1,720,993 research outputs found
Eliciting and Measuring Betrayal Aversion using the BDM Mechanism
No full textBetrayal aversion has been operationalized as the evidence that subjects demand a higher risk premium to take social risks compared to natural risks. This evidence has been first shown by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (J Econ Behav 98: 294-310, 2004) using an adaptation of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM, Becker et al. Behav Sci 9:226-232, 1964). We compare their implementation of the BDM mechanism with a new version designed to facilitate subjects' comprehension. We find that, although the two versions produce different distributions of values, the size of betrayal aversion, measured as an average treatment difference between social and natural risk settings, is not different across the two versions. We further show that our implementation is preferable to use in practice as it reduces substantially subjects' mistakes and the likelihood of noisy valuations
Natural or organic? How framing impacts choices of sustainable food and wine products
No full textAbstract
Purpose – The paper investigates the choice preferences of Gen Z individuals between products labelled as “organic” versus products labelled as “natural”. While the former category guarantees production standards set by EU legislation, no codified standard exists for natural products. Understanding whether consumers value the difference is important for policy and marketing reasons.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a between-subject laboratory experiment. Participants are undergraduate students from a medium-sized university, randomized into two conditions. In both conditions, individuals choose between a conventional product and a sustainable one. In the first condition, we frame the organic product as “organic”. In the second condition, we frame the same organic product as “natural”. We always refer to the conventional product as “conventional”. This methodology is applied to a choice regarding wine and a choice regarding food. Choices are incentive-compatible, as one participant is
randomly selected in each session to receive the chosen product.
Findings – We find no significant difference between the frequency of choices of the product framed as organic and the one framed as natural, neither for wine nor for food.
Originality/value – The paper tests in a controlled and incentivized laboratory experiment the choice differences regarding products framed as organic versus products framed as natural. The results provide policymakers and marketers with a better understanding of the effects of sustainability labelling on consumer behaviour. The policy implications of our results, which we discuss in the paper, are relevant and multifaceted
The influence of empirical and normative expectations on cooperation
No full textIn this paper, we investigate the importance of empirical and normative expectations for cooperative behavior. We conduct two experimental studies (n = 243) in which we separately elicit (i) behavior in a public goods game and (ii) normative and empirical expectations of cooperation. In a situation where others’ contributions are known, we find a strong norm of conditional cooperation whereby people find it socially appropriate to match others contribution and believe others to comply with such rule of behavior. In contrast, when there is strategic uncertainty regarding others’ behavior, empirical and normative expectations diverge substantially. While individuals believe that contributing fully to the public good is the most appropriate action, they expect others to contribute only half of their resources. This renders normative expectations unpredictive for average behavior and underlines the importance of a close alignment of empirical and normative expectations for the influence of social norms on behavior
Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size
Full text linkWe study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in previous experiments. However, in the high MPCR condition we observe a negative group size effect. We extend the design to investigate two- and three-person groups in the high MPCR condition, and find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with those from n-person prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in larger groups. The findings from the low MPCR condition suggest that this effect can be overridden. In particular, when cooperation is low other factors, such as considerations of the social benefits of contributing (which increase with group size), may dominate any negative group size effect
Social preferences under the shadow of the future
No full textSocial interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions
The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments
No full textWe compare the strategy method and the direct response method in public good experiments in a within-subject design. This comparison is interesting because the strategy method is frequently used to investigate preference heterogeneity. We find that people identified by the strategy method as conditional cooperators also behave as conditional cooperators under the direct response method. Free-rider types contribute systematically less than all others. Overall, our results support the behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
No full textWe investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs across two studies (n = 991). In Experiment 1, in a standard die-rollingparadigm, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. We find that ourself-awareness manipulation has no effect on overreporting in comparison to a control treatment, while our observability manipulation significantly decreases reports. In Experiment 2, we introduce a design that allows to compare the effects of self and social image concerns by directing the focus either on oneself or on an external observer while keeping constant the set of observers and their information. In line with the results from Experiment 1, people lie significantly less when their focus is on the external observer rather than on themselves
Affirmative action and retaliation in experimental contests
Full text linkWe conduct a real-effort experiment to test the effects of an affirmative action policy that reserves a share of the prize to subjects of a disadvantaged category in rent-seeking contests. We test three potential pitfalls of the affirmative action policy: (i) whether the introduction of the policy distorts effort and selection in the contest, (ii) whether it leads to reverse discrimination, that is, discourages entry from the advantaged category and (iii) whether the possibility of ex-post retaliatory actions undermines the effectiveness of the policy. We find that the affirmative action contest increases entry of players from the disadvantaged category without affecting entry of advantaged players. This increases overall effort in the contest. However, we find that the possibility of retaliation can undermine the benefits of the affirmative action policy reducing contest participation. This suggests that retaliation is an important aspect to consider when implementing affirmative action policies. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
On the psychology of the relation between optimism and risk taking
Full text linkIn this paper, we provide an explanation for why risk taking is related to optimism. Using a laboratory experiment, we show that the degree of optimism predicts whether people tend to focus on the positive or negative outcomes of risky decisions. While optimists tend to focus on the good outcomes, pessimists focus on the bad outcomes of risk. The tendency to focus on good or bad outcomes of risk in turn affects both the self-reported willingness to take risk and actual risk taking behavior. This suggests that dispositional optimism may affect risk taking mainly by shifting attention to specific outcomes rather than causing misperception of probabilities. In a second study we find evidence that dispositional optimism is related to elicited parameters of rank dependent utility theory suggesting that focusing may be among the psychological determinants of decision weights. Finally, we corroborate our findings with process data related to focusing showing that optimists tend to remember more and attend more to good outcomes and this in turn affects their risk taking
Preferences and Perceptions in Provision and Maintenance Public Goods
Full text linkWe study two generic versions of public goods problems: in Provision problems, the public good does not exist initially and needs to be provided; in Maintenance problems, the public good already exists and needs to be maintained. In four lab and online experiments (,105), we document a robust asymmetry in preferences and perceptions in two incentive-equivalent versions of these public good problems. We find fewer conditional cooperators and more free riders in Maintenance than Provision, a difference that is replicable, stable, and reflected in perceptions of kindness. Incentivized control questions administered before gameplay reveal dilemma-specific misperceptions but controlling for them neither eliminates game-dependent conditional cooperation, nor differences in perceived kindness of others' cooperation. Thus, even when sharing the same game form, Maintenance and Provision are different social dilemmas that require separate behavioral analyses
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