1,338 research outputs found
Przesłanki prawomocności decyzji interpretacyjnych w teorii wykładni Jerzego Wróblewskiego
No full textPREMISES OF VALIDITY OF INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS IN JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONIn the article the Author carries on his deliberations on the metatheoretical level. He aims at answering the question: what is the cognitive status of the Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation?By cognitive status the Author means descriptive or normative character of the theoretical propositions about interpretation, as well as premises of validity of these propositions. The Author focuses on reasons why these propositions are accepted. He discusses such reasons as: correspondence between these propositions and some interpretative reality, as well as primary acceptance of definite axiological premises. The Author especially strives to answer the question of great epistemological importance: is it true, that logical corollaries of philosophical propositions inevitably turn out to be philosophical statements? Trying to answer this question, the Author especially takes into account the premises of validity of interpretative decision which are assumed by Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation.PREMISES OF VALIDITY OF INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS IN JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONIn the article the Author carries on his deliberations on the metatheoretical level. He aims at answering the question: what is the cognitive status of the Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation?By cognitive status the Author means descriptive or normative character of the theoretical propositions about interpretation, as well as premises of validity of these propositions. The Author focuses on reasons why these propositions are accepted. He discusses such reasons as: correspondence between these propositions and some interpretative reality, as well as primary acceptance of definite axiological premises. The Author especially strives to answer the question of great epistemological importance: is it true, that logical corollaries of philosophical propositions inevitably turn out to be philosophical statements? Trying to answer this question, the Author especially takes into account the premises of validity of interpretative decision which are assumed by Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation
Założenie spójności semantycznej systemu prawa w klaryfikacyjnej teorii wykładni
No full textTHE ASSUMPTION OF SEMANTIC COHERENCE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE CLARIFICATORY THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONThe author assumes that a clarificatory theory of interpretation may be counted as a theory which directly expresses a philosophical attitude consisting in acceptance of the main assertions of Marxism as a logically prior presuppositions of the theoretical cognition of the legal phenomena. Especially, logically prior Marxism is to determine fundamental values accepted by the legal theory.Marxian axiology recognizes social unity as a fundamental value. This value transferred to the legal theory takes shape of the unity of the legal system. An especially important form of unity of the legal system is its semantic coherence. The author tends to point out that in the clarificatory theory of interpretation the assumption of semantic coherence of the legal system is expressed by the directive called “presumption of the legal language.” According to this directive, if the meaning of the phrase is determined by the legal language, such meaning should be accepted as binding in the whole legal system, i.e. in all branches of the legal system. The author treats this directive as a result of the impact of logically prior philosophical assumptions on the theory of legal interpretation.THE ASSUMPTION OF SEMANTIC COHERENCE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE CLARIFICATORY THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONThe author assumes that a clarificatory theory of interpretation may be counted as a theory which directly expresses a philosophical attitude consisting in acceptance of the main assertions of Marxism as a logically prior presuppositions of the theoretical cognition of the legal phenomena. Especially, logically prior Marxism is to determine fundamental values accepted by the legal theory.Marxian axiology recognizes social unity as a fundamental value. This value transferred to the legal theory takes shape of the unity of the legal system. An especially important form of unity of the legal system is its semantic coherence. The author tends to point out that in the clarificatory theory of interpretation the assumption of semantic coherence of the legal system is expressed by the directive called “presumption of the legal language.” According to this directive, if the meaning of the phrase is determined by the legal language, such meaning should be accepted as binding in the whole legal system, i.e. in all branches of the legal system. The author treats this directive as a result of the impact of logically prior philosophical assumptions on the theory of legal interpretation
Filozoficzne przesłanki pojmowania systemowości prawa w teorii wykładni Jerzego Wróblewskiego
No full textTHE ASSUMPTION OF SYSTEMIC NATURE OF LAW IN JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONThat is to say that Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation assumes philosophical attitude consisting in acceptance of Marxist philosophy. Consequently, Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation may be counted as theory of interpretation of “people’s law”. The author tends to point out that the notion of “people’s law” is a philosophical category, i. e. the main traits of “peoples law” are defined on the level of Marxist philosophy. Consequently, all propositions of Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation are propositions which presuppose existence of such conceived “people’s law”. In the article, the author strives to point out that philosophical assumptions of Marxist philosophy determine Jerzy Wróblewski’s way of conceiving the systemic character of law.THE ASSUMPTION OF SYSTEMIC NATURE OF LAW IN JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATIONThat is to say that Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation assumes philosophical attitude consisting in acceptance of Marxist philosophy. Consequently, Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation may be counted as theory of interpretation of “people’s law”. The author tends to point out that the notion of “people’s law” is a philosophical category, i. e. the main traits of “peoples law” are defined on the level of Marxist philosophy. Consequently, all propositions of Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation are propositions which presuppose existence of such conceived “people’s law”. In the article, the author strives to point out that philosophical assumptions of Marxist philosophy determine Jerzy Wróblewski’s way of conceiving the systemic character of law
STANISŁAW EHRLICH’S VERSION OF JURIDICAL REALISM
No full textAn attempt is made in the article to approach and to assess integrally the whole of the work
of Stanisław Ehrlich. The Author considers that this work is an example of consequently realistic
opinions on the sphere of normative phenomenons regarded as a kind of decision making processes.
