1,721,002 research outputs found
Completely mixed games and M-matrices
AbstractAny non-singular M-matrix is a completely mixed matrix game with positive value. We exploit this property to give game-theoretic proofs of several well-known characterizations of such matrices. The same methods yield also many theorems on S0-irreducible matrices that are closely related to M-matrices
Semi-infinite stochastic games
We investigate two-person zero-sum stopping stochastic games with a finite number of states, for which the action sets of player i are finite and those for player ii are countably infinite. Concerning the payoffs no restrictions are made. We show that for such games the value, possibly —∞ in some coordinates, exists; player i possesses optimal stationary strategies and player ii possesses near-optimal stationary strategies with finite support. Furthermore we relate the existence of value and of (near-)optimal stationary strategies with a maximal solution to the shapley-equation.keywordsstationary strategystochastic gamematrix gamemixed actionfinite supportthese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves
On diagonal products of doubly stochastic matrices
AbstractThe following result is proved: If A and B are distinct n × n doubly stochastic matrices, then there exists a permutation σ of {1, 2,…, n} such that ∏iaiσ(i) > ∏ib iσ(i)
A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
In this paper we propose a dynamic game theoretic modeling framework for the international climate change negotiations that should take place, at the end of the Kyoto protocol agreement, if the necessity to curb drastically carbon emissions is confirmed. The model is composed of a set of optimal economic growth models corresponding to the different groups of nations that will be parties in the negotiations. Emissions of greenhouse gases are represented as by-products of the economic production process. Two types of capital (clean vs. dirty) can be used to produce the economic good with different emissions effects. The negotiations should determine a set of allowances that define caps on GHG emissions such that a long term constraint on total emissions is satisfied. At each instant of time, given the emission caps, an international emissions trading system is organized. In order to be self-enforcing the emission caps, and the economic growth paths have to satisfy a noncooperative equilibrium condition. We describe mathematically this two-level game structure and give the necessary optimality conditions that have to be satisfied by the equilibrium solution, under the coupled global emission constraint.LEUR
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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