1,720,999 research outputs found
An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders
No full textWe consider the competition among quantity setting players in a linear evolutionary environment. To set their outputs, players adopt, alternatively, the best response rule having perfect foresight or an imitative rule. Players are allowed to change their behavior through an evolutionary mechanism according to which the rule with better performance will attract more followers. The relevant stationary state of the model describes a scenario where players produce at the Cournot-Nash level. Due to the presence of imitative behavior, we find that the number of players and implementation costs, needed to the best response exploitation, have an ambiguous role in determining the stability properties of the equilibrium and double stability thresholds can be observed. Differently, the role of the intensity of choice, representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, has a destabilizing role, in line with the common occurrence in evolutionary models. The global analysis of the model reveals that increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter determine increasing dynamic complexities for the internal attractor representing a population where both decision mechanisms coexist
LOCAL AND GLOBAL INDETERMINACY IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES
No full textWe analyze an overlapping generations model where individuals’ well-being is negatively
affected by the economy-wide average consumption level. Each individual aims at increasing
his consumption level relative to that of the others.We show that this ‘positional competition’ can
generate (local and global) indeterminacy and chao
An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules
No full textWe formulate an evolutionary oligopoly model where quantity setting players produce following either the static expectation best response or a performance-proportional imitation rule. The choice on how to behave is driven by an evolutionary selection mechanism according to which the rule that brought the highest performance attracts more followers. The model has a stationary state that represents a heterogeneous population where rational and imitative rules coexist and where players produce at the Cournot–Nash level. We find that the intensity of choice, a parameter representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, the cost of the best response implementation as well as the number of players have ambiguous roles in determining the stability property of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. This marks important differences with most of the results from evolutionary models and oligopoly competitions. Such differences should be referred to the particular imitative behavior we consider in the present modeling setup. Moreover, the global analysis of the model reveals that the above-mentioned parameters introduce further elements of complexity, conditioning the convergence toward an inner attractor. In particular, even when the Cournot–Nash equilibrium loses its stability, outputs of players little differ from the Cournot–Nash level and most of the dynamics is due to wide variations of imitators’ relative fraction. This describes dynamic scenarios where shares of players produce more or less at the same level alternating their decision mechanisms
Imitative and best response behaviors in a nonlinear Cournotian setting
No full textWe consider the competition among quantity setting players in a deterministic nonlinear oligopoly framework characterized by an isoelastic demand curve. Players are characterized by having heterogeneous decisional mechanisms to set their outputs: some players are imitators, while the remaining others adopt a rational-like rule according to which their past decisions are adjusted towards their static expectation best response. The Cournot-Nash production level is a stationary state of our model together with a further production level that can be interpreted as the competitive outcome in case only imitators are present. We found that both the number of players and the relative fraction of imitators influence stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with an ambiguous role, and double instability thresholds may be observed. Global analysis shows that a wide variety of complex dynamic scenarios emerge. Chaotic trajectories as well as multi-stabilities, where different attractors coexist, are robust phenomena that can be observed for a wide spectrum of parameter sets
An oligopoly model with rational and imitation rules
No full textIn the rank of behavioral rules, imitation-based heuristics have received special attention in economics (see Vega-Redondo, 1997; Schlag, 1998). In particular, imitative behavior explains the evidence from experimental oligopolies where the Cournot–Nash equilibrium does not emerge as unique outcome and outputs are placed, for the most part, on fairly competitive levels (see e.g. Apesteguia et al., 2006 and Oechssler et al., 2016). Here, we derive a dynamic model of a linear Cournot oligopoly with a deterministic structure where rational agents having perfect foresight and imitators are present. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium is a stationary state of our models together with a further production level that can be interpreted as the competitive equilibrium in case only imitators are present. We found that the heterogeneities among players influence the stability properties of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium and the arising dynamical scenarios are characterized by similar features as those from experimental outcomes
Nonlinear dynamics and global analysis of a heterogeneous Cournot duopoly with a local monopolistic approach versus a gradient rule with endogenous reactivity
No full textGrowing Through ChaoticIntervals
No full textWe consider a growth model proposed by Matsuyama [K. Matsuyama, Growing through cycles, Econometrica 67 (2) (1999) 335–347] which describes the interaction of two sources of economic growth: The mechanism of capital accumulation (Solow regime) and the process of technical change and innovation (Romer regime). In this model the dynamics often alternates between the two different regimes: There is a tradeoff between growth and innovation. Analytically the model is represented by a piecewise smooth one-dimensional unimodal map described by two different functions, each of which characterizes a different regime. The existence of regimes with attracting equilibria or 2-cycles was already known, but the transition to complex behavior never explained properly. This is the object of the present paper. We shown that no stable cycle can exist, except for a fixed point and a cycle of period two. The Necessary and Sufficient conditions for regular or chaotic regimes are formulated. The bifurcation structure of the two-dimensional parameter plane is completely explained. It is shown how the border-collision bifurcation may lead from the stable fixed point either to another equilibrium or to an attracting cycle of period two or directly to a pure chaotic regime (which consists either in 4-cyclical chaotic intervals, 2-cyclical chaotic intervals or in one chaotic interval). All the bifurcation parameters are analytically detected making use of the bifurcation curves of a piecewise linear map in canonical form, which can be determined analytically
Local and Global Indeterminacy in an Overlapping Generations Model with Consumption Externalities
No full textMultiple Attractors and Nonlinear Dynamics in an Overlapping Generations Model with Environment
Full text linkThis paper develops a one-sector productive overlapping generations model with environment where a CES technology is assumed. Relying
on numerical and geometrical approaches, various dynamic properties of the proposed model are explored: the existence of the phenomenon of multistability or the coexistence of different attractors was demonstrated. Finally, we describe a nontypical global bifurcation which determines the appearance of an attracting cycle
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