178 research outputs found

    Not a NICE Fallacy: A Reply to Dr. Quigley

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    A repudiation of Muireann Quigley?s argument that the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) values and assesses the worth of people?s lives; together with an alternative account of what it appears that NICE actually does, why these procedures are not unreasonable and some of the unresolved problems, especially when making interpersonal comparisons of health, which remain for NICE or, indeed, anyone seeking to determine the contents of the benefits bundles of a public health insurance programme such as the NHS. Some other ethically dubious propositions by Dr. Quigley are also rejected

    Quigley, Muireann. Self-Ownership, Property Rights, and the Human Body: A Legal and Philosophical Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. 360. $39.99 (paper)

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    [Extract]Are bodies and body parts "things" which are capable of being owned and subjected to property rights? Or does the "personness" associated with living human beings survive death of, or separation from, the human source, thereby eluding traditional property paradigms? In 'Self-Ownership, Property Rights, and the Human Body', Muireann Quigley grapples with the legal and ethical implications of this conundrum, attributable to advances in biotechnology which have imbued bodies and biomaterials with potential destinies and value beyond their traditional fate of burial and worm fodder (caro data vermibus

    Self-ownership, property rights, and the human body:a legal and philosophical analysis

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    How ought the law to deal with novel challenges regarding the use and control of human biomaterials? As it stands the law is ill-equipped to deal with these. Quigley argues that advancing biotechnology means that the law must confront and move boundaries which it has constructed; in particular, those which delineate property from non-property in relation to biomaterials. Drawing together often disparate strands of property discourse, she offers a philosophical and legal re-analysis of the law in relation to property in the body and biomaterials. She advances a new defence, underpinned by self-ownership, of the position that persons ought to be seen as the prima facie holders of property rights in their separated biomaterials. This book will appeal to those interested in medical and property law, philosophy, bioethics, and health policy amongst others
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