268,681 research outputs found
Nagel, Katherina, October 23, 2010 [Interview]
No full textKatherina Nagel was interviewed on Octboer 23, 2010 by Katherine Hanisko about her early life. During this time, German troops moved into her home town in Romania and evacuated them to Austria in 1944. After the Geneva Conference, her family was moved to Germany and she eventually came to America.Ditzig, AnnaWorld War I
Teilnachlaß Hans Thoma I / Brief von Gert Nagel von Kunst- und Auktionshaus Doktor Fritz Nagel an Franz Anselm Schmitt an Badische Landesbibliothek, 10.10.1961
No full textBeil. Auktionskatalog der Firma Dr. Fritz Nagel sowie Zeitungsartikel von Schmitt über den erworbenen Nachlaß (Badische Neueste Neue Nachrichten vom 20.10.1961).K 2727,45Handschrif
Nagel on Conceivability
No full textIn the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary idealist, namely Donald Davidson
Nagel on Conceivability
Full text linkIn the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary idealist, namely Donald Davidson
Nagel on Conceivability
No full textIn the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary idealist, namely Donald Davidson
Gödel, Nagel, minds and machines
No full textimbroglio about the possible inclusion of Gödel’s original work on incompleteness in the book, Gödel’s Proof, then being written by Nagel with James R. Newman. What led to the conflict were some unprecedented demands that Gödel made over the use of his material and his involvement in the contents of the book⎯demands that resulted in an explosive reaction on Nagel’s part. In the end the proposal came to naught. But the story is of interest because of what was basically at issue, namely their provocative related but contrasting views on the possible significance of Gödel’s theorems for minds vs. machines in the development of mathematics. That is our point of departure for the attempts by Gödel, and later Lucas and Penrose, to establish definitive consequences of those theorems, attempts which⎯as we shall see⎯depend on highly idealized and problematic assumptions about minds, machines and mathematics. In particular, I shall argue that there is a fundamental equivocation involved in those assumptions that needs to be reexamined. In conclusion, that will lead us to a new way of looking at how the mind works in deriving mathematics that in a way straddles the mechanist and anti-mechanist viewpoints
Problem „nietoperza Nagel\u27a" w argumentacji Johna Hicka i Paula M. Churchlanda.
Full text linkThe article tries to show the relations between P. M. Churchland\u27s and J. Hick\u27s reference to T. Nagel\u27s „bat argument" and is based on Nagel\u27s, Mortal questions, Chuchralnd\u27s The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. A Philosophical Journey into the Brain and J. Hick\u27s The New Frontier of Religion and Science. Religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. The clue is that Churchland and Hick beg the main point of the Nagel\u27s argument about the difference between mind and brain. Churchland agrees with Nagel in assuming of the self and only self knowledge about mind states. But the former author and Hick misunderstand that indeed Nagel argues that it is still impossible to identify subjective states as objective. Moreover, Hick avoids Churchland\u27s counter-argument. Therefore, not all of the dispute concerns the same problem.The article tries to show the relations between P. M. Churchland\u27s and J. Hick\u27s reference to T. Nagel\u27s „bat argument" and is based on Nagel\u27s, Mortal questions, Chuchralnd\u27s The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. A Philosophical Journey into the Brain and J. Hick\u27s The New Frontier of Religion and Science. Religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. The clue is that Churchland and Hick beg the main point of the Nagel\u27s argument about the difference between mind and brain. Churchland agrees with Nagel in assuming of the self and only self knowledge about mind states. But the former author and Hick misunderstand that indeed Nagel argues that it is still impossible to identify subjective states as objective. Moreover, Hick avoids Churchland\u27s counter-argument. Therefore, not all of the dispute concerns the same problem
Paussus laosensis Maruyama et Nagel, n.sp.. Pp. 57-60 in: Maruyama M., 2016. Revision of the hystrix Westwood, 1850 Group of the Genus Paussus Linné, 1775 (Coleoptera: Carabidae: Paussinae). I. Description of Nineteen New Species.
No full textDescription of the new beetle species Paussus laosensis Maruyama et Nagel (Coleoptera, Carabidae, Paussinae
NAGEL AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN
No full textThomas Nagel has recently discussed whether intelligent design theory (IDT) is scientific and should be taught in public schools alongside the theory of evolution (ET). Nagel writes:I do not regard divine intervention as a possibility, even though I have no other candidates. Yet I recognize that this is because of an aspect of my overall worldview that does not rest on empirical grounds or any other kind of rational grounds…. [S]omeone who can offer serious scientific reasons to doubt the adequacy of [ET], and who believes in God, in the same immediate way that I believe there is no god, can quite reasonably conclude that the hypothesis of design should be taken seriously. (‘Public Education and Intelligent Design’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36.2 (2008), pp. 187–205, p. 192.)</jats:p
Churchland, Nagel, and Their Severe Critique of Folk Psychology
No full textIn this paper, I attempt to show that Thomas Nagel and Patricia Churchland, two seemingly very different philosophers of mind, in fact resemble each other quite closely in their severe critique of folk psychology. Due to folk psychology's deep inadequacies, both Nagel and Churchland have suggested important revisions to it, which, strikingly, have led both of them to call their positions "revisionist". This paper makes a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind literature, since almost all philosophers, including the Churchlands and Nagel themselves, understand the Churchlands and Nagel to espouse completely different philosophical views on these matters
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