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    Bargaining in the Shadow of Arbitration

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    Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation for contract disputes, reduces costs and time. While it has frequently been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement privately while engaged in the arbitration process. Consequently, the institutional design of the arbitration may influence the bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining that is able to identify the impact of the institutional features on its success. A detailed data set from arbitration proceedings in Italy is analyzed. The exogenous heterogeneity in the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. We show that the number of arbitrators used interacts with their experience and independence to reduce uncertainty and facilitate settlement

    Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration

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    What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duration

    A Note on Marginal Deterrence: Evidence

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    Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Italy between 1960 and 2012, changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease in the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced

    Ransom Kidnapping

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    The practice of kidnapping for ransom, a pred- atory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, is a salient phenomenon in many regions of the world. It causes serious harm not only to victims and their families but also to private and social capital. As a paradigmatic rational crime involving negotiations, the incentives to commit the crime and the way it ends change with the probability severity of punishment, the kidnapper’s willingness to kill the hostage, and the value of the hostage life from the point of view of the family. Limiting the family’s ability to pay reduces the frequency of the offense but opens the possibility of unintended conse- quences in terms of fatalities and duration of abduction

    Ransom Kidnapping

    No full text
    The practice of kidnapping for ransom, a predatory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, is a salient phenomenon in many regions of the world. It causes serious harm not only to victims and their families but also to private and social capital. As a paradigmatic rational crime involving negotiations, the incentives to commit the crime and the way it ends change with the probability and severity of punishment, the kidnapper’s willingness to kill the hostage, and the value of the hostage life from the point of view of the family. Limiting the family’s ability to pay reduces the frequency of the offense but opens the possibility of unintended consequences in terms of fatalities and duration of abduction

    Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and its Duration

    No full text
    What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duratio

    Understanding Ransom Kidnappings and Their Duration

    No full text
    What factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duration

    Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy

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    Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Italy between 1960 and 2012, changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease in the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced

    Barganing in the shadow of arbitration

    No full text
    Arbitration, as an alternative to litigation for contract disputes, reduces costs and time. While it has frequently been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement privately while engaged in the arbitration process. Consequently, the institutional design may influence the bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining that is able to identify the impact of the institutional features on its success. A detailed data set from arbitration proceedings in Italy is analyzed. The exogenous heterogeneity in the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. We show that the number of arbitrators used interacts with their experience and independence to reduce uncertainty and facilitate settlement
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