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Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire. Manuale
Partendo dal presupposto che l’identità di un’organizzazione
sia un aspetto articolato e complesso
da definire, l’Intensity & Strength Organizational
Cultural Questionnaire (IS-OCQ) è stato sviluppato
facendo riferimento a modelli teorici che
potessero contribuire a misurare le seguenti caratteristiche
della cultura organizzativa:
- profondità, ovvero l’esistenza di aspetti culturali
stratificati che si differenziano tra loro in
base a quanto sono radicati nella realtà organizzativa;
- forza, ovvero il grado di condivisione di un
aspetto culturale tra i membri dell’organizzazione,
e la sua “forza” o “debolezza” a seconda
di quanto è pervasivo e trasversale alle persone
che condividono lo stesso contesto;
- tipologia, ovvero la corrispondenza tra gli indizi
rivelatori di specifiche logiche interne all’organizzazione
e delle categorie predefinite (tipologia
di cultura) in cui l’organizzazione viene fatta
rientrare in base alle caratteristiche culturali
che presenta;
- identità complessa, ovvero la coesistenza di
più identità
culturali che possono essere analizzate
cercando di cogliere l’articolazione e le
sfumature che meglio rappresentano la frammentazione
della realtà organizzativa in ambiti,
o aree, differenti, come ad esempio l’ambito del
cambiamento, o della sicurezza sul lavoro, o
della struttura del lavoro, o del benessere delle
persone, o della gestione dell’errore, ecc.
Il questionario self-report Intensity & Strength
Organizational Culture Questionnaire (IS‐OCQ)
intende rilevare le principali caratteristiche della
cultura organizzativa ed è stato messo a punto
principalmente a partire da quanto proposto dai
modelli teorici di:
a) Schein (1985), per quanto riguarda la concettualizzazione
di base della cultura organizzativa,
intesa come insieme di comportamenti,
valori e credenze profonde condivisi;
b) Enriquez (1970), per l’identificazione di una
tipologia di diverse culture organizzative di riferimento
(Autocratica, Burocratica, Paternalistico-
clientelare, Tecnocratica, Cooperativa),
rispetto a ognuna delle quali misurare gli atteggiamenti,
i comportamenti, i valori e le credenze
profonde prototipici;
c) Payne (2000), per il modello di misura multidimensionale
delle variabili culturali, ovvero la
rilevazione
simultanea della profondità (Intensity)
della cultura (come varia il gradiente
che va dall’atteggiamento, al comportamento,
al valore,
alla credenza profonda) e della sua
forza-diffusione (Strength) (ovvero quante persone
esprimono l’atteggiamento, il comportamento,
il valore, la credenza profonda specificatamente
legate alle diverse tipologie di
cultura organizzativa);
d) Martin (1992) e Irrmann (2002) per la frammentazione
dell’analisi culturale in ambiti, o
aree, differenti, ovvero la realizzazione dell’analisi
ripetuta in relazione a temi differenti
che auspicabilmente possono aiutare a far
emergere la coesistenza di più identità culturali
in uno specifico contesto lavorativo.The I & S Organizational Culture Questionnaire (Intensity and Strength O.C.Q.) intends to study the principal characteristics of organizational culture and was developed and refined in line with (a) Schein’s (1985) theory which bases the conceptualization of organizational culture on a combination of widespread and shared attitudes, behaviors, values and beliefs; (b) Enriquez’s (1970), identification of a typology of organizational culture with respect to each of the prototypical attitudes, behaviors, values and beliefs; (c) Payne’s (2000) multidimensional model of cultural variables or rather, the simultaneous finding of cultural Intensity (which varies from attitude to deeply rooted belief) and cultural Strength (or rather, how many people express the attitude, behavior, value and/or belief specifically related to the different types of organizational culture)
Cross-cultural validation of the Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire.
In the final presentation, Laura Petitta, Claudio Barbaranelli, and Tahira Probst address the relevance of capturing organizational culture complexity for effective managerial action and intervention. They present findings of a cross-cultural validation of a new combined typing and profiling measure of organizational culture, the Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire. This measure was developed in line with (a) Schein’s (1985) organizational culture theory; (b) Enriquez’s (1970) typology of organizational cultures; (c) Payne’s (2000) multidimensional model of cultural intensity and strength. Results support the validity and reliability of the ISOCQ, as well as the hypothesized invariance of the factorial structure across the Italian and United States samples. Furthermore, the different levels of intensity allow researchers and practitioners to determine the consistency between members’ actual behaviours and espoused values. Finally, because the ISOCQ appears to function equivalently across the two cultures, this allows for future investigations of relational equivalence in different national contexts and strengthens the generalizability of extant research findings
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Does safety climate predict safety performance in Italy?
