177,417 research outputs found
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
"Closing the R&D Gap, Evaluating the Sources of R&D Spending"
Get PDFBoth spending and tax policies have been implemented in the United States with the goal of stimulating private sector research and development (R&D). Karier questions whether current R&D policy, especially the research and experimentation tax credit, can contribute to closing the gap between nondefense expenditures on R&D in the United States and such expenditures in other countries, such as Japan and Germany. He also explores possible changes to our current R&D policy to make it more effective.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Letter from R. R. Zellick, Assistant Trust Officer, Anglo California National Bank of San Francisco, to Joseph R. Goodman, October 2, 1942
No full textLetter from R. R. Zellick, Assistant Trust Officer at The Anglo California National Bank of San Francisco, to Joseph R. Goodman, regarding property owned by Dave Tatsuno. Zellick mentions a dispute between current tenants and Tatsuno, and that Tatsuno has asked Goodman to help locate trustworthy tenants.Personal correspondence, organizational records, government documents, publications, and other papers created or collected by Joseph R. Goodman documenting the forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II, as well as organized resistance to incarceration. Included in the collection are records of the Japanese Young Men's Christian Association and the Japanese American Citizens' League in San Francisco, including papers of the Japanese YMCA's executive secretary Lincoln Kanai; Sakai family papers; Goodman's correspondence to and from Japanese American incarcerees, organizations opposing forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans, the War Relocation Authority, and others; publications, photographs, and ephemera from the Topaz Relocation Center, where Goodman taught high school; War Relocation Authority records and publications; and newspaper clippings, pamphlets, and reports about forced removal and incarceration created by various government, religious, and civic organizations, in California and nationwide
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Get PDFWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
Liftings for noncomplete probability spaces
No full textThe current state of knowledge concerning liftings for noncomplete probability spaces is discussed. This is a somewhat expanded version of the author's talk given at the 1991 Summer Conference on General Topology and Applications in Honor of Mary Ellen Rudin and Her Work.PT: S; CR: BURKE MR, IN PRESS P AM MATH S BURKE MR, 1991, ISRAEL J MATH, V73, P33 BURKE MR, 1992, ISRAEL J MATH, V79, P289 CARLSON T, THEOREM LIFTING CHRISTENSEN JPR, 1974, TOPOLOGY BOREL STRUC FREMLIN DH, 1989, HDB BOOLEAN ALGEBRAS, P877 INOESCUTULCEA A, 1966, 5TH P BERK S MATH ST, V2 IONESCUTULCEA A, 1967, CONTRIBUTIONS PROB 1, P63 IONESCUTULCEA A, 1969, TOPICS THEORY LIFTIN JECH TJ, 1978, SET THEORY JOHNSON RA, 1980, P AM MATH SOC, V80, P234 JUST W, IN PRESS T AM MATH S KUPKA J, 1983, INDIANA U MATH J, V32, P717 LOSERT V, 1983, LNM, V1080, P95 MAHARAM D, 1958, P AM MATH SOC, V9, P987 SHELAH S, 1983, ISRAEL J MATH, V45, P90 TALAGRAND M, 1982, P AM MATH SOC, V84, P379 VONNEUMANN J, 1931, CRELLES J MATH, V165, P109; NR: 18; TC: 0; J9: ANN N Y ACAD SCI; PG: 4; GA: BZ86BSource type: Electronic(1
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Get PDFThis chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law — the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society’s resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions.public enforcement of law, fines, imprisonment, strict liability, fault-based liability, probability of detection, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, fairness of sanctions, norms
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
Get PDFThis article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the optimal mix of sanctions, including the imprisonment sentence imposed on offenders who do not pay the fine -- referred to as the "alternative" imprisonment sentence. Among other things, I demonstrate that if imprisonment sanctions are used, the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is sufficiently high that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay a fine exceeding the wealth level of low-wealth individuals and bear a lower (possibly no) imprisonment sentence rather than to pretend to be low-wealth individuals. I also show that if the optimal enforcement system would rely exclusively on fines when wealth is observable, the inability to observe wealth is detrimental because higher fines then could not be levied on higher-wealth individuals. In this case, it may be desirable when wealth is unobservable to impose an imprisonment sentence on offenders who do not pay the fine -- who will be low-wealth offenders -- in order to induce high-wealth offenders to pay the fine. However, if the optimal enforcement system would employ both fines and imprisonment sentences when wealth is observable, the inability to observe wealth is not detrimental. In this case, the same sanctions would be chosen if wealth is unobservable and these sanctions lead high-wealth individuals to pay more than low-wealth individuals.
Hansen, Lee (Lee R.). Union, non-union, and managerial pay plan state employees, 2008-2019
No full text1 online resource (2 pages)"July 1, 2021."Provides the number of union and non-union state employees in each of the last 14 years. Also provides the number of state employees paid under the state's managerial pay plan during each of those years. Updates OLR research report 2019-R-011
Public Enforcement of Law
Get PDFThis entry for the forthcoming The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Second Edition) surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law — the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first discuss the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions, including the costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, and incapacitation.fines, imprisonment, probability of detection, sanctions, crime, enforcement, strict liability, fault-based liability, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, incapacitation
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