99 research outputs found
HAPLA, Martin: Dělba moci a nezávislost justice
No full textRecenze publikace - HAPLA, Martin: Dělba moci a nezávislost justiceBrno: Masarykova univerzita, Právnická fakulta, 2017, 95 s. ISBN 978-80-210-8478-0
MRVA, Michal a Martin TURČAN: Interpretácia a argumentácia v práve
No full textRecenze publikace - MRVA, Michal a Martin TURČAN: Interpretácia a argumentácia v práveBratislava: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 195 s. ISBN 978-80-8168-390-9
Theory of Needs as Justification of Human Rights: Current Approaches and Problems of Uncertainty and Normativeness
No full textThis paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts
Is Separation of Powers a Useless Concept? Part II: Tripartite System Criticism and Application Problems
No full textIn this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a useless concept. It summarizes some critical arguments against the tripartite separation of powers. The paper deals with application issues related to the separation of powers and distinguishes several attitudes toward them, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to formalism and functionalism. eventually, the author wonders whether it would be better to innovate the idea of separation of powers, or to dismiss and replace it with some other principle. He concludes that the separation of powers has problems, but we need to evaluate this idea in relation to its possible alternatives. In such a light it still sounds promising
(Im)moral Lawyers: Problem of Justifying Norms of Professional Ethics
No full textNormy profesní etiky často stanoví advokátům při výkonu jejich profese odlišné standardy chování, než jaké by v totožné situaci platily pro obyčejného člověka. Článek se zabývá otázkou, jak můžeme tyto rozdíly ospravedlnit prostřednictvím různých etických teorií. Autor v něm nejprve charakterizuje profesní etiku advokátů jako soubor právních a morálních norem. Následně analyzuje samotný problém její justifikace. Pozornost je věnována nejprve různým deontologickým přístupům (např. Charles Fried, David Luban). Autor rozebírá jejich nedostatky a dospívá k závěru, že musí primárně zdůrazňovat význam morálního a racionálního aktérství, pokud mají být věrohodné. Vstřícně se pak staví k utilitaristickému ospravedlnění. Také to je podle něj v kombinaci s některými pragmatickými hledisky schopno profesní etiku advokátů věrohodně justifikovat. Obě skupiny přístupů lze tedy považovat za relevantní a není proto vhodné z debat o výše uvedené etice některý z nich vylučovat.The norms of professional ethics often impose different standards of conduct on lawyers in the practicing of their profession than they would apply to an ordinary person in the same situation. The article analyzes how we can justify these differences through various ethical theories. The author describes the legal ethics as a set of legal and moral norms. He then analyzes the problem of its justification. Attention is first dedicated to various deontological approaches (eg Charles Fried, David Luban). The author analyzes their disadvantages and concludes that they must primarily emphasize the importance of moral and rational agency if they are to be credible. He evaluates utilitarian justification as appropriate. It is also this justification, combined with some pragmatic aspects, that is able to credibly justify the legal ethics. Both groups of approaches can be considered relevant and therefore it is not appropriate to exclude any of them from the professional ethics debate
Is the Separation of Powers a Useless Concept? The Components and Purpose of the Separation of Powers
No full textIn this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a use-less concept. It points out to insufficient reflection of its theoretical and philosophical origins. The paper also distinguishes its components, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to the tension between the system of checks and bal-ances and the institutional independence. It also examines the purpose of the separation of powers, warning that we can no longer seek it exclusively in the prevention of tyranny but rather in the optimization of government. At the end of the paper is emphasized the need to examine the question of how to solve tension between these components
Richard Rorty and Human Rights
No full textLidská práva již tradičně představují jedno ze stěžejních témat právní filosofie. Již od svého zrodu vzbuzovala pozornost mnohých myslitelů a stávala se tak předmětem jejich úvah, zároveň však byla těmito reflexemi utvářena a formována. Je proto nepochybně na místě zeptat se, jaký postoj zaujímá právní filosofie k lidským právům dnes. Je-li však otázka položena právě takto, jen stěží lze na ni dát odpověď. Přístupů k těmto právům totiž v současné době existuje celá řada a spíše než o nějakém jednotném postoji je přesnější hovořit o široké škále různých náhledů.The author in his text examines a contribution of the American philosopher Richard Rorty to the theory of human rights. Author's attention is mostly dedicated to the analysis of three important parts of Rorty's efforts – refusal of the idea of human rights founding and its substitution for the development of human rights culture, formulation of the concept of sentimental education and finally, elimination of questions influenced by metaphysics from our contemporary discussion about human rights. The author endeavours to conceptualize these problems in a wider context of Rorty's philosophy and therefore he deals with some general aspects of Rorty's thinking. The author examines for example Rorty's emphasis on the concept of effectiveness, his perspectionism or his opinions on a human nature. The author also asks the question if Rorty's attitude is still philosophical. In his contribution the author dedicates attention to one of the critical commentaries on Rorty's opinions, namely Patrick Hayden's objections to the concept of sentimental education. The author's conclusion is that Rorty's attitude bears a lot of useful and valuable impulses to us but only under the condition that this attitude is recognized as peripheral. On the other hand, the author means that it is necessary to be aware of this attitude in case it should be recognized as predominant, because Rorty excessively underestimates the role of rationality in our discourse
The Concept of Legitimacy and the Crisis of Human Rights
