1,306 research outputs found
Letter from Charles Greene to Alden Partridge, 4 October 1822
No full textCharles W. Greene writes from Jamaica Plain to Alden Partridge at the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy in Norwich, Vermont, with recommendations from William R. Lee's former teacher, Henry Colman, and himself.Transcription by Raymond Bouchard. Transcriptions may be subject to error
Parallel reduction of plasma levels of high and low molecular weight kininogen in patients with cirrhosis
No full textLittle is known about the regulation of high-molecular-weight-kininogen (HK) and low-molecular-weight-kininogen (LK) or the relationship of each to the degree of liver function impairment in patients with cirrhosis. In this study, we evaluated HK and LK quantitatively by a recently described particle concentration fluorescence immunoassay (PCFIA) and qualitatively by SDS PAGE and immunoblotting analyses in plasma from 33 patients with cirrhosis presenting various degrees of impairment of liver function. Thirty-three healthy subjects served as normal controls. Patients with cirrhosis had significantly lower plasma levels of HK (median 49 microg/ml [range 22-99 microg/ml]) and LK (58 microg/ml [15-100 microg/ml]) than normal subjects (HK 83 microg/ml [65-115 microg/ml]; LK 80 microg/ml [45-120 microg/ml]) (p<0.0001). The plasma concentrations of HK and LK were directly related to plasma levels of cholinesterase (P<0.0001) and albumin (P<0.0001 and P<0.001) and inversely to the Child-Pugh score (P<0.0001) and to prothrombin time ratio (P<0.0001) (reflecting the clinical and laboratory abnormalities in liver disease). Similar to normal individuals, in patients with cirrhosis, plasma HK and LK levels paralleled one another, suggesting that a coordinate regulation of those proteins persists in liver disease. SDS PAGE and immunoblotting analyses of kininogens in cirrhotic plasma showed a pattern similar to that observed in normal controls for LK (a single band at 66 kDa) with some lower molecular weight forms noted in cirrhotic plasma. A slight increase of cleavage of HK (a major band at 130 kDa and a faint but increased band at 107 kDa) was evident. The increased cleavage of HK was confirmed by the lower cleaved kininogen index (CKI), as compared to normal controls. These data suggest a defect in hepatic synthesis as well as increased destructive cleavage of both kininogens in plasma from patients with cirrhosis. The decrease of important regulatory proteins like kininogens may contribute to the imbalance in coagulation and fibrinolytic systems, which frequently occurs in cirrhotic patient
Complex scale-free networks with tunable power-law exponent and clustering
No full textThis article is made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund. It is distributed under a Creative Commons License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). Copyright @ 2013 Elsevier B.V.We introduce a network evolution process motivated by the network of citations in the scientific literature. In each iteration of the process a node is born and directed links are created from the new node to a set of target nodes already in the network. This set includes mm “ambassador” nodes and ll of each ambassador’s descendants where mm and ll are random variables selected from any choice of distributions plpl and qmqm. The process mimics the tendency of authors to cite varying numbers of papers included in the bibliographies of the other papers they cite. We show that the degree distributions of the networks generated after a large number of iterations are scale-free and derive an expression for the power-law exponent. In a particular case of the model where the number of ambassadors is always the constant mm and the number of selected descendants from each ambassador is the constant ll, the power-law exponent is (2l+1)/l(2l+1)/l. For this example we derive expressions for the degree distribution and clustering coefficient in terms of ll and mm. We conclude that the proposed model can be tuned to have the same power law exponent and clustering coefficient of a broad range of the scale-free distributions that have been studied empirically.EPSR
