1,720,973 research outputs found
Bargaining in the Shadow of Arbitration
Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation
for contract disputes, reduces costs and time.
While it has frequently been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and
litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement privately while engaged in the arbitration process. Consequently, the institutional design of the arbitration may influence the bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining
that is able to identify the impact of the institutional features on its success. A detailed data set from arbitration proceedings in Italy is analyzed. The
exogenous heterogeneity in
the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. We show that the number of arbitrators used interacts with their experience and independence
to reduce uncertainty and facilitate settlement
Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration
What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duration
A Note on Marginal Deterrence: Evidence
Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Italy between 1960 and 2012, changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease in the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced
Ransom Kidnapping
The practice of kidnapping for ransom, a pred- atory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, is a salient phenomenon in many regions of the world. It causes serious harm not only to victims and their families but also to private and social capital. As a paradigmatic rational crime involving negotiations, the incentives to commit the crime and the way it ends change with the probability severity of punishment, the kidnapper’s willingness to kill the hostage, and the value of the hostage life from the point of view of the family. Limiting the family’s ability to pay reduces the frequency of the offense but opens the possibility of unintended conse- quences in terms of fatalities and duration of abduction
Ransom Kidnapping
The practice of kidnapping for ransom, a predatory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, is a salient phenomenon in many regions of the world. It causes serious harm not only to victims and their families but also to private and social capital. As a paradigmatic rational crime involving negotiations, the incentives to commit the crime and the way it ends change with the probability and severity of punishment, the kidnapper’s willingness to kill the hostage, and the value of the hostage life from the point of view of the family. Limiting the family’s ability to pay reduces the frequency of the offense but opens the possibility of unintended consequences in terms of fatalities and duration of abduction
Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and its Duration
What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duratio
Understanding Ransom Kidnappings and Their Duration
What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical
model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set
covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010
is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction
matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed
effects on its duration
Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy
Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Italy between 1960 and 2012, changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease in the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced
Barganing in the shadow of arbitration
Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation for contract disputes, reduces costs and time. While it has frequently been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement privately while engaged in the arbitration process. Consequently, the institutional design may influence the bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining that is able to identify the impact of the institutional features on its success. A detailed data set from arbitration proceedings in Italy is analyzed. The exogenous heterogeneity in the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. We show that the number of arbitrators used interacts with their experience and independence to reduce uncertainty and facilitate settlement
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