1,720,973 research outputs found
Inequality, Polarization and Redistributive Policies
Full text linkQuesta tesi ha per oggetto la teoria della tassazione ottima del reddito e analizza l’effetto di differenti obiettivi redistributivi sul sistema fiscale. In particolare, si identifica la struttura di un sistema fiscale volto a conseguire la riduzione della diseguaglianza e della polarizzazione dei redditi. A tal fine, in linea con Kanbur et. al (2006) e Saez e Stantcheva (2016) si adotta un approccio “non-welfarista” (n.w.) e si esaminano sistemi di tassazione“a scaglioni” (piecewise). Come noto, la distinzione principale tra approccio welfarista e n.w. è data dall'argomento della funzione di benessere sociale adottata. In particolare, l’approccio n.w. è caratterizzato dallo spostamento dell’interesse dall'utilità al reddito. Esso risulta il più adatto quando si assumono obiettivi di riduzione della diseguaglianza, povertà e polarizzazione. Il sistema di tassazione ottimale scaturisce da un esercizio di massimizzazione vincolata di una funzione di benessere sociale basata sui redditi netti degli individui, ordinati in ordine crescente e pesati secondo la posizione occupata nella relativa distribuzione. La specifica forma della funzione di pesi adottata identifica l’obiettivo n.w. Si considerano due diverse funzioni di pesi che permettono di esprimere gli obiettivi redistributivi in termini di variazioni di un indice di diseguaglianza (Gini) o di un indice di polarizzazione. Il sistema fiscale considerato, oltre ad essere il più diffuso, è lo strumento più idoneo a identificare gli effetti dovuti alla variazione degli obiettivi redistributivi. I risultati ottenuti evidenziano la relazione tra lo specifico obiettivo redistributivo e la struttura del sistema fiscale ottimale. Quando la tassazione è finalizzata a raccogliere un certo livello di gettito, senza ridistribuire le risorse raccolte, il risultato cambia se l’obiettivo è ridurre la diseguaglianza oppure la polarizzazione. Con offerta di lavoro fissa, il sistema fiscale finalizzato alla riduzione della diseguaglianza richiede di tassare con l’aliquota massima consentita tutti i redditi al di sopra di una certa soglia, mentre per tutti quelli al di sotto di tale soglia la tassazione è zero. La soglia è fissata in modo da raccogliere il gettito richiesto. Per ridurre la polarizzazione, invece, la soluzione ottima prevede tre scaglioni reddituali con aliquote marginali nulle nel primo e nell'ultimo scaglione, e la massima consentita in quello centrale, che include il reddito mediano. Con offerta di lavoro variabile ed elasticità costante su tutta la distribuzione, i risultati sono qualitativamente in linea con quelli ottenuti con offerta fissa; pertanto il sistema fiscale per ridurre la diseguaglianza è “convesso” con aliquote marginali crescenti, mentre quello per ridurre la polarizzazione è “non-convesso” con aliquota marginale ridotta per l’ultimo scaglione. Il ricorso a trasferimenti “lump-sum” rende il sistema fiscale ottimale indipendente dal livello di gettito richiesto; il segno del trasferimento è dato dalla differenza tra il gettito raccolto e quello richiesto. Il sistema fiscale per ridurre la diseguaglianza è convesso, tranne i casi in cui l’elasticità dell’offerta di lavoro è alta oppure quando il livello iniziale di diseguaglianza non è molto elevato. Per ridurre la polarizzazione il sistema ottimale è sempre non-convesso. In entrambi i casi le aliquote marginali si riducono all'aumentare dell’elasticità, assunta costante su tutta la distribuzione. L’utilizzo di sussidi o tasse “lump-sum” dipende dalla combinazione tra il livello iniziale di dispersione e il valore dell’elasticità. La tassazione a somma fissa risulta preferibile per ridurre la polarizzazione. Infine, con elasticità non costante e senza ridistribuzione, i risultati sono in linea con quelli ottenuti con elasticità costante. Tuttavia, rispetto a quest’ultimo caso le aliquote marginali risultano inferiori per i redditi che occupano i percentili più bassi associati a elasticità più elevate.This dissertation focuses on optimal income taxation theory and analyses the effect of different redistributive objectives on the shape of the optimal tax system. In particular, we investigate how the optimal tax system should be designed in order to achieve inequality and polarization reduction objectives. To this end, in line with the works by Kanbur et al. (2006) and Saez and Stantcheva (2016) we adopt a “non-welfarist” (n.w.) approach and focus on piecewise linear tax systems. By choosing the n.w. approach we recognize that redistributive objectives are crucial per se to the determination of the optimal tax schedule, and not necessarily because of the shape of the agents’ utility function. The main difference between welfarism and n.w. is that in the latter the argument of the social welfare function is different from individuals’ utility. Therefore, we focus on income as the most appropriate variable to investigate when the government’s objective is the reduction of inequality, poverty or polarization. We formalize the n.w. objective by assuming that the government maximizes a rank-dependent social evaluation function defined over individuals’ net income, subject to a budget constraint. Then, the evaluation of the income distribution can be summarized by the mean income of the distribution and a linear index of dispersion dependent on the choice