1,720,963 research outputs found
Collective intentionality and the roots of human societal life
What can we learn from animals? In this chapter, I would like to pursue the more specific question: What can we learn from other animals about what kind of social animals we are, and how we become so? Obviously, human sociality is quite unique. Our cooperative, societal, and institutional forms of life clearly set us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. From an onto- genetic point of view, I will inquire into the potential cognitive underpinnings of such unique sociality and its development. The ontogeny of different forms of intentionality in early childhood will be traced, with a comparative eye on common primate and uniquely human aspects. The picture that emerges will be this: We share with other animals, in particular great apes, basic forms of individual intentionality, and probably even simple forms of individual second-order intentionality that develop in human ontogeny in the course of the first one and a half years. What lies at the heart of uniquely human cognition, though, and what lays the foundation for uniquely human sociality, is the ability to enter into collective “WE”-intentionality, which develops from the second year on
Collective intentionality and the roots of human societal life
What can we learn from animals? In this chapter, I would like to pursue the more specific question: What can we learn from other animals about what kind of social animals we are, and how we become so? Obviously, human sociality is quite unique. Our cooperative, societal, and institutional forms of life clearly set us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. From an onto- genetic point of view, I will inquire into the potential cognitive underpinnings of such unique sociality and its development. The ontogeny of different forms of intentionality in early childhood will be traced, with a comparative eye on common primate and uniquely human aspects. The picture that emerges will be this: We share with other animals, in particular great apes, basic forms of individual intentionality, and probably even simple forms of individual second-order intentionality that develop in human ontogeny in the course of the first one and a half years. What lies at the heart of uniquely human cognition, though, and what lays the foundation for uniquely human sociality, is the ability to enter into collective “WE”-intentionality, which develops from the second year on
GENES IN DEVELOPMENT: RE-READING THE MOLECULAR PARADIGM
Introduction / Eva M. Neumann-Held and Christoph Rehmann-Sutter -- Pt. I. Empirical approaches -- Ch. 1. Genome analysis and developmental biology: the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans as a model system / Thomas R. Burglin -- Ch. 2. Genes and form: inherency in the evolution of developmental mechanisms / Stuart A. Newman and Gerd B. Muller -- Pt. II. Looking back into history -- Ch. 3. From genes as determinants to DNA as resource: historical notes on development and genetics / Sahotra Sarkar -- Pt. III. Theorizing genes -- Ch. 4. The origin of species: a structuralist approach / Gerry Webster and Brian C. Goodwin -- Ch. 5. On the problem of the molecular versus the organismic approach in biology / Ulrich Wolf -- Ch. 6. Genes, development, and semiosis / Jesper Hoffmeyer -- Ch. 7. The fearless vampire conservator: Philip Kitcher, genetic determinism, and the informational gene / Paul E. Griffiths -- Ch. 8. Genetics from an evolutionary process perspective / James Griesemer -- Ch. 9. Genes - causes - codes: deciphering DNA'S ontological privilege / Eva M. Neumann-Held -- Ch. 10. Boundaries and (constructive) interaction / Susan Oyama -- Ch. 11. Beyond the gene but beneath the skin / Evelyn Fox Keller -- Ch. 12. Poiesis and praxis: two modes of understanding development / Christoph Rehmann-Sutter -- Pt. IV. Social and ethical implications -- Ch. 13. Developmental emergence, genes, and responsible science / Brian C. Goodwin -- Ch. 14. Nothing like a gene / Jackie Leach Scully -- Contributors -- Inde
From similarity to uniqueness: Method and theory in comparative psychology
Comparative psychology is a strongly interdisciplinary field that shares many of its experimental methods and observational techniques with ethology and developmental psychology. The great variety of theories that comparative psychology evokes to explain behavior generates a wide array of exciting and potentially fruitful accounts, but is also problematic. It increases the risk of error in the forms of inconsistent background assumptions, conceptual misunderstandings, unfalsifiable hypotheses and incoherent explanations, which in spite of perhaps being minor by themselves will impede scientific progress in the long run. Moreover, similarly to psychology at large, comparative psychology tends to emphasize empirical investigations to the disadvantage of the analysis and development of theories and concepts. Consequently, disagreements that have their roots elsewhere than in methodology and experimental design do not receive sufficient attention. Furthermore, while evidence about biological evolution (i.e., the behavior and cognition of ancient animals) is notoriously hard to find, the methodology for comparing the capacities of different species is under continuous development. This forces comparative psychology to rely on the adequacy of the theoretical and conceptual framework to a greater extent than normally in the empirical sciences. In view of investigating the background of the problems that contemporary comparative psychology is facing, the present chapter examines central parts of the methodology and explanatory framework of comparative psychology as well as its global objective
Can it Be a "Sin" to Understand Disease? On "Genes" and "Eugenics" and an "Unconnected Connection"
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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