1,721,045 research outputs found
Screening and short-term contracts
Full text linkThis article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker’s bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications
Search and the firm's choice of the optimal labor contract
Full text linkThis article studies the behavior of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn the worker's type. After this stage, the firm can propose a long- term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endogenously, for the firms can be optimal to start a working relationship with a short-term contract, but that this policy has a negative impact on unemployment and welfare. On the contrary, if this wage is fixed exogenously, this policy could be optimal also from welfare point of view
Delegation, externalities and organizational design
No full textIn a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents
Universal service financing in competitive postal markets: one size does not fit all
Full text linkIn the postal sector, the net cost of universal service depends on the content of the service, the postal market characteristics and the country's geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the cost of universal service between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, one size does not fit all
Investments in education in a two-sector, random matching economy
Full text linkWe consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents endogenously choose to invest time and real resources in education. Generically in the space of the economies, there is an open interval of possible lengths of schooling such that, at at least one of the associated steady states equilibria, some agents, but not all of them, choose to invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained Pareto inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained Pareto optimality. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals, which are sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (undereducation), and present some results on their comparative static properties
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