of the weighting function. Specifically, we consider two weighting functions which allow to formalize redistributive objectives expressed in terms of changes in the Gini index of income in case of inequality considerations. Then, by suitable modifications of the positional weights it is possible, within the same model, to move towards evaluations concerned with the income polarization. We consider piecewise linear tax systems that represent the most adopted scheme and the easiest way to identify changes in the tax schedule when the government objectives move from inequality to polarization reduction. The results we obtain highlight the relationship between the redistributive objective and the theoretical optimal shape of the tax system. In particular, when redistribution is not allowed and the focus is only on the socially desirable mechanism collecting a given level of per-capita revenue, the optimal tax schemes substantially differ depending on whether the government is inequality or polarization sensitive. With fixed labour supply the optimal tax system reducing inequality requires a no tax area until a given threshold and the maximal admissible taxation above that threshold, which is set in order to satisfy the revenue requirement. As to polarization reduction, the optimal tax system requires to tax with the maximal admissible tax rate all incomes within the central bracket, including also the median income. Tax rates in the two external brackets are set equal to zero. When we introduce constant labour supply elasticity the results are qualitatively confirmed. The optimal tax systems reducing inequality and polarization are respectively convex and non-convex. By introducing the possibility to use lump-sum transfers (tax and subsidy) the design of the optimal tax system is independent of the revenue requirement and the sign of the lump-sum transfer depends on the difference between the collected amount and the required revenue. The optimal tax system reducing inequality (polarization) is convex (non-convex), with marginal tax rates decreasing in the level of the constant labour supply elasticity. The lump-sum transfer is positive or negative depending on the combination of the level of gross income dispersion and the value of labour supply elasticity. Then, the lump-sum taxation is more likely to be used to reduce polarization. Finally, when redistribution is not allowed and assuming non-constant labour supply elasticity the results are qualitatively in line with the case of constant elasticity. However, marginal tax rates are lower for income percentiles exhibiting higher elasticity
The political economy of educational policies and inequality of opportunity
No full textWe propose a political economy model to explain cross-country differences observed in educational policies and to show how such heterogeneity is associated with the level of a country’s development and inequality. Parents, heterogeneous in terms of income and their child’s ability, vote over the educational policy, by deciding the allocation of a given public budget between basic and higher education. Parents can invest in supplemental private education to increase the probability of their children of being admitted to higher education. When the level of development is low and inequality between social classes is sufficiently large, there is low exchange social mobility in the access to higher education, and educational policies are characterized by a large relative per-student expenditure in higher education
Optimal Non-Welfarist Income Taxation for Inequality and Polarization Reduction
No full textWe adopt a non-welfarist approach to investigate the effect of different redistributive objectives on the shape of the optimal tax schedule. We consider inequality and income polarization reduction objectives and we identify socially desirable three brackets piecewise linear tax systems that allow to collect a given revenue. The optimal tax problem is formalized as the maximization of families of rank-dependent social evaluation function defined over net incomes. These functions allow to incorporate within the same social evaluation model concerns for inequality and for polarization reduction. Both with fixed and variable labour supply the optimal tax schemes substantially differ as the focus moves from the reduction of inequality to the one of polarization. In the case of inequality concerns the optimal tax system is mainly convex exhibiting increasing marginal tax rates unless when labour supply elasticities are higher. While in case of polarization concerns the optimal tax scheme is non-convex with reduced marginal tax rate for the upper income bracket
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
Segregation and the onset of COVID-19 in American cities
Full text linkWe show that ethnic segregation in American cities has contributed to the early
onset and to the speed of propagation of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that
one standard deviation increase in the exposure dimension of segregation, which
we measure by mean of the Gini Exposure segregation index, leads to an increase
of 8.7 COVID-19 cases per 100,000 inhabitants across American urban counties.
Exploiting heterogeneity in the geography and timing of stay-at-home orders, we
also find evidence that segregation mitigated the effect of lock-down measures
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