15,317 research outputs found

    Speeches by David L. Smiley, 1987

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    11 speeches by history professor David L. Smiley. Titles include: "Faculty Talent," regarding wit and humor; "The Problem of the South," regarding William L. Yancey; "History Day," regarding history learning; "Percival Perry," regarding professor Percival Perry; "Daughters of the American Revolution. Jefferson Davis, Education," regarding the Confederate States of America; "Potemkin Village and Philadelphias: What we can learn from the past. Governor's School," regarding Potemkin Villages in Russia and Philadelphia; "Bicentennial Committee, Forsyth Country," regarding N.C.'s state anniversary; "Constitution Bi-Centennial," regarding the Constitution; "Wake in the 60's," regarding WFU in the 1960's; "Kernersville Breakfast," regarding Advent and Christmas; "Walkertown Lions," regarding learning from history

    David L. Titus

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    David L. Titus receives an award for 15 years of service in Student Affairs. (l-r) President William Perry, David L. Titus, Vice President of Student Affairs Dan Nadler.https://thekeep.eiu.edu/years_of_service_2013/1118/thumbnail.jp

    MDL as Public Administration

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    From the Deepwater Horizon disaster to the opioid crisis, multidistrict litigation—or simply MDL—has become the preeminent forum for devising solutions to the most difficult problems in the federal courts. MDL works by refusing to follow a regular procedural playbook. Its solutions are case specific, evolving, and ad hoc. This very flexibility, however, provokes charges that MDL violates basic requirements of the rule of law. At the heart of these charges is the assumption that MDL is simply a larger version of the litigation that takes place every day in federal district courts. But MDL is not just different in scale than ordinary litigation; it is different in kind. In structure and operation, MDL parallels programs like Social Security in which an administrative agency continuously develops new procedures to handle a high volume of changing claims. Accordingly, MDL is appropriately judged against the “administrative” rule of law that emerged in the decades after World War II and underpins the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. When one views MDL as an administrative program instead of a larger version of ordinary civil litigation, the real threats to its legitimacy come into focus. The problem is not that MDL is ad hoc. Rather, it is that MDL lacks the guarantees of transparency, public participation, and ex post review that administrative agencies have operated under since the middle of the twentieth century. The history of the administrative state suggests that MDL’s continued success as a forum for resolving staggeringly complex problems depends on how it addresses these governance deficits

    David Ross

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    David Ross retires after 10 years of service. (l-r) President Perry, David Ross, William Weberhttps://thekeep.eiu.edu/retirements_2014/1040/thumbnail.jp

    David Flach

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    David Flach retires after 10 years of service. (l-r) President Perry, David Flach, Mark Hudsonhttps://thekeep.eiu.edu/retirements_2014/1038/thumbnail.jp

    The New Conflicts Law

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    The deterrent and remedial power of civil litigation in U.S. courts is justifiably famous. But as Kiobel and other cases underscore, such litigation is only one of many possible ways to regulate harms that affect multiple sovereigns. Globalization, increased cross-border activity, and the lightweight limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction imposed by international law combine to create an environment in which it is common for multiple legal systems to regulate a single course of conduct. When sovereigns disagree over how to regulate harm, the ensuing conflicts expose U.S. legal systems to a new and unfamiliar form of political backlash. This Article identifies, explains, and critically analyzes a new body of law that responds to these conflicts in a novel and problematic way. Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in recent terms, the Supreme Court has interpreted indeterminate legal materials that are not obviously about regulatory conflict to create a set of clear, ex ante rules restricting private regulatory enforcement in U.S. courts. This set of rules--"the new conflicts law"-- prevents conflicts between domestic litigation and other nations' approaches to regulating harm and transfers authority for regulatory conflict from frontline decisionmakers to the U.S. Supreme Court. But in seeking to limit interference with foreign regulation, the new law undermines U.S. regulatory systems with no clear welfare payoff. And it often precludes democratically accountable policymakers from revisiting the Supreme Court's conclusions about the appropriate relationship between U.S. litigation and foreign regulation. To address these concerns, the Article proposes incremental changes to four doctrines within the new conflicts law. The more basic and urgent task, however, is to recognize the new conflicts law for the significant development it is. With little fanfare, the Supreme Court has dramatically changed the way in which the U.S. legal system manages regulatory conflict
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