According to Ehrlich’s intention the notion of a norm as an accomplished normative pronouncement
is supposed to place the law in the sphere of social facts. Next — realistic solutions within
the scope of ontology of law have to exclude a reduction of theoretical and juridical research to the
only plane of logic and language. The Author of the article states that Ehrlich did not happen to
realise his postulated programme of multiplaned theoretical — (and) juridical research and the
theory of law as proposed by Ehrlich is imprinted with distinct traces of aksiological involvements
Human dignity – an autonomous or a heteronomous feature
No full textThe subject of the work is an attempt to analyse the notion of dignity in legal sciences, especially in legal theory and philosophy of law. The author distinguishes autonomous and heteronomous version of the notion in question. The first way of conceiving human dignity, assumes that dignity, i.e. the worth of human life, is fully independent of social conditions in which people live their lives. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Kant’s philosophy of moral autonomy as immanent trait of every human being. The second way of conceiving human dignity assumes that the worth of human life is fully dependent of social conditions in which people live their lives. Consequently, it is taken for granted that there are social conditions in which people can lose dignity as contingent trait of human being. In this case, in order to get back lost dignity, people ought to change social conditions by way of social revolution. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Marxist philosophy of alienation. The author tends to point out, that a different way of conceiving dignity is followed by serious legal consequences
Apocalipsis y entropía de la literatura estadounidense. Historias. Revista de la Dirección de Estudios Históricos Num. 82 (2012) mayo-agosto
No full textTomado del libro de Zbigniew Lewicki, The Bang and the Whimper. Apocalypse and Entropy in American Literature (Greenwood Press, 1984). Lewicki nació en 1945 en Lodz y es un estudioso de la civilización anglosajona
Zbigniew Herbert - Towards Mystery Of Socrates
No full textIn the essay the author follows Zbigniew Herbert’s path by asking a question: “What is a mystery of Socrates?”. The author wants to present that Zbigniew Herbert in his books took a journey, a spiritual wander, to the Greek roots (beginnings) to the European culture and sources of the European humanity. He distinguishes the difference between ‘root’ (or ‘beginning’) from ‘source’. “The portrait of Socrates” by Herbert reflects the two main dimensions of poet’s creative as well as philosophical aspirations. Socrates represents different reflections on the human condition. He encompasses various – for many philosophers – unpredictable dimensions of human existence. He has ability to rational, intellectual examination of the world as well as tendency to investigate his artistic poetic work and vocation. However, the mystery of Socrates appears to be a source of creative thinking
"Opening the great parable" : on Zbigniew Herbert’s writing of one of his poems
No full textThe main objective of the present article is to offer a reading of Zbigniew Herbert’s manuscripts, drawing upon French and British theories of genetic criticism. The author analyzes the physical shape of the page and the stages of the making of the poem with reference to specific examples based on materials collected in the Zbigniew Herbert archive at the National Library of Poland
Starosta lubelski Zbigniew Firlej (zm. 1649) i jego testament z dnia 31 grudnia 1648 roku. Karta z dziejów rodziny Firlejów herbu Lewart od połowy XVI do połowy XVII wieku
