327,062 research outputs found
Special Issue: The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis
No full textThe European Union (EU) has been exposed to multiple stresses during the past decade. Virtually every EU member state has been affected (albeit to varying degree) by the negative consequences of the economic and financial crisis that unfolded after 2008. While the actual causes of this crisis are manifold, its occurrence primarily emphasised the structural limits of the Eurozone as a currency union without fiscal coordination. Just as the economies of member states were exiting the most severe phase of the crisis and finally undergoing recovery, a new crisis struck the EU. Amid an increasingly instable international political scenario, asylum seekers from near East and African countries reached EU borders in exceptional numbers. The 2015 refugee crisis put under considerable strain the internal decision-making of the EU – not to mention the consensus about international principles of solidarity. In June 2016, finally, the decision of the UK’s referendum to opt for ‘Brexit’ has the potential to be at least difficult, and at worst a full–blown crisis for EU crisis in terms of its legitimacy and need for reform.
Already in the months preceding the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, a number of journalistic accounts anticipated a populist Eurosceptic landslide as one of the likeliest outcomes of the vote. While this alarmist scenario did not materialise in full (e.g. Mudde 2014), the reason for assuming a populist takeover in times of crisis rests both in the ideological persuasion(s) of these actors and the loss of legitimacy that recently affected the EU. Populist organisations traditionally voiced their opposition to ‘Europe’ on the basis of a composite series of arguments (Taggart 1998; Hooghe et al. 2002; de Vries and Edwards 2009); moreover, their ability to profit from moments of (real or perceived) crisis instinctively elevated them to potential beneficiaries of these particular junctures.
With the proposed special issue, we set out to investigate and systematically tackle the intersection of populism and Euroscepticism in the face of the multiple European crises. Populism and Euroscepticism have surged to the level of becoming empty signifiers in public debates (e.g. Bale et al. 2011); as we argue, the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism is neither necessary, nor consequential. Most importantly, even when these features are found in unison, they are liable to adapt to changing socioeconomic, cultural, and political circumstances. We believe that the crises that have hit the EU over the past decade offer critical instances of change – and it is indeed the crucial element of ‘crisis’ that we intend to factor into the equation. Crises have been long interpreted as macro-level background conditions favouring the surge of populist parties (e.g. Taggart 2000); however, very little attempts have been made to address how populists perform crises (Moffitt 2015). The special issue critically connects the unfolding of the Great Recession, the refugee crisis, and Brexit to the Eurosceptic discourse of populist parties across a number of cases. As it stands, the special issue comes across as the very first attempt to coherently link these three aspects through comparative and empirical contributions.
Straying from accounts on the performance of these parties in the electoral market, we aim to contribute to the existing literature on the ‘supply side’ of populist Eurosceptic politics in two ways. First, by ascertaining if and how the ideological contours of Euroscepticism have changed as a result of these crises (i.e. the ‘inward’ aspect). Second, by establishing if and how these discourses have reverberated across the party-political arena, releasing effects in the political process (i.e. the ‘outward’ aspect).
The recent economic, financial, refugee, and Brexit crises offer an unprecedented opportunity to delve deeper into these aspects. While we are generally agnostic about the possibility that populist actors may have substantively altered the content of their oppositional discourses as a result of these crises, we nevertheless think that parties expressing Euroscepticism might strategically harden their opposition to the EU, and/or frame the issue differently according to changing circumstances (Pirro and van Kessel, forthcoming). For the second aspect of our enquiry, we are partly motivated by a growing body of literature pointing to the increasing relevance of populist parties in their respective national arenas (e.g. van Spanje 2010; Minkenberg 2015). Assuming that populist (in this case, radical right) actors have effectively managed to exert influence on policy dimensions such as immigration or minority politics, we are interested to address the question of changing/additional dimensions of contestation (Pirro 2015). In other words, what competition dynamics unfold following the co-optation of populist radical issues by mainstream political parties? Does competition shift towards other (i.e. EU-related) policy dimensions? And what are the effects released by populist Eurosceptic actors in the political process
Il medico Pirro Maria Gabbrielli
No full textIl saggio esamina la figuradel medico Pirro Maria Gabbrielli, uno dei fondatori dell'Accademia dei Fisiocritici di Siena che influenzò i primi anni di attività dell'accademia scientifica
L' heliometro fisiocritico overo la meridiana sanese
No full textdel nobil signor dottore Pirro Maria GabbrielliFehlpaginierung: Nach S. 144 folgt S. 125ff
Stratigraphical and paleontological data from the Early Pleistocene P10 karst gallery filling at Pirro Nord (Puglia, south-eastern Italy)
No full textThe Pirro Nord palaeontological and archaeological locality has been the object of recent field research to investigate the fossil content of its Early Pleistocene vertebrate palaeocommunities, and to understand the genesis of the karst network and related deposits that delivered the lithic industry representing the earliest human occupation of Europe known so far, spanning 1.7-1.3 Ma. The succession of the Pirro 10 site has been described in terms of facies and fossil vertebrate content of the 37 distinguished Sedimentary Units (SU). On the whole, the succession is made of chemical and clastic sediments that include debris fall and alluvial deposits. SU are distinguished according to lithology, colour, discontinuities, lamination, fossil concentration, and taphonomical parameters. Palaeomagnetic data and biochronological characteristics refer the Pirro 10 site to the latest Late Villafranchian Mammal Age of the Italian biochronological mammal scale.
The fossil content is quite homogenous. Common taxa are Axis eurygonos, Hystrix refossa, Ursus etruscus, Canis mosbachensis together with small mammal remains mainly represented by Chiroptera and the arvicolid Microtus (Allophaiomys) ex gr. ruffoi. A significant change in the taxonomic record occurs in SU 22 and 108, where a clear increase of Equus altidens and Bison (Eobison) degiulii remains indicates shifting towards drier and more open environments and possibly deteriorating local climatic conditions. In general, for all phases, taphonomic evidence suggests that (1) bone accumulation results from carcass transport into the cave system by accident, (2) skeletons were decomposed and partially disarticulated near the cave entrance, (3) the cave environment caused corrosion, desquamation and pitting, and (4) bones were moved within the cave system by water flow, usually for short distances.
Pirro 10, Pirro 13 and all karst structures of the Pirro Nord locality during Early Pleistocene were part of a complex interconnected karst system. Dissolution was more effective along the highly fractured corezones of the Pliocene fault that bounded the "Apricena horst" to the south, where Pirro 10 gallery and Pirro 13 shaft are located. At that time, Pirro 10 was developed within the vadose zone whereas Pirro 13 represented a vertical structure connecting the surface to an underground karst floor. In general, the filling of Pirro 10 indicates fluctuations of the base level: water flow circulation in phreatic and epiphreatic conditions led to the deposition of clastic sediments, whereas flowstones reflect base level lowerings. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd and INQUA. All rights reserved
Community deception in directed influence networks
No full textCommunity deception is about protecting users of a community from being discovered by community detection algorithms. This paper studies community deception in directed influence network (DIN). It aims to address the limitations of the state of the art through a twofold strategy: introducing directed influence and considering the role of nodes in the deception strategy. The study focuses on using modularity as the optimization function. It offers several contributions, including an upgraded version of modularity that accommodates the concept of influence, edge-based, and node-based deception algorithms. The study concludes with a comparison of the proposed methods with the state of the art showing that not only influence is a valuable ingredient to devising deception strategies but also that novel deception approaches centered on node operations can be successfully devised
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