1,721,035 research outputs found
Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals in the Psychology of Reasoning
Our objective in this chapter is to introduce the study of indictive and counterfactual conditionals in the psychology of reasoning, and to discuss how psychology can make progress in understanding the relationship between these conditionals in people’s thinking and reasoning. There is a great deal of psychological research on both indicative and counterfactual conditionals, but to a large extent, the two research topics have not been closely connected in the psychology of reasoning
Independence Conditionals
Douven et al. (this volume) have replied to our critique (Over and Cruz this volume) of their version of truth condition inferentialism (TCI). They have generously allowed us to have the last word (in this volume) in this debate. Their TCI theory is that there must be a compelling argument from p, plus background information and not from this information alone, to q for a “standard” conditional, if p then q, to be true. This argument can be deductive, inductive, abductive, or possibly contain some other kind of step (such as an analogical inference), and it does not have to be conclusive (see Douven et al. this volume, for their truth conditions)
Probabilities of conditionals and previsions of iterated conditionals
We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then C as information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We conclude our study with some remarks on the supposed “independence” of two conditionals, and we interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantitie
On Trivalent Logics, Probabilistic Weak Deduction Theorems, and a General Import-Export Principle
In this paper we first recall some results for conditional events, compound conditionals, conditional random quantities, p-consistency, and p-entailment. We discuss the equivalence between conditional bets and bets on conditionals, and review de Finetti's trivalent analysis of conditionals. But we go beyond de Finetti's early trivalent logical analysis and his later ideas, aiming to take his proposals to a higher level. We examine two recent articles that explore trivalent logics for conditionals and their definitions of logical validity and compare them with the approach to compound conditionals introduced by Gilio and Sanfilippo within the framework of conditional random quantities. As we use the notion of p-entailment, the full deduction theorem does not hold. We prove a Probabilistic Weak Deduction Theorem for conditional events. After that we study some variants of it, with further results, and we present several examples. Moreover, we illustrate how to derive new inference rules related to selected Aristotelian syllogisms. We focus on iterated conditionals and the invalidity of the Import-Export principle in the light of our Probabilistic Weak Deduction Theorem. We use the inference from a disjunction, A or B, to the conditional, if not-A then B, as an example to show the invalidity of this principle. We introduce a General Import-Export principle by examining examples and counterexamples. In particular, when considering the inference rules of System P, we find that a General Import-Export principle is satisfied, even if the assumptions of the Probabilistic Weak Deduction Theorem do not hold. We also deepen further aspects related to the p-entailment and p-consistency. Finally, we briefly discuss some related work relevant to AI
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
On Independence and Compound and Iterated Conditionals
Understanding the logic of uncertain conditionals is a key problem in the new paradigm psychology of reasoning and related fields. We investigate conjunctions of conditionals, iterated conditionals, and independence within the theory of logical operations on conditionals, where compound conditionals are suitably defined as conditional random quantities. We show how conjunctions of conditionals and conditionals which feature conditionals in the antecedent and the consequent can be rationally interpreted. In particular, we study the behavior of such objects under different logical constraints, by also considering a kind of “independence” property. Unlike alternative approaches, in our framework we avoid counterintuitive consequences, which is necessary for understanding, or improving, human and artificial rationality in general
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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