1,720,997 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer quoted in ProPublica New Tax Return Shows Karl Rove\u27s Group Spent Even More On Politics Than It Said
No full textLloyd Hitoshi Mayer quoted in ProPublica article New Tax Return Shows Karl Rove\u27s Group Spent Even More On Politics Than It Said by Kim Barker.
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, a law professor and associate dean at the University of Notre Dame who specializes in nonprofits and campaign finance, reviewed the Americans for Tax Reform documents at the request of ProPublica and said it was possible that the group was allocating overhead or other costs differently in its tax return than in its FEC filings.
I do not see how any reasonable allocation differences could result in such a large disparity, however, Mayer said
Politics and the Public’s Right to Know
Full text linkIn the United States it is taken for granted that members of the public should have access to information about their government. This access takes many forms, including the ability to obtain copies of government documents, the ability to attend meetings of government officials, and the related obligations of government officials to document their activities and to reveal certain otherwise private information about themselves. This access also is often limited by countervailing concerns, such as the privacy of individual citizens and national security. Nevertheless, the presumption both at the federal level and in every state is to provide such access. Now, however, a number of public debates raise the issue of whether this right to know should extend beyond government-government and private-government interactions to also reach private-private interactions that indirectly attempt to influence government officials. For example, should the right to know extend to public identification of bundlers who successfully encourage others to make substantial campaign contributions? Similarly, should the right to know require the public disclosure of all significant funders for election-related spending done independently of candidates and political parties? Should the right to know also extend to significant funders behind grassroots lobbying efforts? This Article explores these questions. Part I briefly describes the history of the public’s right to know in the United States. Part II explains and critiques the reasons commonly asserted to support the public’s right to know, considering whether they in fact support a right to know about government-related activities and actors on the part of the public, including when it comes to private-private political interactions. Finally, Part III considers the extent to which the public’s right to know should extend to certain specific types of private-private interactions that have political ramifications
What Is This Lobbying That We Are So Worried About?
Full text linkLobbying is both an essential part of our democratic process and a source of some of our greatest fears about dangers to that process. Yet when Congress, the public, and scholars consider loosening or, as is more often the case, tightening the restrictions on lobbying, they usually assume that everyone knows what activities are in fact lobbying. They therefore overlook the fact that multiple definitions of lobbying currently exist in the various federal laws addressing lobbying. This Article seeks to fill this gap by answering the question of how lobbying should be defined for purposes of the existing federal laws relating to lobbying. The Article first explores the three sets of applicable laws, which tax lobbying, disclose lobbying, and restrict lobbyists. This exploration reveals that all three sets of laws arise out of a common concern regarding the influence of interest groups on government actions. Drawing on the extensive research regarding how interest groups wield such influence, the Article then determines that this research strongly suggests that the vulnerability to interest group methods that raise the greatest concerns varies depending on the type of government actor that an interest group seeks to influence. The Article therefore proposes the adoption of single definition of lobbying that covers all direct attempts to influence government officials and employees in Congress and at the very highest levels of the Executive Branch, while excluding attempts to influence other types of government actors and to influence the public
Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections
Full text linkWith a brief order issued at the end of its last term, the Supreme Court dramatically raised the stakes in Citizens United v. FEC. What many had predicted would be a case decided on narrow, technical grounds has now become a possible vehicle for overturning two key campaign finance precedents. By ordering re-argument and supplemental briefing on the issue of whether it should overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the part of McConnell v. FEC which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, the Court signaled that it was considering breaching the already leaking dam that keeps corporate (and union) funds at least partially out of federal elections. The first part of this Article places the Citizens United case in context by reviewing the almost 100 years of gradually tightening federal election laws governing the use of corporate funds, including the Court’s decision in Austin that upheld a state election law ban on corporations making certain election-related expenditures. The second part reviews the specific facts and issues raised in Citizens United. The third part then addresses how the Court is likely to answer the new question it has posed. That part concludes that given the stated and likely positions of the current nine Justices, the argument that is most likely to convince a majority of the Court not to overturn Austin is the doctrine of stare decisis, although that result is far from assured. Even stare decisis is unlikely to preserve the relevant portion of McConnell, however. The fourth and final part addresses the potential ramifications if the Court overrules either or both of the precedents it cited, including the new pressure an overruling of Austin would place on seemingly unrelated federal tax laws governing tax-exempt, nonprofit corporations
Nonprofits, Taxes, and Speech
Full text linkFederal tax law is of two minds when it comes to speech by nonprofits. The tax benefits provided to nonprofits are justified in significant part because they provide nonprofits great discretion in choosing the specific ends and means to pursue, thereby promoting diversity and pluralism. But current law withholds some of these tax benefits if a nonprofit engages in certain types of political speech. Legislators have also repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, sought to expand these political speech restrictions in various ways. And some commentators have proposed denying tax benefits to groups engaged in other types of disfavored speech, including hate speech and fake news. These latter proposals have recently become more prominent as additional facts come to light about the role of nonprofits in supporting white supremacy and in disseminating misleading information about COVID-19 treatments.
