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    Husserl on Specifically Normative Concepts

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    In this chapter, I explore Husserl’s theory of specifically normative concepts (or “thin normative concepts,” in contemporary idiom) as presented in his lectures on ethics (1920/1924). In the first section, I examine Husserl’s account of normative judgment in the Prolegomena. I argue that it is insufficient because it does not appreciate the irreducibility of normative to non-normative concepts. In the second section, I turn to Husserl’s later account of normative concepts in his lectures on ethics and explicate the meaning and significance of his claim that such concepts refer to posita (Sätze) rather than ordinary objects. I also explain how, on Husserl’s account, the normative stance that makes specifically normative concepts possible can be extended to ordinary objects and acts of consciousness. I conclude with some remarks about the significance of Husserl’s analysis for metanormative theory

    超越論的観念論と強い相関主義 ──メイヤスーとハイデガー的有限性の終焉 [Transcendental Idealism and Strong Correlationism: Meillassoux and the End of Heideggerian Finitude]

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    Translated into Japanese by Yuto Kannari from: “Transcendental Idealism and Strong Correlationism: Meillassoux and the End of Heideggerian Finitude,” by Jussi Backman, in Phenomenology and the Transcendental, edited by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo, and Timo Miettinen, pp. 276–294. Copyright 2014. Routledge. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group through PLSclear

    »Philosophie der Arithmetik«

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    MIRJA HARTIMO, ed. Phenomenology and Mathematics

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    Grassmann’s influence on Husserl

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    HUSSERL AND GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS

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    AbstractThe paper examines Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s in order to assess Husserl’s awareness of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. While there is no mention about the results in Husserl’s known exchanges with Hilbert, Weyl, or Zermelo, the most likely source about them for Husserl is Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949). Husserl’s interactions with Kaufmann show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so. Ultimately Husserl’s reading marks on Friedrich Waismann’s Einführung in das mathematische Denken: die Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936, show that he knew about them before his death in 1938.</jats:p

    Husserl on ‘Besinnung’ and Formal Ontology 1

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    Husserl’s scientific context, 1917–1938

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    Phänomenologie und Mathematik

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    Husserl and Peirce and the Goals of Mathematics

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