86 research outputs found
Algorithmic Price Recommendations and Collusion
No full textThis repository accompanies the paper “Algorithmic Price Recommendations and Collusion: Experimental Evidence,” co-authored by Matthias Hunold and Tobias Werner
Contents:
- Replication Package: The repository includes a comprehensive
"replication_package.zip" file containing:
- Raw and processed data.
- oTree application used for the experiments.
- Analysis scripts to reproduce all statistical results and figures.
- The experiment instructions both in German (original) and Englis
Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion: Experimental evidence
No full textThis paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.</p
The effects of cartel damage compensations
No full textDamage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence,
compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead
have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion
to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims
of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market
increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to
compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more
careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law
Aufsätze in Wettbewerbsökonomik
No full textThis thesis consists of three essays in the field of competition economics. Chapter 1 contains an essay on resale price maintenance, co-authored by Johannes Muthers, doctoral student at the University of Würzburg. Chapter 2 contains an essay on strategic backward integration, co-authored by Lars-Hendrik Röller and Konrad Stahl. Chapter 3 contains an essay on the design of damage compensations in case of competition law infringements such as price cartels.
Each of the three essays is built around a game-theoretical model that is used to analyze how the allocation of rights to profits and control over strategies within a vertical
chain influences the market outcome
Backward ownership, uniform pricing and entry deterrence
No full textEntry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier which is commited to charge uniform prices to all downstream firms. The ownership shares imply a rebate on the input price for the incumbents through the profit participation. Such backward ownership induces the supplier to accommodate entry by charging a low uniform price to all downstream firms in case of entry. However, just the entry-accommodating behavior reduces entry profits and thereby can lead to market foreclosure. Based on this theory, the article reviews a merger case in the financial services industry and draws conclusions for regulation and competition policy
Manufacturer Cartels and Resale Price Maintenance
No full textWe provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer's contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by leaving a sufficient margin to the retailers. This restricts the wholesale price level even when manufacturers collude. In this context, resale price maintenance may only be profitable for the manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and illustrate the fit of this theory in various competition policy cases
Bewahrte Kultur
No full textThis is a valuable reprint of one of the many books celebrating Aesop having fun. The frontispiece identifies Hunold as Menantes. The illustrations are only adequate. According to Bodemann, they are based upon Solis and Salomon. It is great to have them in the collection, even in a reproduction. Those leanings upon earlier great fable illustration conceptions are clear in the second fable: Fox and Goat. The illustration is excellent but also derivative. The French and German are presented in two columns on each page. There is a typical problem with the lion's face on 19 and again on 23. For each fable there is about a one-third page illustration above the two columns with their respective titles for the fables. Further French fables are inserted in open space or open pages after the two-column fables. The last of the fables -- XCV -- has an excellent illustration of the fox and wolf. It is followed, as Bodemann notes, by seven French fables without German translation or illustration. 276 pages. About 5 x 7.This is a hardbound book (hard cover)Language note: Bilingual: French/GermanChristian Friedrich Hunold, Nach der letzten Frantzösischen Ausfertigung Seiner Fabeln Ins Teutsche übersetzt Von Menante
Supply Contracts under Partial Forward Ownership
No full textWith forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that instead downstream prices generally increase if firms use two-part tariffs. The price-increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two-part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm
Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints
No full textWe characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We show that consumers may benefit from price discrimination whereas the the firms make the same profits as with uniform pricing. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis
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