1,721,039 research outputs found
L'approccio distribuito allo studio del linguaggio
Per i teorici della cognizione distribuita la spiegazione completa di alcuni
fenomeni cognitivi deve tenere conto di fattori non locali, cioè di processi
che si verificano anche “al di fuori della pelle e del cranio” dei singoli
soggetti cognitivi. In questo lavoro verranno presentati gli sviluppi di
questa prospettiva in relazione allo studio dei fenomeni linguistici. I
sostenitori dell’approccio distribuito pongono l’accento sulla componente
attiva e dialogica collegata all’apprendimento e all’uso del linguaggio
naturale. La considerazione di questi fenomeni rende possibile la
spiegazione di alcuni problemi collegati allo sviluppo del linguaggio che
nella linguistica computazionale sono risolti in maniera poco soddisfacente
attraverso il riferimento a strutture cognitive innate
For a dynamical approach to human computation
In this article, we show that, in agreement with Alan Turing’s original view, but contrary to many of his interpreters, high-level cognitive activities like algorithm execution are better described as dynamical activities, which involve the coordinate work of both internal (mental) resources and external ones, like paper and pencil or similar external tools. We, then, propose to exploit the basic dynamical features of a Turing machine in order to develop a dynamical approach to the cognitive
explanation of human computational activities
Expressing knowledge as linked data by FOOL
The vision underlying the development of the Semantic Web is that the whole complex of our knowledge forms a huge semantic network, which should be represented and made explicit by means of languages such as RDF, RDFS, or OWL. However, these languages have important expressive limits, since none of
them reaches the full expressive power of a first-order language. As a result, large parts of our knowledge—in particular mathematical and scientific theories—cannot currently be made available on the SemanticWeb as linked data, not even in principle. In this work, we are going to define FOOL (First Order Ontology Language), a new ontological language compatible with RDF, which allows the expression of any formula of a first-order language as a connected RDF graph. FOOL is as expressive as a first-order language, but unlike it, its statements do not have a serialized form. Instead, like a RDF statement, each statement of a FOOL knowledge base is a connected graph, and different statements link to each other through the meaningful
nodes they share. In this way, the semantic relationships between statements are made explicit, and given FOOL’s compatibility with RDF, virtually the entire complex of our knowledge can in principle be made available on the SemanticWeb as linked data. The semantic relationships made explicit by a FOOL ontology are not those of logical consequence, but they are meaning connections between statements represented as
graphs. It is not far-fetched to think that, by devising appropriate measures of the linking patterns between statements, such relations can be mechanized, thus opening the way to new and possibly unforeseen results and applications
The Turing machine as a cognitive model of human computation
Classical computationalism considers the Turing Machine to be a psychologically implausible model of human
computation. In this paper, I will first elaborate on Andrew Wells' thesis that the claim of psychological implausibility
derives from a wrong interpretation of the TM as originally conceived by Turing. Then, I will show how Turing's original
interpretation of the TM could be useful to construct cognitive models of simple phenomena of human computation, such as
counting using our fingers or performing arithmetical operations using paper and pencil
Menti e macchine. Teorie filosofiche e scientifiche
Che cos’è la mente e che relazione ha con il corpo? Come posso essere certo dell’esistenza delle menti degli altri? Che cosa sono i miei stati mentali e in che rapporto stanno con gli stati fisici del mio corpo? Che cos’è la coscienza? La mente è una caratteristica peculiare della specie umana, o anche altri esseri viventi la possiedono? È possibile ipotizzare macchine con una mente? Queste sono alcune delle domande sulle quali si incentra la riflessione
filosofica sulla mente. Questo libro propone una classificazione
generale delle teorie filosofiche della mente e ne analizza i temi principali, con un’attenzione particolare al pensiero contemporaneo e alla sua relazione con gli sviluppi dell’Intelligenza Artificiale, delle neuroscienze e della scienza cognitiva. Fra i temi trattati, la problematica relativa alla coscienza fenomenica è affrontata nei più importanti aspetti messi in luce nel recente dibattito filosofico e scientifico e, a conclusione di questa analisi, viene proposta una soluzione originale a tale problema
Multiple clocks in mental time processing
How does the mind keep track of time? Timing capacity is one of the key elements not only of learning, but also of our sense of identity and agency. This capacity is the most basic feature of the brain working, it connects an individual mind with its environment. May there be a metronome independent of other structures that acts as a unit of temporal measurement? There are two different possible answers to this question that imply a completely different understanding of the workings of attention, and so of individual consciousness. First, we could say that there is a specific area that always pulses at the same frequency, which works as a timer. In this sense, we have to suppose that it starts to pulse at some point of the development of the neural system. The features which define different contents of perception would then depend on those internal and subjective rhythms that are related to this original timing unit. Under this perspective, attentional content is a step-by-step sum of speedier activations compared to this timer. But, as we will argue here, this is only one possible answer, for we should also consider the existence of multiple clocks and an alternative way of measuring time might depend on their integration or overlap
Ongoing Activity of the Brain: A Timing-Based Approach to Perception and Memory
The human mind is constantly engaged in predicting the future using
past experiences to anticipate what is likely to happen next. The predictive coding
approach focuses on this ongoing activity and proposes a unified mechanism that
underlies both perception and action. In this paper, we showthat some applications
of the predictive coding model to memory and perception processes often face the
ambiguity of two controversial aspects. (I) How can the brain apply similar mechanisms
to handle qualitatively different degrees of prediction (e.g. imaginative
and procedural predictions)? (II) How is it possible to reconcile the presence of
stable mental representations with the continuous dynamic change of perceptual
data? We suggest that the relation between different degrees of prediction can be
seen as analogous to the relation between a perception and its recollection, and we
argue that this relation can be better understood within a timing-based approach
that looks at the temporal architectures underlying these cognitive phenomena.
Therefore, based on the interpretation of some empirical data from the study of
auditory perception, we show how the timing-based approach we delineate can
help to clarify aspects (I) and (II)
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