Dylematy etyczne w świetle teorii gier
No full textZdigitalizowano i udostępniono w ramach projektu pn. Rozbudowa otwartych zasobów naukowych Repozytorium Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, dofinansowanego z programu „Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki” Ministra Edukacji i Nauki na podstawie umowy SONB/SP/512497/2021.Zakład Ekonometrii i Statystyki, Wydział Ekonomii i Zarządzania, Uniwersytet w BiałymstokuBugdol M. 2007 Gry i zachowania nieetyczne w organizacji, Warszawa.Burns T.R., Meeker L. 1974 Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisonier's Dilemma Game, [w:] Game Theory as the Conflict Resolution, ed. A. Rapoport, Dordrecht-Holland.Burns T.R., Roszkowska E. 2003 Fuzzy Game Theory: The Perspective of the General Theory of Games on Nash and Normative Equilibria, [w:] Rough-Neural Computing: Techniques for Computing with Words, red. K.P. Sankar, L. Polkowski, A. Skowron, Springer.Burns T., Roszkowska E. 2005 Generalized Game Theory: Assumptions, Principies, and Elaborations Grounded in Social Theory, "In Search of Social Order, Series "Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric", 8 (21).Colman A. 1982 Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction, Oxford-New York, Toronto-Sydney-Paris-Frankfurt.Drabik E. 1998 Elementy teorii gier dla ekonomistów, Białystok.Friedman W.J. 1990 Game theory with applications to economics, Oxford University Press.Gasparski W. 2004 Wykłady z etyki biznesu, Warszawa.Gomolińska A. 1999 Rule Complexes for Representing Social Actors and Interactions, "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric", nr 3(16).Grzelak J. 1987 Homo Oeconomicus. Konflikt interesów w tradycji teorii gier, "Studia Psychologiczne", nr 25(2).Hare J.M. 1963 Freedom and Reason, Oxford.Harsanyi, J.C, SeIten J. 1972 A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information, "Management Science", (18).Kalai E., Smorodinsky M. 1975 Other solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, "Econometrica", (43).Kalinowski S. 2008 Konkurencja lub kooperacja. Studia eksperymentalne nad funkcjonowaniem rynków, Poznań.Kant I. 2001 Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności, Kęty.Kictliński K., Reyes V.M, Oleksyn T. 2005 Etyka w biznesie i zarządzaniu, Kraków.Kozielecki J. 1970 Konflikt teoria gier i psychologia, Warszawa.Kreps D. 1990 Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford University Press.Kuc B.R, Moczydłowska J.M. 2009 Zachowania organizacyjne, Warszawa.Kwarciński T. 2009 Racjonalność ekonomiczna i zasady moralne, [w:] Człowiek i jego decyzje, red. K.A. Kłosiński, A. Biela, Lublin.Luce R., Raiffa H. 1964 Gry i Decyzje, Warszawa.Malawski M., Wieczorek A., Sosnowska H. 1997 Konkurencja i kooperacja. Teoria gier w ekonomii i naukach społecznych, Warszawa.McClintock C. Game Behavior and Social Motivation in Interpersonal Settings, [w:] Experimental Social Psychology.Myerson R.B. 1991 Game theory. Analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press.Nash J. 1950 The bargaining problem, "Econometrica", (18).Nash J. 1953 Two-Persons Cooperative Games, "Econometrica", (21).Osborne M.J, Rubinstein A. 1990 Bargaining and Markets, Academic Press, Inc.Rawls J. 1994 Teoria sprawiedliwości, Warszawa.Robbins S.P., DeCenzo D.A. 2002 Podstawy zarządzania, Warszawa.Roszkowska E. 2007 Modelowanie procesów decyzyjnych oraz negocjacji za pomocą kompleksów reguł, Białystok.Schelling T.C. 1960 The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA.Sen A.K. 1982 Choice, Orderings and Morality, [w:] Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Oxford.Sidgwick H. 1967 The Methods of Ethics, London.Straffin P.D. 2001 Teoria gier, Warszawa.Tyszka T. 1978 Konflikty i strategie. Niektóre zastosowania teorii gier, Warszawa.Thompson W. 1994 Cooperative models of bargaining, [w:] Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Tom II, red. R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Elsevier.314516
Achilles in petticoats. [electronic resource] : An opera. As it is performed at the Theatre-Royal, in Covent-Garden. Written by Mr. Gay, with alterations. The Music entirely new by Dr. Arne.