This Article explores the existing and proposed limitations on speech by tax-exempt nonprofits given the constitutional restrictions on such limitations and the policy justifications for existing nonprofit tax benefits. It explains why the current limits on political campaign intervention and lobbying by charities are both justified given the subsidy provided to charities and their supporters under existing federal tax law and existing and longstanding constitutional case law. It further concludes that any expansion of these limits on charities to cover other types of speech, including hate speech and fake news, would be inconsistent with the existing broad definitions of the purposes that charities can pursue as well as, in some circumstances, constitutionally suspect. The Article also concludes that limits on speech by non-charitable tax-exempt nonprofits, including the existing limit on political campaign intervention for some of these nonprofits, are both unwise as a policy matter and, in some circumstances, constitutionally suspect given the lack of a subsidy for such speech by these nonprofits
Nonprofit Corporations & Politics: The Entity/Coordination Tension
No full textFederal tax law treats separate nonprofit corporations as distinct legal entities for almost all purposes, in common with most other areas of law. With respect to political activity, this means that one nonprofit corporation’s lobbying or election-related actions are generally not attributed to another nonprofit corporation. This is the case even if the two entities have overlapping or even identical boards of directors. It is also the case even if the two entities collaborate regarding their respective activities and share employees, facilities, outside vendors, and other resources, as long as the entities reasonably allocate the costs for those shared resources. In addition, longstanding Supreme Court precedents strongly indicate that the First Amendment requires Congress and the IRS to permit this overlapping, collaboration, and sharing.
That lack of attribution is important because different types of nonprofit corporations receive different tax benefits and face different restrictions on their political activity under federal tax law. For example, a charitable nonprofit corporation that is tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions is limited with respect to lobbying and is prohibited from supporting or opposing candidates for elected public office. In contrast, a social welfare nonprofit corporation that is tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4) but not eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions can engage in unlimited lobbying related to its social welfare purpose and can also support or oppose candidates as long as doing so is not its primary activity. And a political organization that is tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 527, although only with respect to contributions received for political purposes, can engage entirely in supporting or opposing candidates. Yet a section 501(c)(3) organization, a section 501(c)(4) organization, and a section 527 organization can have overlapping boards, collaborate about their respective activities, and share resources, as long as they reasonably allocate their expenses and avoid spending directly on political activity that is limited or prohibited given their specific exemption category. There are therefore many groups of nonprofit organizations that consist of affiliated organizations with different federal tax categorizations but a common political purpose.
This lack of attribution is in tension with an aspect of federal election law and the election laws of many states. Under these election laws, if an individual or entity coordinates its activities with a candidate committee or political party, that activity is considered a contribution to the benefitted candidate or party. This result means that any spending on that activity is subject to existing source and amount limits on such contributions. In effect, the activity is attributed to the candidate or party because of the coordination even though the candidate or party does not legally control that activity. This is a common sense approach because if it did not exist it would be easy for individuals and other entities to evade contribution limits by engaging in activities not only designed to benefit a candidate or party but done at the specific request of that candidate or party. This reasoning also provides the basis for Supreme Court decisions concluding that this approach is constitutional under the First Amendment.
This essay explores the tension created by federal tax law’s respect for separate entity status on one hand and the coordination rules of federal and state election law on the other hand. It also revisits whether, given this tension, the Supreme Court was correct to constitutionalize the former approach when it comes to tax-exempt nonprofits. I conclude that whether this difference is appropriate as a policy matter depends on the policy justification for the political activity limits on section 501(c)(3) charities. If the only such justification is to support the broader federal tax policy prohibiting the deduction of expenditures for political activities, then the lack of attribution is appropriate. If instead the justification is that political activity is inconsistent with status as a section 501(c)(3) charity for broader reasons, then there is a policy argument for attributing the political activity of noncharitable nonprofit corporations to closely affiliated charitable nonprofit corporations and so subjecting that activity to the section 501(c)(3) limits. I also conclude that this latter justification could provide a basis for revisiting the Supreme Court precedents that bar this attribution as a constitutional matter
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