2,179,232 research outputs found
Behavior as mind in context
No full text(from the chapter) Like some other contributors to this book (Kitayama & Imada, Chapter 9), we approach the theme of "mind in context" from the perspective of cultural psychology (CP). This theme is central to the concept of culture, which we define as explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and selected ideas and their material manifestations in institutions, practices, and artifacts (Adams & Markus, 2004, based on Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 357). In contrast to popular associations of culture with group, this statement explicitly defines culture as structures of mind in context: "patterns of ideas... and their material manifestations" in everyday worlds. Associated with this definition is a conception of culture not as membership in rigidly bounded groups, but rather as engagement with flexible structures of mind in context distributed across unbounded worlds. The key to our discussion of behavior as mind in context comes from the second half of this definition: Cultural patterns may be considered both products of action and as conditioning elements of further action (also based on Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 357; see Adams & Markus, 2004). Although theory and research in psychology typically portray behavior as the end product of experience, a CP analysis implies a more dynamic conception in which behavior—and its intentional counterpart, action (Bruner, 1990)—is also a "conditioning element" of further experience. As such, behavior and its observable sediment constitute intentional worlds: structures of mind in context that not only bear psychological traces of previous behavior and action, but also direct subsequent behavior and action toward particular ends.
The Web-extended mind
No full textThe rapid growth and penetration of the Web raises important questions about its effects, not just on our social activities, but also on the nature of our cognitive and epistemic profiles. The extended mind hypothesis may be particularly well-suited to addressing these questions because it encourages us to think about the way in which much of our cognitive success is grounded in processing loops that factor in the contributions of our extra-neural social and technological environments. When applied to the specific socio-technical context of the Web, the extended mind hypothesis gives us the notion of the ‘Web-extended mind’, or the idea that the technological and informational elements of the Web can (at least sometimes) serve as part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states and processes. This paper attempts to explore the notion of the Web-extended mind. It first provides an overview of cognitive extension and the extended mind hypothesis, and it then goes on to discuss the possibility of Web-based forms of cognitive extension involving current or near-future technologies. It is argued that while current forms of the Web may not be particularly suited to the realization of Web-extended minds, new forms of user interaction technology as well as new approaches to information representation on the Web do provide promising new opportunities for Web-based forms of cognitive extension. Extended minds, however, are not solely the product of technological innovation. Cognitively-empowering forms of bio-technological union sometimes rely on the emergence of social practices and conventions that shape how a technology is used, as well as the specific (bio-)cognitive mechanisms that are available to support its effective exploitation. In particular, it is suggested that Web-extended minds may depend on forms of socio-technical co-evolution in which social forces and factors play just as an important role as do the processes of technology design and development
Mind Yourself (poster)
No full textA poster for 'Mind Yourself' and the services they provide for the health and well-being of Irish people living in London
Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading
No full textAbstract The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker's meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, with its own special principles and mechanisms. We show how such a metacommunicative module might have evolved, and what principles and mechanisms it might contain
Mind.
No full text"A Quarterly review of philosophy."Mode of access: Internet.Vols. for 1901- issued by the Mind Association.Vols. 1-10, 1876-1885, in v. 10; vols. 1-16, 1876-91, with v. 16; New ser., v. 1-12, 1892-1903. 1 v.; New ser., v. 13-32, 1904-23, with v. 33; New ser., v. 33-42, 1924-33. 1 v
The epiphenomenal mind
No full textThe Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the
human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in
the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events
in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is
sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not
dependent on society or its resources).
Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal.
Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the
physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to
demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more
of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under
two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on
physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar)
who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience
based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory
of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle
of the causal closure of the physical.
In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for
social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human
subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and
self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the
concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of
a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that
it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return
to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology
Mind and body
No full textMind and Body
Jan Zwicky (Author)
Wittgenstein Elegies: Brick Books Classics 6. Brick Books (purchase at Amazon.ca)
Nicole Brossard (Author)
Ardour. Coach House Books (purchase at Amazon.ca)
Reviewed by Myra Bloo
Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith
No full textFrank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicalism. Once it is appreciated that this assumption is contestable, Jackson's opponents may be seen in a different light from the one in which they appear in his writings. More generally, a connection will appear between the vast literature on physicalism as a topic in philosophy of mind and the equally vast literature on material constitution as a topic in metaphysics
Spontaneous theory of mind and its absence in autism spectrum disorders
No full textTheory of mind, the cognitive capacity to infer others' mental states, is crucial for the development of social communication. The impairment of theory of mind may relate to autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is characterized by profound difficulties in social interaction and communication. In the current article, I summarize recent updates in theory of mind research utilizing the spontaneous false belief test, which assesses participants' spontaneous tendency to attribute belief status to others. These studies reveal that young infants pass the spontaneous false belief test well before they can pass the same task when explicitly asked to answer. By contrast, high-functioning adults with ASD, who can easily pass the false belief task when explicitly asked to, do not show spontaneous false belief attribution. These findings suggest that the capacity for theory of mind develops much earlier than was previously thought, and the absence of spontaneous theory of mind may relate to impairment in social interaction and communication found in ASD
A Mind Map on Mind Mapping - Mini Lecture
No full textThis is a mini-lecture - or rather an mind map with explanatory audio. A mind map on mind mapping is discussed.
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