No full textThe paper focuses primarily on Zbigniew of Dąbrowica Firlej, Lewart coat of arms (1611–1649), son of the Sandomierz voivode Mikołaj (d. 1636) and the daughter of Lublin voivode Regina Oleśnicka, Dębno coat of arms. It also briefly presents the people who made up the family circle of the eponymous character, i.e. both of his grandfathers, Mikołaj Firlej (d. 1600) and Mikołaj Oleśnicki (d. 1629), his parents and their siblings, as well as the siblings of Zbigniew himself. The article discusses their family situation, property status and public activity. Much attention is paid, in particular, to the grandfather and father of the Lublin starost. Zbigniew Firlej was undoubtedly one of the last representatives of the Firlej family to play an important role on the political scene of the Polish- -Lithuanian Commonwealth. He was an educated man who spent several years studying abroad. In 1633, he became the starost of Lublin. After he had returned to Poland in 1636, he was very active politically. He participated in the sessions of the Lublin regional assembly (sejmik), served as a deputy to the Sejm many times, and was also a deputy to the Crown Tribunal. In 1638, he married Princess Anna Wiśniowiecka, Korybut coat of arms. Along with her hand, he received a huge dowry. He also became related to the leading families of the Crown magnates. In 1648, after the outbreak of Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s uprising, he headed a cavalry regiment raised at the expense of the nobility of the Lublin voivodeship. He was an envoy to the convocation. He took part in the battle of Piławce, which was lost by the Crown Army. After arriving in Warsaw, he took part in the election and cast his vote for Jan Kazimierz. The author thoroughly traces both Zbigniew Firlej’s achievements in the public sphere as well as his financial situation and activities in private life. The article contains many new findings. Several misleading or inaccurate findings concerning the closest family of the Lublin starost were also corrected. It is also worth noting that after the death of his first wife, Zbigniew Firlej remarried Katarzyna Opalińska of Bnin, the daughter of the Grand Marshal of the Crown Łukasz, who was only 10 years old at the time of the wedding. From his first marriage he left an only son Mikołaj (d. 1678). On 31 December 1648, Zbigniew Firlej, who was terminally ill at that time, made in Warsaw a very interesting will attached as an annex to this work. He died before 27 January 1649.Bohaterem prezentowanego tu tekstu jest Zbigniew z Dąbrowicy Firlej h. Lewart (1611–1649), syn wojewody sandomierskiego Mikołaja (zm. 1636) i wojewodzianki lubelskiej Reginy Oleśnickiej h. Dębno. W artykule przedstawiono też pokrótce osoby tworzące krąg rodzinny tytułowego bohatera, a więc obu jego dziadków, Mikołaja Firleja (zm. 1600) i Mikołaja Oleśnickiego (zm. 1629), jego rodziców i ich rodzeństwo, jak również rodzeństwo samego Zbigniewa. Omówiono ich sytuację rodzinną, stan posiadania oraz działalność publiczną. Sporo uwagi poświęcono zwłaszcza dziadkowi i ojcu starosty lubelskiego. Najwięcej miejsca zajęło jednak opisanie osiągnięć tytułowego bohatera tego tekstu. Był on bez wątpienia jednym z ostatnich przedstawicieli rodziny Firlejów odgrywających istotną rolę na scenie politycznej Rzeczypospolitej. Zbigniew Firlej był człowiekiem wykształconym. Kilka lat spędził na studiach zagranicznych. W 1633 r. został starostą lubelskim. Od chwili powrotu do kraju w 1636 r. był bardzo aktywnym politycznie. Uczestniczył w obradach sejmiku lubelskiego, wielokrotnie pełnił funkcję posła na sejm, był też deputatem do Trybunału Koronnego. W 1638 r. ożenił się z księżniczką Anną Wiśniowiecką h. Korybut. Wraz z jej ręką otrzymał ogromny posag. Skoligacił się też z czołowymi rodami magnaterii koronnej. W 1648 r., po wybuchu powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego, stanął na czele pułku jazdy wystawionego na koszt szlachty województwa lubelskiego. Był posłem na konwokację. Uczestniczył w przegranej przez wojsko koronne bitwie pod Piławcami. Po przyjeździe do Warszawy wziął udział w elekcji i oddał swój głos na Jana Kazimierza. Autorowi udało się dokładnie prześledzić zarówno dokonania Zbigniewa Firleja w sferze publicznej, jak też jego sytuację majątkową i poczynania w życiu prywatnym. W artykule znalazło się wiele nowych ustaleń. Dokonano też korekty kilku bałamutnych lub też niedokładnych ustaleń dotyczących najbliższej rodziny starosty lubelskiego. Warto też odnotować, że po śmierci pierwszej żony Zbigniew Firlej ożenił się ponownie z liczącą w chwili ślubu zaledwie 10 lat Katarzyną z Bnina Opalińską, córką marszałka wielkiego koronnego Łukasza. Z pierwszego małżeństwa pozostawił jedynego syna Mikołaja (zm. 1678). W dniu 31 grudnia 1648 r. Zbigniew Firlej sporządził w Warszawie bardzo interesujący testament, który został załączony jako aneks do niniejszego opracowania. Był już wówczas śmiertelnie chory. Zmarł przed 27 stycznia 1649 r
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