1,720,970 research outputs found
On the optimality of not allocating
Get PDFWe show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2012-
38863.Publicad
Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions?
No full textDoes the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one-shot environments? We revisit this question in first-price auction markets. We consider three feedback types: minimal (only knowing whether winning or not), loser (also knowing the winning bid) and winner (knowing the second highest bid if winning). Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids. We use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs. Using a sample of 624 subjects, we find that bidders' ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid/value ratios
The social impact investment race: toward an interpretative framework
Get PDFPurpose: This paper aims to develop an interpretative framework of the evolution of social impact investment (SII) in different countries. SII is a strategy of asset allocation, which combines financial profitability with a measurable social and environmental impact. Design/methodology/approach: Through a thematic analysis of 75 documents, i.e. reports, experts’ considerations, reflections on practitioners’ experience, meetings’ minutes, written by the SII Taskforce of the Group of Eight and the relative National Advisory Boards, the authors identify the main themes connected to the topic of SII development and recognize four main elements useful to segment the market, namely, information asymmetry, financial instruments, source of capital and market intermediation. Findings: They map the ongoing practices in the Group of Eight’s members and distinguish two speeds in the evolution of SII: on one hand, there is a group of roadrunners, which pave the way to SII and in which SII activities have being institutionalized; on the other hand, there is a wider group of chasers, where the SII infrastructures lack any systematization. Originality/value: Although some authors provide preliminary interpretations of the SII evolution, they mainly focus on the national level and do not provide any cross-countries analysis. The findings of the present work contribute to overcome the lack of evidence characterizing the SII field and the absence of comparable and consistent data at the global level by filling the academic literature about SII, through a structured interpretative framework
On the efficiency of the first price auction
Get PDFWe provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.Ángel Hernando-Veciana acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish
Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grants ECO2015-68406-P,
MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444) is
gratefully acknowledged. Fabio Michelucci acknowledges financial support from
the Boston Consulting Group, Prague
Building Smart Communities in Local Governments
No full textInclusive and participatory processes to design and build smart city environments has been receiving increasing attention due to the acknowledgement that excessive focus on information and communication technologies (ICT) and services may result in overlooking the role of communities towards creating smarter and more sustainable city. The meaning of "smart community" refers to the community participation in the co-production and innovation of public services for urban living. Via embracing the idea that who directly experiences a problem is keener to develop more innovative solutions, the public sector has started to engage local communities in contributing their innovation to public service delivery. However, smartening public service delivery through the engagement of the community is not a straightforward process and several barriers challenge its success. This paper analyses the critical success and failure factors of smart community projects for public service innovation. For this purpose, we analyse the case study of the municipality to develop a participatory smart community project. Results show that the involved community felt disappointed by the outcomes of the project, which failed in both building a smart community and innovating the public services of the cit
Inefficient rushes in auctions
Get PDFWe analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule.Ángel Hernando-Veciana thanks the support
from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants ECO2012-38863 and ECO2015-68406-P
(MINECO/FEDER), MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444). Fabio
Michelucci thanks the research support of Boston Consulting Group, Prague, and financial support for his
stay at the University of Queensland, where he worked on the revision of this paper, from the People Programme
(Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013/
under REA Grant 609642
Second best efficiency and the English auction
Get PDFWe study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders' incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin's (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
- …
