and the realized payoff. By applying techniques from stochastic stable states (Kandori et al. 1993 and Young 1993), it is shown that the risk dominant outcome is selected; that is, it is realized more frequently in the long run.

    A Comparison of Polarization Measures

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    This paper provides a systematic classification of the different measures of polarization based on their properties. Together with the axioms proposed in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and in Wang and Tsui (2000) we consider three additional properties. We examine which properties are common to all indices and which set them apart.

    Dominant party rule, development, and the rise of Hindu nationalism in West Bengal

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    To what extent does the BJP’s dramatic electoral success in West Bengal in the 2019 Lok Sabha election indicate a fundamental rupture in the state’s political party system? This chapter offers the first systematic exploration of this question. More specifically, the chapter asks: What are the individual-level correlates of taking up membership in the various Sangh Parivar affiliate organizations in West Bengal? The chapter examines this question in the empirical context of the state’s Junglemahal region. My analysis is based on original survey data collected in Junglemahal in the run-up to the 2019 election. Using questions embedded in the survey on membership in cultural organisations and inclination to vote for the BJP, I show that the growth of Hindu nationalism in the region is consistent with an embedded mobilisation strategy. While the data reveal a positive correlation between affinity towards Hindutva policies and propensity to vote for the BJP, such affinity plays no role in the decision to join the RSS or the Seva Bharati, which is primarily driven by secular dissatisfaction with the TMC’s governance failures
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