Different conceptualizations of safety climate have been proposed in the literature. One that seems particularly interesting from a measurement perspective was proposed by Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000). In their model, safety climate is defined as a specific form of organizational climate involving individual perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment which can be broken down into four facets: management values, communication, training, and safety systems. Furthermore, they propose a conceptual model in which safety climate affects safety knowledge and safety motivation, which in turn influence the two components of safety performance, namely safety compliance and safety participation. To date, however, their measure of these constructs has largely been applied and validated in English-speaking samples.
Thus, the purpose of the current research was twofold:
1) to validate the Italian version of the questionnaire developed by Neal and colleagues
2) to examine the conceptual model linking safety climate to antecedents and components of safety performance.
Our hypotheses were tested using a sample of 1255 employees from 14 different companies in Italy.
Following Anderson and Gerbing (1981), a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the 32 items comprising the Neal and colleagues’ questionnaire. Results, 2 (450, N=1255)=1118, p<.001; CFI=.96; TLI=.96; RMSEA=.034(.032, .037), supported a model where safety compliance, safety participation, safety knowledge and safety motivation where posited as first order factors measured by their respective items. Safety climate was posited as a second order factor measured by management values, communication, training, and safety systems, which were, in turn, modelled as first order factors measured by their respective items.
A structural equation model where safety climate influenced safety performance only indirectly via safety knowledge and motivation was first tested. This model showed an excellent fit to the data. However, a model also allowing direct effects of safety climate on both components of safety performance resulted in an even better fit, 2diff(2)=95., p<.0001. The final model explained 62% of safety compliance variance, and 52% of safety participation variance.
In conclusion, the current results replicated in an Italian sample the original findings of Neal and colleagues, confirming the indirect contribution of safety climate on safety performance components, while also evidencing a direct effect of safety climate in predicting safety performance
Comparing different culture models in predicting employee job satisfaction and turnover intentions.
Despite the flourishing literature (De Witte, 2005; Diaz-Serrano & Cabral Vieira, 2005; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2002) on how
insecure jobs trends (László et al., 2010) relate to individuals attitudes towards organizations, to their work productivity and health,
no study has yet explored the conjoint influence of different theoretical culture models on both positive (i.e., job satisfaction; JS) and
negative (i.e., turnover intentions; TI) indicators of employee well-being. The present study seeks to address this literature
shortcoming.
In particular, we aim to investigate how different theoretical culture models, namely GLOBE (House et al., 2004),
Individualism/Collectivism (INDCOL; Singelis, 1995), and Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire (IS-OCQ;
Petitta, Barbaranelli, & Probst, 2013), predict both positive (JS) and negative (TI) indicators of employee well-being.
Participants (N=734) from different USA organizations were 63.7% female. The average tenure was 2.6 yrs (SD = 1.5). Participants
returned an anonymous self-report questionnaire measuring: JS (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969); TI (Firth, Mellor, Moore, & Loquet,
2004); INDCOL; IS-OCQ, which measured autocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and cooperative culture typologies;
and GLOBE Values and Practices.Despite the flourishing literature (De Witte, 2005; Diaz-Serrano & Cabral Vieira, 2005; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2002) on how
insecure jobs trends (László et al., 2010) relate to individuals attitudes towards organizations, to their work productivity and health,
no study has yet explored the conjoint influence of different theoretical culture models on both positive (i.e., job satisfaction; JS) and
negative (i.e., turnover intentions; TI) indicators of employee well-being. The present study seeks to address this literature
shortcoming.
In particular, we aim to investigate how different theoretical culture models, namely GLOBE (House et al., 2004),
Individualism/Collectivism (INDCOL; Singelis, 1995), and Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire (IS-OCQ;
Petitta, Barbaranelli, & Probst, 2013), predict both positive (JS) and negative (TI) indicators of employee well-being.