No full textV jistém smyslu můžeme říci, že se tématem legitimity práva zabývají filosofové, právníci, politologové i státovědci již od nepaměti. Klademe-li si otázku po legitimitě práva, zpravidla se ptáme po jeho oprávněnosti – hledáme jeho ospravedlnění. Je přirozené, že toto tázání nezůstává izolované, nýbrž již v zápětí vyvolává další a další otázky. Jaké konsekvence plynou – nebo by měly plynout – z toho, pokud je právo shledáno nelegitimním? Nakolik vůbec musí (nebo nemusí) být právo legitimní, aby mohlo být nazýváno právem? Jaký je vztah mezi legitimitou, legalitou a spravedlností? Jsou to zcela odlišné pojmy anebo se alespoň částečně překrývají? To je jen několik příkladů z mnoha. Již na nich však můžeme sledovat, jak úzce souvisí problematika legitimity práva s jeho podstatou. Není tedy divu, že se jedná o téma stále živé a v obecné rovině reflektované i v prostředí české právní vědy. Jedná se ovšem také o téma velmi rozsáhlé, a proto bych se rád v následujícím textu zamyslel nad otázkou legitimity zejména ve vztahu k jedné relativně užší oblasti, kterou jsou lidská práva.In this article the author focuses on the concept of legitimacy and its specifics in a relation to human rights. His aim is trying to answer questions as “How are human rights in contemporary world legitimized?” “In what kind is their legitimacy specific in comparison with legitimacy of law or politic power in general?” “Does delegitimization deal with these rights?” In the first part of the text author analyses the concept of legitimacy. At first, he presents several possible definitions of legitimacy and analyses its different types. He also examines descriptive and normative attitudes to legitimacy. Instead of their definitions he also compares it with foreign conception of subjective and objective theories of legitimacy and contemplates about their advantages. Special attention is dedicated to the concept of metanarrative, which is known from theories of Jean- François Lyotard, and to the concept of infiction, which was constructed by Jiří Přibáň. The first part of the text is finished by the analysis of delegitimization. This analysis is considering differences which emerged from descriptive or normative attitudes to legitimacy. In the second part of the text the author tries to research questions of legitimacy of human rights with help of some facts and attitudes which he analyses in the first part. The author is also concentrated on the concept of legitimazation by power and effectiveness and some others approaches which try to resolve the lack of legitimacy in the area of human rights by putting emphasis on practical consensus. At the end of the work the author presents general evaluation of researching issues
Explicative-Existencial Justificacion of Human Rights Analysis of Robert Alexy\u27s Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem
No full textThis paper analyzes Robert Alexy\u27s explicative-existential justification of human rights. According to the author, there are two problems connected with this concept. It cannot establish human rights universally and explain why we should accept them. In the paper, these questions are addressed in the context of the Is-Ought problem. Alexy\u27s approach is compared with other theories that strive for human rights justification (basic needs approach, capability approach, and the foundationalism of Alan Gewirth). The author finds that in this respect all other theories have similar disadvantages. The inability to adequately elucidate the transition from Is to Ought is a general problem in moral philosophy, and therefore cannot diminish the position of Alexy\u27s justification in this context. Although his approach does not really meet certain absolute requirements for good justification, if we evaluate it in relation to other available alternatives, we have to acknowledge its significant place in the philosophy of human rights. Even with Alexy\u27s theory, however, the problem persists that it establishes rights of human persons rather than rights of human beings. It is therefore not able to fulfill some of its universalist aspirations
The Origine of the Imperative Mandate in the First Czechoslovak Republic
No full textAutor v příspěvku sleduje vývoj vázaného mandátu v době první republiky a snaží se postihnout příčiny, které jej umožnily. V tomto kontextu se zabývá především vlivem předcházejících rakouských právních úprav, činností Revolučního Národního shromáždění a Volebního soudu. Analyzuje i podíl, který měly na vývoji tohoto institutu zásada poměrného zastoupení a vázané kandidátní listiny. Na základě svých úvah a rozborů dospívá k názoru, že vázaný mandát nebyl pevnou, promyšlenou a žádoucí součástí ústavních základů první republiky a že okolnosti, které jej umožnily a případně do jisté míry omlouvaly, jsou výrazně odlišné od těch dnešních. Z těchto důvodů odmítá i argumentaci některých současných politiků, kteří svá tvrzení o demokratičnosti vázaného mandátu podpírají právě odkazem na první republiku.In the article author focuses on the progress of the imperative mandate in the First Czechoslovak Republic and tries to involve reasons that made it possible. In this context he mostly investigates influence of the previous Austrian legal regulations, activity of the Revolutionary National Assembly and the Election Court. He also analyses effect that principles of proportional representation and list of electors have on this institute. Author holds an opinion that it was not only statutes which established the imperative mandate but very important was also the way by which these statutes were practised. First of all, the roles of Election Court was indispensable, but postures of many politicians, lawyers and journalists to this thing had an immense influence too. The great deal of public was supporting this positive opinion as well. One of the most significant points were unfortunate matters arising from the facts that a construction of the First Czechoslovak Republic's Constitution stood closer to respectable ideals than to real life and that neighbouring countries, which were not democratic states, considerably enhanced dependence of members of parliaments on political parties. On the base of his reflections author persuades that imperative mandate was not solid, well-considered and desirable part of constitutional bases of the First Czechoslovak Republic and then situation which made it possible was very distinct from nowadays. For these reasons author also refuses argumentation of some present-day politicians who base their arguments about democratic character of imperative mandate on references to the First Czechoslovak Republic
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