1,721,016 research outputs found
On Lie point symmetries in differential games
A technique to determine closed-loop Nash equilibria of n-player differential games is developed when their dynamic state-control system is composed of decoupled ODEs. In particular, the theory of Lie point symmetries is exploited to achieve first integrals of such systems
MANUALE DI GEOMETRIA: ESERCIZI
Testo divulgativo per studentesse e studenti del primo anno di IngegneriaPopular text for students of the first year of Engineerin
Analytic solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
Closed form solutions are found for a particular class of Hamilton- Jacobi-Bellman equations emerging from a differential game among fims competing over quantities in a simultaneous oligopoly framework. After the derivation of the solutions, a microeconomic example in a non-standard market is presented where feedback equilibrium is calculated with the help of one of the previous formulas
Multifactorial Decomposition of Inequality: The Case of CAP
The purpose of this article is to propose a theoretical foundation on the impact of a
transfer scheme on income inequality in the redistribution process among participants
in a related agreement. Our example involves the study of the Common Agricultural Policy implemented by EU Countries. First, we show that ex-post inequality
(after the distribution process) may increase if either initial aggregate income or the
amounts of fiscal contributions are sufficiently high. Second, we characterize a multi-
factorial methodology according to Palestini and Pignataro (2014) to gauge the impact
of redistribution and the effects of different income sources to the inequality profile.
Finally, we propose an exercise where a hypothetical policy is implemented and we
apply the Banzhaf and Shapley values to determine the marginal contributions of each
factor to overall inequality
A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics
We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayesian game with finite type structures, taking into account the cost/benefit features of agents. Building on a standard model of oligopolistic competition also applicable to environmental issues such as profit maximization in presence of an externality affecting all players, we rely on types to describe their heterogeneity. When the damage functions are additively separable, the potential provides necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure monotonicity of pure strategies
What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation
We analyze the screening problem of a firm hiring workers without knowing their ability while observing their intrinsic motivation. We show that volunteerism is the contractual outcome when workers are low-skilled, have high motivation, and are protected by limited liability
On the Feedback Solutions of Differential Oligopoly Games with Hyperbolic Demand Curve and Capacity Accumulation
We characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic inverse demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. The related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman are solved in closed form both on infinite and on finite horizon setups and the optimal strategies are determined. Then, we analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers in both static and dynamic settings, and find appropriate conditions for their profitability under both circumstances. Static profitability of a merger implies dynamic profitability of the same merger. It appears that such a demand structure makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the standard linear inverse demand
MANUALE DI GEOMETRIA: ESERCIZI E TEMI D'ESAME SVOLTI
Testo divulgativo per studentesse e studenti del primo anno di IngegneriaPopular text for students of the first year of Engineerin
MANUALE DI GEOMETRIA: TEORIA
Testo divulgativo per studentesse e studenti del primo anno di IngegneriaPopular text for students of the first year of Engineerin
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