1,721,657 research outputs found
Queer rights and the Puttaswamy judgment
No full textThe Puttaswamy judgment is a significant development for the future of legal interventions involving sexual minorities. When it comes to the constitutional challenge of Section 377, the judgment’s acknowledgement of the “chilling effect” vis-à-vis constitutional rights and repudiation of the de minimis rule as it pertains to constitutional harms is crucial in challenging the Supreme Court’s decision in the Suresh Kumar Koushal case
The right to privacy and access to abortion in a post-Puttaswamy world
Get PDFIn August 2017 India’s Supreme Court ruled that a Constitutional right to privacy exists in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India. While considering the right to privacy, the Supreme Court referenced international case law charting the right to use contraception and to access abortion. Indian jurisprudence already has a wealth of case law on reproductive rights, often referencing the same principles of liberty, autonomy, and dignity that the Puttaswamy judgment refers to. After Puttaswamy, there has been much talk about the scope of reproductive rights in India being broadened. This article contributes and builds upon this discourse as it seeks to predict how the Supreme Court will respond to future challenges using the new constitutional right to privacy. It maps the legal framework under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, which regulates access to abortion within India and considers issues relating to access to abortion, the continuing practise of sex-determination and sex-preferred abortions, and debates surrounding access to abortion where foetuses have been diagnosed with medical conditions likely to affect their quality of life, and/or survival. This article examines liberty, autonomy, and dignity as they are articulated within the Puttaswamy decision and how they are represented within existing reproductive rights jurisprudence and academic debates with reference to access to abortion. This approach aims to predict how any future challenge to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act’s provisions using the new constitutional right to privacy will be responded to by the Supreme Court of India
The Right to Privacy and Access to Abortion in a Post Puttaswamy World
Get PDFIn August 2017 India’s Supreme Court ruled that a Constitutional right to privacy exists in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India. While considering the right to privacy, the Supreme Court referenced international case law charting the right to use contraception and to access abortion. Indian jurisprudence already has a wealth of case law on reproductive rights, often referencing the same principles of liberty, autonomy, and dignity that the Puttaswamy judgment refers to. After Puttaswamy, there has been much talk about the scope of reproductive rights in India being broadened. This article contributes and builds upon this discourse as it seeks to predict how the Supreme Court will respond to future challenges using the new constitutional right to privacy. It maps the legal framework under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, which regulates access to abortion within India and considers issues relating to access to abortion, the continuing practise of sex-determination and sex-preferred abortions, and debates surrounding access to abortion where foetuses have been diagnosed with medical conditions likely to affect their quality of life, and/or survival. This article examines liberty, autonomy, and dignity as they are articulated within the Puttaswamy decision and how they are represented within existing reproductive rights jurisprudence and academic debates with reference to access to abortion. This approach aims to predict how any future challenge to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act’s provisions using the new constitutional right to privacy will be responded to by the Supreme Court of India
Oxidation of tricyclic antidepressant drugs with chloramine-T in acidic solutions: Kinetic, mechanistic and thermodynamic studies
Get PDFThe kinetics of the oxidation of two tricyclic antidepressants (TCA) namely, imipramine (IMP) and clomipramine (CLM) with sodium N-chloro-p-toluenesulfonamide or chloramine-T (CAT) in HClO4 medium was studied at 300 K. The two reactions followed identical kinetics with a first-order dependence of rate on CATo and fractional order dependence on TCAo. The reaction is catalyzed by H+ ions with a fractional order dependence. The reaction was studied at different temperatures and activation parameters were evaluated. The reaction constants involved in the mechanism were computed. The solvent isotope effect was studied using D2O. Addition of p-toluenesulfonamide retards the reaction rate. The rate increased with decreasing dielectric constant of the medium. Variation of ionic strength of the medium and addition of halide ions (Cl- or Br-) showed no effect on the rate. The stoichiometry of the reaction was found to be 1:1 and the oxidation products were identified as imipramine-5-N-oxide and clomipramine-5-N-oxide. The rate of oxidation of IMP is faster than CLM. The observed results have been explained in terms of a mechanism and a relevant rate law has been deduced. © 2013 Sukhdev and Puttaswamy; licensee Springer
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Cour suprême indienne (formation civile), 24 août 2017, Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) et Anr. v Union of India et Ors., n° 000494/2012
No full textCour suprême indienne (formation civile), 24 août 2017, Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) et Anr. v Union of India et Ors., n° 000494/2012. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 69 N°4,2017. pp. 1027-1028
An Analysis of Puttaswamy: The Supreme Court's Privacy Verdict
Get PDFOn 24th August 2017, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India passed a historic judgment affirming the constitutional right to privacy. It declared privacy to be an integral component of Part III of the Constitution of India, which lays down our fundamental rights, ranging from rights relating to equality (Articles 14 to 18); freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)); freedom of movement (Article 19(1)(d)); protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21) and others. These fundamental rights cannot be given or taken away by law, and all laws and executive actions must abide by them.
The Supreme Court has, however, clarified that like most other fundamental rights, the right to privacy is not an "absolute right". Subject to the satisfaction of certain tests and benchmarks, a person's privacy interests can be overridden by competing state and individual interests. This post discusses the tests that have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the Puttaswamy case, against which privacy infringements will be evaluated going forward. Based on this analysis, the post argues that a majority of the judges in this decision have agreed that the European standard of proportionality shall be applied to test privacy infringements in the future. However, the rigor and technicality with which this doctrine is applied will depend on the nature of the competing interests in question and will evolve on a case by case basis. At the very least, any impugned action will continue to be tested on the "just, fair and reasonable" standard evolved under Article 21 of the Constitution. However, before we delve into the standards laid down by the Court, it is important to understand why the Supreme Court was called upon to decide if we have a fundamental right to privacy and how to read the decision it finally delivered
Revisiting Puttaswamy: a feminist critique- the woman question and the physiological paradigm of abortion in privacy
Get PDFThe Supreme Court in the case of Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, placed the ‘individual’ in the heart of privacy, instead of ‘walling off’ the private space, thus recognizing the creation of the ‘individual’. This essay seeks to analyse Justice Chandrachud’s majority opinion in the Puttaswamy judgement from the lens of Feminism, discussing reproductive rights as a key aspect of decisional autonomy or intimate decision. It argues that Justice Chandrachud while trying to form a global perspective of decisional privacy in relation to abortion, ends up formulating a doctrine which lacks indigenous appeal as it is unable to engage with the ‘voices of Indian women’. He upholds a highly contested physiological paradigm of abortion, by placing abortion in the private sphere, rather than as an integral condition for a decent life. This does not perpetuate the establishment of class divisions among women themselves. Further, the law of privacy protects the existing aggregation of power in the hands of man as women in India are influenced directly or indirectly by prevailing social forces and ethos or families and husbands. Thus, the law fails severely to contextualize the woman in question and instead ends up talking about an American middle class one
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