Participants (N=734) from different USA organizations were 63.7% female. The average tenure was 2.6 yrs (
Multilevel job demands and resources: cross-level effects of competing organizational facet-specific climates on risky safety behaviors
Both individual demands (i.e., workload) and organizational demands and resources (i.e., production pressure and safety climates) may affect the likelihood that employees undertake risky safety behaviors in different ways. Adopting an organizational multilevel perspective, the aim of the present research was fourfold: 1) to examine the impact of individual-level job demands (i.e., workload) on the enactment of risky safety behaviors; 2) to evaluate the effects of coexisting and competing organizational facet-specific climates (i.e., for safety and for production pressure) on the above outcome; 3) to assess their cross-level interactions with individual job demands, and 4) to test the interaction among such organizational demands and resources in shaping risky behaviors. A series of multilevel regression models tested on surveydata from 1375 employees nested within 33 organizations indicated that high workload increases the likelihood of employees enacting risky safety behaviors, while organizational safety and production pressure climates showed significant and opposite direct effects on this safety outcome. Moreover, organizational safety climate significantly mitigated the effect of individual job demands on risky safety behaviors, while organizational production pressure climate exacerbated this individual-level relationship. Finally, organizational safety climate mitigates the cross-level direct effect of organizational production pressure climate on the enactment of risky safety behaviors
The impact of emotional contagion on workplace safety: investigating the roles of sleep, health, and production pressure
Using emotional contagion theory and the Job Demands-Resources model as a theoretical foundation, we tested the proposition that higher levels of contagion of anger (i.e., a demand) vs. higher levels of contagion of joy (i.e., a resource) will be associated respectively with more vs. fewer sleep disturbances and health problems, which in turn are related to more workplace accidents and injuries. Moreover, we examined the moderating impact of production pressure (i.e., a contextual demand) on the relationship between emotional contagion and employee poor sleep and health. Data from 1000 employees in Italy showed that the conditional indirect effects of contagion of anger, but not of joy, on accidents and injuries via sleep and health problems were intensified as levels of production pressure increased. Furthermore, contagion of anger was positively associated with both sleep disturbances and health problems whereas contagion of joy was negatively related to only sleep disturbances. These findings suggest that the effect of anger that employees absorb during social interactions at work likely persists when coming at home and represents an emotional demand that impairs the physiological functions that regulate restorative sleep and energies recharging; and, this effect is even stronger among employees who perceived higher levels of organizational production pressure
Organizational culture, moral disengagement, and employees’ silence on work accidents
Moral disengagement (MD) was first introduced by Bandura (1990) to explain the psychosocial mechanisms by which individuals mitigate the moral consequences of harmful behaviors. Such mechanisms allow people to misbehave without feeling obliged to any kind of reparation in spite of the individuals’ moral standards that would normally serve to guide human conduct. Furthermore, these mechanisms are internalized during the socialization process that regulate moral standards of an individual. As such, MD is embedded and co-determined by culture norms (Bandura).
Despite the flourishing literature on moral disengagement, to our knowledge, no study has yet explored the role of organizational culture as a predictor of moral disengagement mechanisms, which in turn enable conduct that is detrimental for safety at work, such as accident under-reporting behaviors.
The present study seeks to address the problem of accident under-reporting, i.e., the silence of employees in reporting safety incidents and accidents to their organization. In particular, this study seeks to explore the role of organizational culture as a predictor of moral disengagement mechanisms that may precede under-reporting. Toward these ends, we tested a structural model positing organizational culture typologies as predictors of moral disengagement, which in turn was expected to predict accident under-reporting. In doing so, we also assessed the psychometric properties of a newly developed organizational safety culture scale, the Job Safety - Intensity & Strength Organizational Culture Questionnaire (JS-ISOCQ), and a Job Safety Moral Disengagement scale (JS-MD),
Method. Participants (N=1108) were recruited from numerous Italian industry sector organizations, which were at average or above risk of employee injuries; 75% were men. The average age was 41 (SD= 10.43). Each participant completed an anonymous self-report questionnaire and was guaranteed confidentiality.
The 20-item self-report JS-ISOCQ measured five cultural typologies with regard to workplace safety. The scale is a new combined typing and profiling measure of organizational culture (Petitta, Barbaranelli, & Probst, 2012), developed in line with (a) Schein’s (1985) theory; (b) Enriquez’s (1970) typology of organizational cultures (autocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and cooperative); and (c) Payne’s (2000) multidimensional model of cultural intensity. The response scale measured both cultural intensity and strength by having respondents indicate for each statement how many people from their organization: 1) manifest a positive attitude towards the situation, 2) engage in behavior that is in line with the situation, 3) attribute importance to the situation, and 4) consider the situation so fundamental as to take it for granted. A sample item is “With respect to strictly adhering to the rules and security procedures proposed by the organization” and response options ranged from 1=almost no one to 4=almost everyone.
