1,721,072 research outputs found
From Douhet to drones, air warfare, and the evolution of targeting
No full textThrough the prism of the experience of air warfare, this chapter identifies key factors that have shaped targeting. These include technological developments, organizational structures, and processes and inter-service competition for scarce resources. Moreover, targeting is informed by perspectives on the nature of the political mandate and objectives, by the type of war, by intelligence on the nature of the opponent, and by assumptions that are derived from experience, doctrine, or strategic theory. It is, of course, shaped by societal norms. Targeting’s evolutionary process is one of solving technical and informational obstacles to finding and hitting targets. It is characterized by a trend in increased munitions accuracy and pinpoint attack capability against objects of an ever-decreasing physical signature in ever-shortening response times, and, if necessary, from ever-increasing distances from the target. The evolution is also a story of constant organizational learning, rediscovery, and theorizing about and experimenting with new targeting planning tools and processes. Moreover, there is a constantly swinging pendulum between the poles of centralized and decentralized control, with a strong tendency toward stringent political oversight. Finally, norms play an increasing role. As this chapter will argue, contemporary targeting challenges emanate from a paradox—as targeting accuracy has reached an unprecedented level, so too has the societal demand for risk-mitigation, precisely because of demonstrated targeting capabilities
Bounding the debate on drones: the paradox of postmodern warfare
No full textAs the author puts it, drone strikes have become the icon of the western post-modern style of warfare and they have been the subject of an ongoing debate. Paying due attention to the risk of drone warfare, moral disengagement and questionable legality included, as well as practicalities of the use of drones, Osinga proposes a balanced view. He points out tha that the current debates on drones is a manifestation of the paradox of post-modern warfare in which more precise weapons seem to provoke changes in the western attitudes towards the use of military force
Reframing lawfare
No full textLaw, in particular international law, plays an increasingly significant role in todays military operations. In accordance with the principle of the rule of law, States can deploy their armed forces abroad based on a clear legal foundation while the deployed forces must operate within the applicable rules. The growing emphasis on this legal framework for military operation entails that today, law is not just a factor to be reckoned with when preparing for and conducting military operations, but can be a possible means to reach a military objective as well. Recently, to help understand this development the term lawfare has been introduced. Lawfare it is not generally accepted as a term of art yet. As it is a catchy phrase the term is also used for politically motivated reasons, criticizing the application of law to certain aspects of military operations, as it is felt to endanger national security or to curb armed forces unnecessarily, especially when dealing with less law abiding opponents. From a military operational law perspective, manipulating lawfare in this way threatens to turn the concept in an empty shell devoid of any meaningful content. As lawfare is a useful term to describe and understand the dynamics of the instrumental role law can play in the context of contemporary complex military operations, the sometime random use of it blurs the scope of its application. This article will, therefore, explore and clarify the meaning and scope of the concept
Manoeuvring and generating effects in the information environment
Get PDFThis paper aims to offer a framework for States in general and armed forces in particular for generating effects in or through the information environment by answering the question: How to generate effects in or through the information environment and therefore, how to manoeuvre in this information environment? This environment is part of the larger operational environment and consists of three dimensions: the cognitive, virtual and physical. These dimensions in turn host certain layers and these hold targetable entities. States can create effects in this environmentby wielding the instruments at their disposal (diplomacy, informational, military and economic) for various purposes (anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection, intervention, stabilizationand normalization). In order to be able to do so, States must organise and equip themselves for manoeuvring in the information environment. To show that indeed States can use this environment, this paper highlights some cases where an actor uses the information environment to great effect, being: the U.S. Election Information Campaign (2016) and the Black Energy operation (2015) in Ukraine. These cases are indicative of the potential of manoeuvring in the information environment by States and their armed forces
Non-kinetic capabilities and the threshold of attack in the law of armed conflict
No full textIn this chapter it is argued that within the framework of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), attack and kinetic operations can be used as equivalents where military operations that do not constitute attacks have a large overlap with non-kinetic operations. These topics present more than just a linguistic exercise because many (restrictive) rules in LOAC are constructed around the definition of attack, placing fewer restrictions on other military operations. Traditionally, the qualification of attack is determined by the (intended) physical consequences of a military operation. If it does not (intend to) result in physical consequences, it is not defined as attack. If this approach is applied to non-kinetic military capabilities, especially in cyberspace with its non-physical components, the question is raised whether the traditional physical consequences are still valid criteria for determining whether or not a military operation qualifies as attack
Maritime economic enforcement measures: 'winning without killing' in modern conflicts at sea
No full textThis chapter deals with the non-kinetic side of naval operations. In particular, it deals with the use of naval forces in applying economic maritime enforcement measures. There has always been a solid connection between the use of the navy and the economy. Traditionally, the relationship between naval forces and the economy has come to be expressed in two principles where during conflict the navy aims to destroy the opponents economy, and during both peacetime and conflict the navy aims to protect the States own economic interests. At an operational level, three models of enforcing economic maritime enforcement measures can be identified that translate these principles to todays naval operations: traditional economic warfare operations, maritime embargo operations and maritime security operations. These measures are also often considered to be at the low end of the use of force scale
Non-kinetic capabilities: complementing the kinetic prevalence to targeting
No full textTargeting is used in military doctrine to describe a military operational way, using (military) means to influence a target (or addressee) in order to achieve designated political and/or military goals. The four factors italicized are used to analyse non-kinetic targeting, thereby complementing our knowledge and understanding of the prevalent kinetic targeting. Paradoxically, non-kinetic targeting is not recognized as a separate concept; kinetic and non-kinetic are intertwined facets of targeting. Kinetic targeting refers to the targeted application of military force based on the release or concentration of kinetic energy against opposing forces or objects with (primarily) lethal effects in the physical domain, whereas non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of (other military and non-military) capabilities against addressees to generate (additional) non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domain . This chapter attempts to provide a better demarcation between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, first by reviewing recent developments in military operations and targeting and introducing a ‘full spectrum approach ’. It then enumerates and analyses a number of typical non-kinetic capabilities : information activities, key leader engagement, lawfare, criminal legal action, security detention, assets freezes, and cyber operations. The chapter concludes that although non-kinetic targeting does not exist as a stand-alone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect additional target audiences (including supporters) with less devastating effects (including constructive effects) by offering additional means to conduct operations, stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding, and will
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