322,898 research outputs found
Fair immunization and network topology of complex financial ecosystems
No full textThe aftermath of the recent financial crisis has shown how expensive and unfair the stabilization of financial ecosystems can be. The main cause is the level of complexity of financial interactions that poses a problem for regulators. We provide an analytical framework that decomposes complex ecosystems in both their overall level of instability and the contribution of institutions to instability. These ingredients are then used to study the pathways of the ecosystems towards stability by means of immunization schemes. The latter can be designed to penalize institutions proportionally to their contribution to instability, and therefore enhance fairness. We show that fair immunization schemes can also be cost-efficient when employed on ecosystems characterized by a tiered network structure of interactions concentrated among few core nodes that at the same time form many closed cycles that exacerbate instability. For less tiered network topologies we observe a trade-off between fairness and dollar-cost of immunization, allowing regulators to choose the combination that best meets their objectives. The implementation of immunization schemes on real cross-border financial networks of the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) reporting country banking systems is also provided
Multi-agent financial network (MAFN) model of US collateralized debt obligations (CDO): Regulatory capital arbitrage, negative CDS carry trade, and systemic risk analysis
No full textA database driven multi-agent model has been developed with automated access to US bank level FDIC Call Reports that yield data on balance sheet and off balance sheet activity, respectively, in Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Credit Default Swaps (CDS). The simultaneous accumulation of RMBS assets on US banks' balance sheets and also large counterparty exposures from CDS positions characterized the $2 trillion Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) market. The latter imploded at the end of 2007 with large scale systemic risk consequences. Based on US FDIC bank data, that could have been available to the regulator at the time, the authors investigate how a CDS negative carry trade combined with incentives provided by Basel II and its precursor in the US, the Joint Agencies Rule 66 Federal Regulation No. 56914, which became effective on January 1, 2002, on synthetic securitization and Credit Risk Transfer (CRT), led to the unsustainable trends and systemic risk. The resultant market structure with heavy concentration in CDS activity involving 5 US banks can be shown to present too interconnected to fail systemic risk outcomes. The simulation package can generate the financial network of obligations of the US banks in the CDS market. The authors aim to show how such a Multi-Agent Financial Network (MAFN) model is well suited to monitor bank activity and to stress test policy for perverse incentives on an ongoing basis
The Impact of Quantitative Easing on UK Bank Lending: Why Banks Do Not Lend to Businesses?
No full textThe growing proportion of UK bank lending to the financial sector reached a peak in 2007 just before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This marks a trend in the dwindling amount of bank lending to private sector non-financial corporations (PNFCs), which was exacerbated with the Great Recession. Many central banks aimed to revive bank lending with quantitative easing (QE) and unconventional monetary policy. We propose an agent based computational economics (ACE) model which combines the main factors in the economic environment of QE and Basel regulatory framework to analyse why UK banks do not prioritize lending to non-financial businesses. The lower bond yields caused by QE encourage big firms to substitute away from bank borrowing to bond issuance. In addition, the risk weight regime of Basel I/II on capital induces banks to favour mortgages over business loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The combination of lower bond yields and Basel II/III capital requirements on banks, which, respectively, impact demand and supply of credit in the UK, plays a role in the drop of bank loans to businesses. The ACE model aims to reinstate policy regimes that form constraints and incentives for the behaviour of market participants to provide the causal factors in observed macro-economic phenomena
'Too interconnected to fail' financial network of US CDS market: Topological fragility and systemic risk
No full textA small segment of credit default swaps (CDS) on residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) stand implicated in the 2007 financial crisis. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks' assets has led to the idea of too interconnected to fail (TITF) resulting, as in the case of AIG, of a tax payer bailout. We provide an empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Call Reports for off balance sheet bank data for the 4th quarter in 2007 and 2008. The propagation of financial contagion in networks with dense clustering which reflects high concentration or localization of exposures between few participants will be identified as one that is TITF. Those that dominate in terms of network centrality and connectivity are called 'super-spreaders'. Management of systemic risk from bank failure in uncorrelated random networks is different to those with clustering. As systemic risk of highly connected financial firms in the CDS (or any other) financial markets is not priced into their holding of capital and collateral, we design a super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality of the banks which can mitigate potential socialized losses. © 2012 Elsevier B.V
Quantitative morphotectonic analysis using DEM and GIS - A case study from South West Coast of India
No full textJayappa K.S., Markose V.J., Nagaraju M
The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence: The effect of misperceived signalling in a network formation process
No full textSocial and economic networks are becoming increasingly popular in the last ten years, because of both the application of game theory to the network formation processes4, and the study of stochastic processes that fit the statistical properties of real world social networks.5 In the very recent years there have also been attempts to combine the contribution of these two streams of research, trying to find strategic models whose equilibria resemble the empirical data.6 A well known source of debate in the game theoretical approach is the incompatibility between stability and efficiency: in most of the models Nash equilibria are actually not the network architectures that maximize the overall sum of utilities, as surveyed in Jackson (2003). On the other hand the econophysics approach is not interested in the utility of single nodes but has other measures of efficiency, which are essentially the probabilities of the ..
Early warning of systemic risk in global banking: eigen-pair R number for financial contagion and market price-based methods
No full textWe analyse systemic risk in the core global banking system using a new network-based spectral eigen-pair method, which treats network failure as a dynamical system stability problem. This is compared with market price-based Systemic Risk Indexes, viz. Marginal Expected Shortfall, Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk, and Conditional Capital Shortfall Measure of Systemic Risk in a cross-border setting. Unlike paradoxical market price based risk measures, which underestimate risk during periods of asset price booms, the eigen-pair method based on bilateral balance sheet data gives early-warning of instability in terms of the tipping point that is analogous to the R number in epidemic models. For this regulatory capital thresholds are used. Furthermore, network centrality measures identify systemically important and vulnerable banking systems. Market price-based SRIs are contemporaneous with the crisis and they are found to covary with risk measures like VaR and betas
Correction to: Early warning of systemic risk in global banking: eigen-pair R number for financial contagion and market price-based methods (Annals of Operations Research, (2021), 10.1007/s10479-021-04120-1)
No full textThis erratum is published as typesetter overlooked several corrections and proofing errors introduced. Original article has been updated
Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks
No full textWe study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1), which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation, reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2. © 2007
Non-performing loans at the dawn of IFRS 9: Regulatory and Accounting Treatment of Asset Quality
No full textAsset quality is a key indicator of sound banking. However, it is difficult for banking regulators and investors to assess it in the absence of a common, cross-border scheme to classify assets. Currently no standard is applied universally to categorise loans, the most sizeable asset on banks’ balance sheets. As a corollary, definitions of nonperforming loans (NPLs), despite recent steps towards greater harmonisation, continue to vary between jurisdictions. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of NPLs and considers variations in the treatment of NPLs across countries, accounting regimes, and firms. The paper relies on a multi-disciplinary perspective and addresses legal, accounting, economic and strategic aspects of loan loss provisioning (LLP) and NPLs. A harmonised approach to NPL recognition is particularly desirable, in view of the fact that IFRS 9, the new accounting standard on loan loss provisioning, will be mandatory from January 2018. IFRS 9 changes the relationship between NPLs and provisions, by relying on greater judgement to determine provisions. The potential for divergence makes the need for comparable indicators against which to assess asset quality all the greater
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