Moral disengagement in the application of workplace safety norms was measured by 12 item selected from the Job Safety Moral Disengagement scale (JS-MD; Barbaranelli & Perna, 2005). The scale is unidimensional and includes six MD mechanisms (moral justification; advantageous comparison; displacement of responsibility; diffusion of responsibility; distorting consequences; attribution of blame). A sample item is “Safety checks are useless, because most machines will eventually malfunction” and response options ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree.
Unreported accidents and experienced accidents were measured using open-ended items adapted from Smecko and Hayes (1999), i.e., “How many accidents did you experience and NOT report to your employer in the past 12 months?” Accident under-reporting was then operationalized as the proportion of the total number of experienced accidents that went unreported to the organization. To avoid zeros in the denominator a very small constant (.00001) was added to the denominator. Due to high skewness and kurtosis, this variable was transformed using the reciprocal method (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Although this transformation reduced the non-normality of the variable, skewness and kurtosis remained high being respectively 3 and 9. This variable was then considered as “censored” in the following analyses. Although the workplace accident variables were self-report in nature, previous studies do indicate that self-report measures of accidents and unsafe behaviors are related to independent observations of these variables (Lusk, Ronis, & Baer, 1995).
Results and discussion. A preliminary Confirmatory Factor Analysis examined the factorial validity of JS-ISOCQ and JS-MD with 6 latent variables (i.e., 5 cultural typologies and moral disengagement) measured by 32 observed variables. The CFA showed excellent indices: 2 (409, N=1108)=1,466, p<.001, RMSEA = 0.048 (.046; .051), CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94.
A full Structural Equation Model was then performed, testing the aforementioned research hypotheses. The WLSMV method of estimation was used, which produces correct parameter estimates and goodness of fit indices in presence of censored variables. No direct effects were posited among the five culture variables and accidents underreporting. We posited then that all the effect of safety cultures on accidents underreporting was carried by moral disengagement. Mediation effects were estimated with bootstrap method. The model showed an adequate fit to the data: 2 (440, N=1108)=959, p<.001, RMSEA = 0.033 (0.030; .035), CFI=0.92, TLI=0.91. Technocratic Safety Culture exerted a significant and positive effect of .31 (p<.001) on MD, while Bureaucratic Safety Culture exerted a significant but negative effect of -.15 (p<.05). All other effects on MD were not statistically significant. MD exerted a positive significant effect of .29 (p<.001) on accident under-reporting. No indirect effect of safety cultures typologies on accident under-reporting were statistically significant with the exception of Technocratic Safety Culture, whose indirect effect was 0.09 (p<.01). Overall, the model explained the 14% of moral disengagement variance and the 9% of accident under-reporting variance.
Together, the results support the validity of the JS-ISOCQ and JS-MD. Furthermore, the disentangling of five different cultural typologies demonstrated how distinct shared patterns of behavior (i.e., culture) shape MD and subsequent organizational outcomes. In particular, a context pervaded by bureaucratic norms (i.e., bureaucratic culture) discourages mechanisms of disengagement. Conversely, a technocratic culture wherein safety practices are followed only if they do not impede progress toward the achievement of desired production outcomes appears to be related to higher MD, and in turn an increase in employees’ silence in reporting of accidents. Implications for practice include managerial suggestions on how to mitigate these unwanted effects of production pressure and simultaneously encourage accurate accident reporting.Moral disengagement (MD) was first introduced by Bandura (1990) to explain the psychosocial mechanisms by which individuals mitigate the moral consequences of harmful behaviors. Such mechanisms allow people to misbehave without feeling obliged to any kind of reparation in spite of the individuals’ moral standards that would normally serve to guide human conduct. Furthermore, these mechanisms are internalized during the socialization process that regulate moral standards of an individual. As such, MD is embedded and co-determined by culture norms (Bandura).
Despite the flourishing literature on moral disengagement, to our knowledge, no study has yet explored the role of organizational culture as a predictor of moral disengagement mechanisms, which in turn enable conduct that is detrimental for safety at work, such as accident under-reporting behaviors.
The present study seeks to address the problem of accident under-reporting, i.e., the silence of employees in reporting safety incid
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