1,721,214 research outputs found
Phenomenal Consciousness. Peter Carruthers
No full textBook review of Phenomenal Consciousness, by Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers vs. Donald Davidson on Propositional Attitudes
No full textI introduce and discuss debate on animal minds, emphasizing the perspectives of Peter Carruthers and Donald Davidson. I argue that crucial flaws in each account can be solved by appeal to a hierarchy of mindedness. I attempt to preserve an important conceptual link between belief and truth and I show how this can coexist with current scientific evidence
Language, Thought and Consciousness
No full textDo we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics.</jats:p
Peter Carruthers and Brute Experience; Descartes Revisited
Full text linkPeter Carruthers argues in favour of the position that the pains of non-human animals are nonconscious ones, and from this that non-human animals are due no moral consideration.1 I outline Carruthers’ argument in Section II, and call attention to significant overlap between Carruthers’ standpoint regarding non-human animals and Rene Descartes’ position. In Section III I specify various ways Carruthers’ premises are undefended. I argue that we are either forced to take seriously an absurd notion of pain experience that fails to be adequately defended, or we are forced to accept an underlying problematic ideology Carruthers shares with Descartes that begs the question of non-human animal consciousness. In Section IV I conclude by arguing from both a common sense and moral perspective that Carruthers’ analysis is fundamentally flawed
Mentes humanas y mentes animales: Peter Carruthers (2019). Human and animal minds: The consciousness questions laid to rest. Oxford University Press.
No full textThe review puts forward the central theses of Peter Carruthers in Human and animal minds: The consciousness questions laid to rest (Oxford University Press, 2019). At the same time, it proposes a critical examination of some of his arguments regarding phenomenal consciousness. La reseña expone los argumentos principales del libro de Peter Carruthers, Human and animal minds: The consciousness questions laid to rest. Oxford University Press, 2019. A su vez, desarrolla algunas críticas a la noción de conciencia fenoménica propuesta por el autor. 
The Animals Issue
No full textDo animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. He explores a variety of moral theories, arguing that animals lack direct moral significance. This provocative but judiciously argued book will appeal to all those interested in animal rights, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why theoretical issues in ethics actually matter.</jats:p
Video 7.2: The short program of pair figure skaters Kitty and Peter Carruthers of the U.S. at the 1984 Winter Olympics
No full textClip from video 1984 Winter Olympics - Pairs Figure Skating Short Program - Kitty & Peter Carruthers by Youtube user westnyacktwins. Available: https://youtu.be/iy4CXi9GnG4https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/physicsofsports/1051/thumbnail.jp
Peter Carruthers: la arquitectura de la mente.
Full text linkIn this introduction to the special issue, the central ideas in Peter Carruther's thought are presented: his particular version of functionalist cognitivism, which inverts the common place that animals feel but not think, to claim that they do think but do not feel. The key to this inversion is the central role Carruthers assigns to language in the architecture of the mind, in spite of his defense of a version of the massive modularity hypothesis: as a ground for qualitative consciousness and for flexible thought. Finally, the different contributions to the special issue are placed in terms of such central axes.En esta introducción al número monográfico, se presentan las líneas centrales del pensamiento de Peter Carruthers, su particular versión del cognitivismo funcionalista, que parte de una curiosa inversión de un lugar común: los animales piensan pero no sienten. Esta inversión deriva del papel central que Carruthers atribuye al lenguaje en la propia arquitectura mental, a pesar de partir de una versión de la modularidad masiva: como base para la conciencia y el pensamiento de nivel superior, flexible y creativo. Finalmente, también se sitúan las diversas contribuciones al volumen dentro de estos ejes centrales
Peter Carruthers: la arquitectura de la mente.
No full textIn this introduction to the special issue, the central ideas in Peter Carruther's thought are presented: his particular version of functionalist cognitivism, which inverts the common place that animals feel but not think, to claim that they do think but do not feel. The key to this inversion is the central role Carruthers assigns to language in the architecture of the mind, in spite of his defense of a version of the massive modularity hypothesis: as a ground for qualitative consciousness and for flexible thought. Finally, the different contributions to the special issue are placed in terms of such central axes.En esta introducción al número monográfico, se presentan las líneas centrales del pensamiento de Peter Carruthers, su particular versión del cognitivismo funcionalista, que parte de una curiosa inversión de un lugar común: los animales piensan pero no sienten. Esta inversión deriva del papel central que Carruthers atribuye al lenguaje en la propia arquitectura mental, a pesar de partir de una versión de la modularidad masiva: como base para la conciencia y el pensamiento de nivel superior, flexible y creativo. Finalmente, también se sitúan las diversas contribuciones al volumen dentro de estos ejes centrales
Teorías de la consciencia de orden superior (HOT) y los animales: El debate entre Peter Carruthers y Rocco Gennaro
Full text linkOne of the main problems attributed to the higher-order theories of consciousness (HOT) lies in its consideration of non-human animals, as well as infants, as non-conscious beings. In response, some HOT theorists, such as Rocco Gennaro, argue that this claim is based on a false assumption, while others, such as Peter Carruthers, deny that the non-attribution of consciousness to animals is a problem. The present work will describe the criticism mentioned to the HOTs, as well as the two possible replies presented by Gennaro and Carruthers. Taking sides for Gennaro's proposal will be carried out a critical review of the second.Uno de los principales problemas achacados a las teorías de la consciencia de orden superior (HOT) reside en su consideración de los animales no humanos, así como de los infantes, como seres no conscientes. Como respuesta, algunos teóricos de las HOT, como Rocco Gennaro, sostienen que esa afirmación parte de un supuesto falso, mientras que otros, como Peter Carruthers, niegan que la no atribución de consciencia a los animales sea un problema. El presente trabajo describirá la crítica mencionada a las HOT, así como las dos posibles réplicas presentadas por Gennaro y Carruthers. Tomando partido por la propuesta de Gennaro, se realizará una revisión crítica de la segunda
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