1,721,120 research outputs found
Imagining the Past - Remembering the Future
Get PDFAt its most general level the author\u27s critique is captured in the title of this Comment. In his view, Edley and Sunstein imagine the past of administrative law that represents but a partial understanding of where we have been and where we have come. They then propose a future that is, he fears, made up primarily of the recollection and extension of reforms that have already been attempted. Thus, their arguments have modest capacities, if applied generally, to do more good than harm
A Sketch of the Consequences for Louisiana Law of the Adoption of “Article 2: Sales” of the Uniform Commercial Code
No full textThe Uniform Commercial Code is presently under study by the Louisiana Law Institute. This article is a partial synopsis of a more detailed report that the author prepared for the Institute. It has the limited purpose of introducing the Louisiana Bar to a few of the concepts and innovations of the UCC in comparison with the existing principles of the Louisiana law of sales. However, the reader is requested to excuse, in an avowedly "sketchy" treatment, an occasional lapse into hypertechnical discussion. One of the inevitable difficulties in comparing sets of legal principles is to decide with any degree of certainty what either or both might mean standing alone
Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice
Get PDFIn reflecting on criticisms of Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act the author has developed some hypotheses that have interesting implications not just for the disability program but for the evaluation of administrative adjudication generally. First, the author thinks these criticisms reflect distinct conceptual models of administrative justice. Second, each of the models is coherent and attractive. But, third, the models, though not mutually exclusive, are highly competitive. Each model\u27s internal logic tends to drive the characteristics of the others from the field in concrete situations
The Fear of Discretion in Government Procurement
No full textBuying things necessary to the pursuit of other government tasks is a pretty boring subject. It is not surprising, therefore, that the press reports largely on the discovery of $450.00 hammers in government tool chests and on the nefarious activities of the Wed-Techs of the world and their public sector allies. Media coverage thus encourages Americans to ignore government procurement or to think of it as both inefficient and corrupt
Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861
No full textJacksonian America was a country in rapid transition. Intensified sectional divisions, exponential increases in urbanization and immigration, the rise of factory production, and repeated cycles of economic boom and bust helped to fuel an anxious desire for political reform. For Jacksonian Democrats the answer to this popular yearning was the reconstruction of American democracy—including a broadened electorate, offices open to all, and the elimination of monopoly and other special privileges. Government at the national level was to be kept small and returned to the people. But as is often the case, the institutionalization of democracy demanded a corresponding increase in governmental capacities. Destroying the power of the “Monster Bank” gave new powers and capacities to the Treasury for the management of monetary policy and fiscal transfers. Offices open to all through the new system of “rotation in office” created the need for bureaucratic systems of control that replaced status-based restraints and personal loyalties. And the side effects of technological development, in particular the human carnage that accompanied the rapid expansion of steamboat travel, generated public demand for protection that prompted the creation of a recognizably modern system of health and safety regulation. “The Democracy” established by the Jacksonians both furthered the building of an American administrative state and solidified an emerging nineteenth-century model of American administration law. In that model administrative accountability was preeminently a matter of political oversight and direction and internal hierarchical control. Judicial control of administration featured a cramped vision of mandamus review combined with almost unlimited personal liability of officials for erroneous action. Although administrative law structured in this fashion seems peculiar, indeed almost invisible, to the twenty-first-century legal imagination, it fit comfortably within Jacksonian democratic ideology
Center and Periphery in Antebellum Federal Administration: The Multiple Faces of Popular Control
Get PDFSteven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo make a basic claim in their new book: all Presidents are essentially Unitarians.1 In one way or another, they all seek to have exclusive control over the executive power and to direct the activities of those in the executive branch. The evidence for this claim is a broad survey of governmental practice from the earliest days of the Republic to the twenty-first century. At this level, the Calabresi-Yoo claim is not terribly controversial. A somewhat stronger claim, however, occasionally creeps into their discussion. That stronger claim might be stated as an argument for the normative force of practice. Because Presidents have consistently acted as if they were the exclusive seat of executive power, that practice should govern our constitutional understandings of the allocation of power within the federal government
Against First Principles
Get PDFLarry Alexander\u27s invitation to participate in this Symposium suggested that our articles should focus on the broader questions of individual liberty, equality and responsibility raised by [Richard] Epstein\u27s book [Forbidden Grounds). Having accepted the invitation I do not want to deviate from Larry\u27s instructions. Nevertheless, my discussion of these broader principles proceeds in a somewhat backhanded fashion. My basic argument is that the broad principles that underlie most such discussions can get us only so far in our analysis of appropriate public policy. Indeed, I want to argue that they often get in the way of sensible policy analysis and that we should be prepared to throw them overboard rather quickly when encountering heavy philosophical or political weather. This claim might seem quite odd in the antidiscrimination context - an arena often inhabited by claims of fundamental rights to equality or basic fairness. Nevertheless, I think Richard Epstein\u27s book is a good example of the difficulty of developing plausible policy prescriptions while engaging in an argument from first principles
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting
No full textWhen governmental-or, for the purposes of this Article, administrative-action deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, the Constitution requires that the affected individual be accorded due process of law. 1 However, the constitutional right thus defined is so open-textured that it seems to be a question in the form of an answer: What process is due process
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