No full textThe alterations are by George Colman the Elder.With a half-title.A variant does not have "W. Griffin" in imprint.Electronic reproduction.English Short Title Catalog,Reproduction of original from British Library
Unprecedented strongly panchromic absorption from proton switchable iridium(III) azoimidazolate complexes
No full textTwo novel heteroleptic iridium(III) complexes bearing an aryldiazoimidazole ligand are reported. These complexes differ structurally with respect to the protonation state of the imidazole ring, but can be independently accessed by varying the synthetic conditions. Their structures have been unequivocally confirmed by X-ray crystal structure analysis, with surprising differences in the structural parameters of the two complexes. The strongly absorbing nature of the free diazoimidazole ligand is enhanced in these iridium complexes, with the protonated cationic complex demonstrating extraordinarily strong panchromic absorption up to 700 nm. The absorption profile of the deprotonated neutral complex is blue-shifted by about 100 nm and thus the interconversion between the two complexes as a function of the acidity/basicity of the environment can be readily monitored by absorption spectroscopy. Theoretical calculations reveal the origins of these markedly different absorption properties. Finally, the protonated analogue has been targeted as an acceptor material for organic photovoltaic (OPV) applications and preliminary results are reported.Peer reviewe
Procesy integracji a negocjacje. Zastosowanie wybranych gier dwuosobowych o sumie niezerowej do analizy sytuacji negocjacyjnej
No full textZdigitalizowano i udostępniono w ramach projektu pn. Rozbudowa otwartych zasobów naukowych Repozytorium Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, dofinansowanego z programu „Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki” Ministra Edukacji i Nauki na podstawie umowy SONB/SP/512497/2021.Wydział Ekonomiczny Uniwersytetu w BiałymstokuBums T., Meeker L., Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisonier's Dilemma Game, [w:] A. Rapoport (red.), Game Theory as the Conflict Resolution, Dordrecht-Holland, 1974.Caderman L., Unpacking the National Interest: An Analysis of Preforence Aggregation in Ordinal Games, [w:] Game Theory and International Relations. Candidate Images in Presidential Elections, Westport-London 1995.Colman A., Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction, Oxford-New York, Toronto-Sydney-Paris-Frankfurt, 1982.Flower A., Jak skutecznie negocjować, Petit, Warszawa 1991.Harsany J., Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflict, [w:] International Politics and Foreign Policy.Kozielecki J., Konflikt teoria gier i psychologia, PWN, Warszawa 1970.Luce R., Raiffa H., Gry i Decyzje, Warszawa 1964.McClintock C., Game Behavior and Social Motivation in Interpersonal Settings, [w:] Experimental Social Psychology.Owen G., Teoria gier, PWN, Warszawa 1975.Ordeshook P.C., Game Theory and Political Theory, Cambrigde University, 1986.Pietraś Z. L., Decydowanie polityczne, PWN, Warszawa 1998.Rapoport A., Guyer M., Gordon D., The 2x2 Games, Ann Arbor 1976.Rubin J., Brown B., The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press, New York 1975.Schelling T. C., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Cambridge, 1980.Straffin P.D., Teoria gier, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2001.Walton RE., McKersie RB., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, ILR Press, Ithaca, New York, 1993.12614
Gut Virome Dynamics during Pregnancy in Mothers with Type 1 Diabetes
No full textSession LB-192 - Late Breaking Poster SessionKi Wook Kim, Digby W. Allen, Thomas Briese, Chi Nam Pang, Komal Jain, Jessica L. Horton, Sonia R. Isaacs, Marc R. Wilkins, Jennifer Couper, Megan A.S. Penno, Leonard C. Harrison, Grant Morahan, Mark Harris, Andrew M. Cotterill, Claire Morbey, Simon C. Barry, Aveni Haynes, Elizabeth Davis, Peter Colman, Lynne Giles, Jodie Dodd, John Wentworth, Richard Sinnott, Tony A. Papenfuss, Peter Vuillermin, W. Ian Lipkin, William D. Rawlinson, Maria E. Crai
Further explorations of interactions between agricultural policy and regional growth in Western Europe - approaches to nonstationarity in spatial econometrics
No full textThe work discussed in Bivand and Brunstad (2003) was an attempt to throw light on apparent variability in regional convergence in relation to agriculture as a sector subject to powerful political measures, in Western Europe, 1989 1999. We tried to explore the possibility that some of the observed specification issues in current results are rooted in neglecting agricultural policy interventions, within the limitations imposed by data available. We also attempted to use this as a case setting for evaluating the appropriateness of geographically weighted regression (GWR) as a technique for assessing coef- ficient variability, over and above for instance country dummies, but possibly reflecting missing variables or other specification problems. The present study takes up a number of points made in conclusion in that paper. Since it is possible that the non-stationarity found there is related to further missing variables, including the inadequacy of the way in which agricultural subsidies are represented, we attempt to replace the agriculture variables with better estimates of producer subsidy equivalents for the base year. We also look at ways of handling changes in agricultural policy regime occurring between years and T. This raises the further challenge of looking at both spatial and temporal dimensions at the same time, which we will discuss, but are not likely to resolve satisfactorily. On the technical side, the tests on GWR estimates also need to be more firmly established. The GWR results also need to be tested for spatial autocorrelation, and re-worked in an adaptive weighting framework, although GWR does already involve a spatial weighting of the observations themselves. The paper is therefore also an account of the development of software contributed to the R project (R Development Core Team, 2004) as packages, in particular the spdep package for spatial econometrics, and the spgwr package for GWR fitting. In particular, specific issues regarding the handling of the Jacobian in fitting spatial simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) models, and in interpreting GWR output will be discussed. These will be set in the context of on-going work on semi-parametric spatial filtering, which it is hoped to add to spdep following contributions by Michael Tiefelsdorf, so that the weaknesses and strengths of alternative approaches can be compared. Concentrating on implementations in R is justified by the preliminary nature of many of these methods requiring open source and replicable statistical research approaches, so that others can, if they wish, see how results were calculated. One such technical issue is the representation of neighbours in the various approaches, and of the impact of symmetry requirements in conditional autoregressive (CAR) models typically used in MCMC estimation using Open- BUGS and elsewhere. Indeed, in many SAR models, symmetry is also required, or at least underlying symmetry, with the weights matrix in the rowstandardised weighting scheme typically being similar to a symmetric matrix. Using the Western European regional growth data augmented with agricultural policy variables, we will try to explore how far some as-yet unresolved technical questions impede progress with substantive interpretation. We will also try to show how these questions may be handled in other software settings, and how data can be moved between software platforms for analysis. In conclusion, the paper has two threads, one focussing on the analysis of the relationships between regional growth and agricultural policy, generating models needing testing, while the other attempts to meet the software demands generated in the first thread, and to incorporate on-going research in spatial data-analytic methods to respond adequately to the potential importance of the substantive research question.
Analiza "dylematu więźnia" z wykorzystaniem kompleksów reguł
No full textZdigitalizowano i udostępniono w ramach projektu pn. Rozbudowa otwartych zasobów naukowych Repozytorium Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, dofinansowanego z programu „Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki” Ministra Edukacji i Nauki na podstawie umowy SONB/SP/512497/2021.Wydział Ekonomii i Zarządzania Uniwersytetu w BiałymstokuBums T.R, Caldas J. C. , Roszkowska E., Generalized Game Theory's Contribution to Multi-agent Modelling Addressing Problems of Social
Regulation, Sodal Order, and Effective Security, [w:] B. Dunin-KepIicz, A. Jankowski, A. Skowron, M.A. Szczuka (red.), Monitoring, Security
and Rescue Techniques in Multiagent Systems, Springer 2005.Bums T.R, Gomolińska A., The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: The Mathematics of Social Relationships, Rule Complexes, and Action
Modalities, "Quality and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology" 2001, t. 34(4).Bums T. R., Gomolińska A. , Meeker L. D. , The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed
Games, "Quality and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology" 2001, nr 35(1).Burns T.R, Meeker L., Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisonier's Dilemma Game, [w:] A. Rapoport (red.), Game Theory as the Conflict Resolution, Dordrecht-Holland, 1974.Burns T. R., Roszkowska E., Economic and Social Equilibria: The perspective of generalized Game Theory, "Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne"
2006, nr 3(31).Burns T. R., Roszkowska E., Fuzzy Game Theory: The Perspective of the General Theory of Games on Nash and Normative Equilibria, [w: ]
K.P. Sankar, L. Polkowski, A. Skowron (red.), Rough-Neural Computing: Techniquesfor Computing with Words, Springer 2003.Burns T. R., Roszkowska E., Generalized Game Theory: Assumptions. Principies. and Elaborations Grounded in Sodal Theory, "In Search of Social
Order", Series Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 2005, Nr 8(21).Burns T. R, Roszkowska E., Sodal Judgement in Multi-Agent Systems, [w:] R. Sun (red.), Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction. From Cognitive
Modeling to Social Simulation, Cambridge University Press 2006.Colman A., Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction, Oxford-New York, Toronto-Sydney-Paris-Frankfurt 1982.Gomolińska A., Rule Complexes for Representing Social Actors and Interactions, "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric" 1999, nr 3(16).Grzelak J., Homo Oeconomicus. Konflikt interesów w tradycji teorii gier, "Studia Psychologiczne" 1987, nr 25(2).Kozielecki J., Konflikt teoria gier i psychologia, PWN, Warszawa 1970.Luce R., Raiffa H., Gry i Decyzje, Warszawa 1964.Ordeshook P. C. , Game Theory and Political Theory, Cambrigde University, 1986.Pietraś Z. L., Decydowanie polityczne, PWN, Warszawa 1998.Rapoport A., Guyer M., Gordon D., The 2x2 Games, Ann Arbor 1976.Reiter R., A logic for default reasoning, "Artificial Intelligence" 1980, nr 13.Roszkowska E., Modelowanie procesów decyzyjnych oraz negocjacji za pomocą kompleksów reguł, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku,
Białystok 2007.Roszkowska E., Procesy integracji a negocjacje. Zastosowanie wybranych gier dwuosobowych o sumie niezerowej do analizy sytuacji negocjacyjnej,
[w:] A. F. Bocian (red.), Podlasie - a procesy integracji, Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Białystok 2005.Rubin J.Z., Brown B. R., The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press, Orlando, Fla. 1975.Schelling T. C., The strategy of conflict, Harvard University Cambridge, 1980.Straffin P. D., Teoria gier, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2001.Tyszka T., Konflikty i strategie. Niektóre zastosowania teorii gier, WNT, Warszawa 1978.21823
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